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ABSTRACT 
In response to the emergence of sustainable development as the dominant environmental 
and economic paradigm, a number of mechanisms have been developed to assist in the 
implementation of these principles. Examples of these bbsupery' instruments abound - 
market measures, eco-covenants, joint implementation and vo luntary compliance. 
Appreciably less enthusiasm has been dedicated to capacity building for other more 
traditional tools prescribed by international laws. Counted among the disregarded tools is 
the widely maligned and misunderstood role of enforcement. 
This thesis argues that the potential for effecting innovative reforms may be significantly 
threatened by an underlying misunderstanding and failed appreciation of the critical role 
that enforcement can and must play in achieving sustainable development. Al1 too often 
arguments for alternative tools are premised on such unfounded and unsuppcrted 
arguments as  "since enforcement doesn't work", "enforcement is too costly" or 
"enforcement is too rigid". In the vast majonty of cases these arguments mask an 
underlying lack of cornmitment to achial implementation of established standards or 
processes. In others it reflects a basic ignorance of the enforcement process itself and the 
wide array of alternative measures available to achieve compliance as wcll as an overdl 
lack of understanding of the role enforcement plays in the implementation of alternative 
strategies for protecting the environment. 
Without a better understanding of the potential contribution of enforcernent and the 
minimum M e w o r k  necessary to ensure compliance, it will be difficult to Mly 
comprehend the underlying barriers to implementing sustainable development. A lack of 
political will coupled with an under-cornmitment of resources, will inevitably result in 
failed capacity to achieve any measurable results. 
This thesis presents a comprehensive examination of the role of effective enforcement in 
achieving specific compliance and a more general adherence to the idea of the " d e  of 
vii 
law". It provides a detailed strategy for the effective enforcement of domestic 
environmental laws. Based on the author's and others' expenences in lesser developed 
economies, the thesis then considers particular constraints which may be faced by lesser 
developed nations in thek efforts to irnplernent an effective enforcement reçime and to 
ultimately achieve sustainable development. 
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A concerted effort has been witnessed at the international level to translate such widely 
eschewed p ~ c i p l e s  as sustainable development, intergenerational equity, the 
precautionary principle, "polluter pays" and participatoq democracy fkom international 
obligations into domestic law and practice. These principles are now wel1 articulated in 
the Rio ~ecluration' and Agenda 212, intemational documents understood to reflect a 
cornmitment (at least by their signatories) to a global agenda for change. In still other 
instances, this bundle of principles has been M e r  translated into regional and 
presumably by virtue of their signators, domestic c o d t m e n t s  to reform, for example 
the North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC).' 
The substance of these principles continues to be the focus in a plethora of fora among 
Environmental Non-govemmental Organization (ENGOS), governments, industry and 
other "experts" in the ongoing dissection of treaty obligations, and in mer instances, their 
domestic implementation. Similar fervour cm be evidenced in the debate over perhaps 
' Rio Declaration on Environrnent and Development, 13 June 1992,3 1 I.L.M. 874. 
United Nations Conference on Environrnent and Developrnent, Agenda 2 1 ,  U.N. Doc. 
NConf. 15 1/26/Rev. 1 (1993). 
Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Cari.-Ma., 32 I.L.M. 1480 (entered into force on January 1 ,  1994). 
more substantively related subjects as exploitation of dwindling resources, desertification, 
global warmhg and the search for clean technologies. The concerted lobby for these 
reforms has triggered exploration of more efficient, less intrusive instruments in response 
to pressure for significant environmental hprovements. Examples of these "niper" 
instruments abound - market measures, eco-covenants, joint implementation and 
voluutary cornpliance. Appreciably less enthusiasm appears to have been dedicated to 
capacity building for other more traditional tools prescribed by international laws. 
Counted among the disregarded tools is the widely maligned and misunderstood role of 
enforcement .4 
4 By way of example the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES) have yet to agree to establish a subcomrnittee on enforcement. More 
encouraging progress in support for enforcement include the dialogues amongst domestic 
environmental enforcernent agencies, the proceedings of which are documented in the 
Proceedings of the International Enforcement Workshop, Volume I and II, May 8- 10, 
1990, Utrecht, ï he  Netberlands, United States Environmental Protection Agency and 
Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment (VROM), The Netherlands; 
Proceedings of the International Conference on Environmenta& Enforcement, Vol urne 1 and 
II, September 22-25, 1992, Budapest Hungary, United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, Commission of the European Communities, Ministry of Housing, Physical 
Planning and the Environment (VROM) The Netherlands; Proceedings of the Third 
International Conference on Environmentai Enjlorcernent, Volume 1 and II, A pril25-28, 
1994, Oaxaca Mexico, United States Environmental Protection Agency, World Wildlife 
Fund, United Nations Environmental Program, Secretaria de Desarrollo Social (Sedosol) 
Mexico, Ministry of Housing, Spatiai Pianning and the Environment (VROM) The 
Netherlands; Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference on Environmental 
Compiiunce und Enforcement, Volumes 1 and 2, April22-26, 1996, Chaing Mai, Thailand, 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, United Nations Environmental Program, 
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM) The Netherlands, 
Environmenta1 Law Institute, European Commission, Environment Canada, Pollution 
Control Department of Thailand; the creation in 1996 of the International Network of 
Environmental Enforcement Agencies (INECE); and, the North American Working Group 
on Environmental Enforcement and Cornpliance Cooperation established by the Council of 
Ministers for the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (Resolution 
$96-06). 
It is rny thesis that the potential for effecting innovative refoms may be significantly 
threatened by an underlying misunderstanding and failed appreciation of the critical role 
that enforcernent can and must play in achieving sustainable deve~o~ment.~ Ail too ofien 
arguments for alternative tools are premised on such unfounded and unsupported 
arguments as "since enforcement doesn't work", "enforcement is too costly" or 
"enforcement is too rigidY6 In the vast majority of cases these arguments mask an 
underlying lack of cornmitment to actual implementation of establis hed standards or 
processes. In others it reflects a basic ignorance of the enforcement process itself and the 
wide array of alternative measures available to achieve cornpliance as well as an overall 
lack of understanding of the role enforcement plays in the implementation of alternative 
strategies for protecting the environment. 
Without a better understanding of the potential contribution of enforcement and the 
minimum framework necessary to ensure cornpliance, it will be dificult to fully 
comprehend the underlying barriers to irnplementing sustainable development. A lack of 
5 A prime example is the recent reaiization by the Parties to the Montreal Protocol of the 
need to consider enforcement measures who during the COP-8 in November 1996, being 
confionted with the spectrurn of losing gains made in further restricting the use of ozone- 
depleting substances (ODS) through illegaI trade in chlorofluorcarbons, issued a decision 
urging industrialized nations to instali verification prograrns to curb illegal trade in ODS. 
As summed up by Under Secretary for the Montreal Protocol Secretariat Elizabeth 
Dowdeswell, International Environme~ztal Reporter, 0 1 49-873 8/96 at p. 1 087 "illegal trade 
in ODS and lack of enforcement would Iead to an increase in their consumption and the 
nullification of the entire global endeavour to phase out the ODS quantities in recent 
y ears". 
6 There have been few empirical studies on environmental enforcement, inclusive of the 
effects of newly touted voluntary approaches. 
political will coupled with an under-commitrnent of resources, will inevitably resdt in 
failed capacity to achieve any measurable results. 
It may be trite to acknowledge that those most concemed with enforcement are the 
enforcers and those directiy affected by the acts of enforcement (violators) and non 
enforcernent (adjacent comrnunities and cornpetitors). It is not surprising that few people 
share the field inspectors' enthusiasm for exchanging pointers on effluent samp h g ,  
assessing exigent circumstances or the technical drafting of a control order. Such is the 
case with the technical aspects of almost every field. 
Minimal attention has been given to official or scholarly empirical work to analyze 
environmental enforcement.' But perhaps most troubling is the lack of attention to and 
awareness of broader enforcement issues such as environmentai justice in enforcement 
policies, the direct fuiancial costs of non enforcement', inclusive of crown ( govenunent ) 
liability for non enforcement. It is similarly noteworthy that while industry has expressed 
broad support for more non-coercive means of enswing compliance, few companies 
actually seize oppomuiities for implernenting "voluntary compliance" strategies even 
7 Supported by D. Saxe in Environmental e en ses, Corpurate ResponsibiIities and 
Executive Liability (Ontario: Canada Law Book Inc., 1990) at p. 45-55 in which she reports 
the results of her empirical study conducted to identiQ the factors triggering corporations 
directors to cornpIy with environmental laws- 
8 For example, the direct emergency-response, evacuation and clean up costs and potential 
related heaIth costs arising fiom the 1997 fire at the Ontario Plastirnet Inc. recycling 
facility. It has been suggested that the incident and assoçiated costs couId have been 
avoided by enforcement of existing laws. 
where govemments have expressed openness to alternatives to traditional enforcement 
Environrnental enforcement involves these and many more similarly complex issues. 
How do we judge whether a nation state is abiding by the " d e  of law" in the 
management and exploitation of its natural resources if no laws are enacted or any 
process instituted to verifi compliance? What are the implications of failing to effectively 
enforce environmental laws, p e r d s  or processes? What are the implications for the "rule 
of law" and public accountability with the adoption of private or "voluntary" compliance 
approaches ? What are the underlying reasons for the failure to achieve compliance with 
protection standards? The answers to these questions lie in fully understanding the factors 
that rnotivate compliance and the pragmatics of implementing an effective enforcement 
regime. As stated by a former Canadian Minister of the Environrnent in tabling his new 
federal law, "A good law, however, is not enough. It must be enforced - mthlessly if 
need be. I o  
9 A 1996 report documenting North Amencan experience with voluntary cornpliance found 
that while a wide array of "voluntary" mechanisms have been introduced to allow regulated 
parties to either opt out of enforceable standards or to renegotiate binding conditions 
surprisingly few companies have actuaHy taken advantage of  these alternate routes. 
Voluntary Cornphce: A Survey of North American Experience (Montreal: Commission 
for Environrnental Cooperation, 1997) [unpublished draft] . 
10 Tom McMillan, then federal Minister of the Environrnent, in his speech to the Canadian 
Parliament during the tabling of the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. Notes for a 
Statement, December 18, 1986, Ottawa, as cited in D. Chappell, From Sawdmt to Toxic 
Blobs: A Consideration of Sanctioning Strategies to Combat Pollution in Canada, Shrdies 
in Replation and Cornpliance (Ottawa: Justice Canada, 1989) at p. 24. 

role of regulation, cornplaints are made about the heavy-handed nature of the usual 
responses, such as prosecution. 
To be able to deliberate on a more effective regime for improving environmental 
performance with operating standards, it is therefore important to distinguish these two 
processes of standard setting and enforcement. A plethora of alternatives are evolving to 
replace or supplement regulation, and debate abounds on the merits of these purported 
miracle instruments. But useful analysis of these innovations requires that the two 
processes be differentiated. In other words, regardless of the ultimate mechanism chosen 
to control or direct environmental performance, a separate, equally necessary process 
must be undertaken. That process is a determination of how best to eEect compliance and 
the appropriate response to free-nders (îhose who do not comply with minimum 
standards particularly in the context of voluntary compliance). This is the dialogue on 
enforcement. 
In setting a context for this thesis about the inherent value of effective environmental 
enforcement it is important to begin with an understanding of enforcement terminology 
and presumptions. Definitions are put fonvard for essential concepts and terminology 
including environmental law, enforcement and compliance. As the thesis rnakes a case 
for the inextricable role of enforcement in achieving sustainable development, 1 begin 
with a definition of that concept. 
Sustainable development has been widely understood to mean " development that me t s  the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs"." Obviously consistent with this recognition of the inappropnateness of 
deflecting costs and impacts to later generations is the need for timely response to prevent 
unnecessary h m  €rom known sources or actions. That is the essence of enforcement. 
Sustainable development is also recognized to represent more than an end objective. The 
concept has evolved to embody certain basic process principles including the precautionary 
principle, polluter pays principle, participatory democracy (including access to information, 
due process and access to administrative processes and courts) and the principle of 
intergenerational equity.'' 
It sllnilarly follows that these principles should be incorporated into the environmental 
decision-making processes inclusive of policy making, project approval and assessment, 
I l  World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Cornmon Fume, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987) at p. 43. 
12 For a more detailed reiteration of these concepts see "Sustainable Development: The 
Challenge to International Law" (Report of a Consultation convened by Foundation for 
International Environmental Law and Development, (FIELD; Windsor, 1993). See also 
I U î N / U N E P W ,  Cming for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living (Gland, 
Switzerland, i991). In this report the authors present an agenda for implementation of 
sustainable development which includes the establishment of a comprehensive system of 
environmental law and its implementation and effective enforcement at p. 68-69. See also D. 
Vandemaag, CEPA and the Precmtionary Prmciple Approach (Reviewing CEPA: the 
Issues #18) (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 1994) and T. OYRiordan and J. Cameron, 
Interpreting the Precmtionary Principle (London: Cameron May, 1994). 
standard setting and enforcemend3 From this perspective, enforcement and cornpliance 
çtrategies may be seen as an integral part of the process of reforming institutions to achieve 
sustainable development The fkst step is understanding the fidl scope and context of  
enforcement and the role it plays in the broader equation. 
Environmental law is generally understood to constitute the wide array of legal 
instruments enacted by governrnents to regdate behavior or activities affecthg the 
environment. Legal mechanisms are chosen with the intent and effect of imposing the 
"Rule of Law" on decision making. These mechanisms commonly include statutes. 
regulations, licenses and permits, contracts, agreements and other related means. Less 
fiequently recognized mechanisms include legally binding procedures for project review 
and assessment, approvals and d e s  for the creation and management of emissions 
trading systems and negotiated sealements. Environmental law also includes legislation 
according rights of participation in decision-making processes, granting legal standing 
before courts and tribunals, and ensuring access to idormation and to due process. 
Substantive environmental law includes achial performance standards prescribed for 
pollution control, allocation and management of resources, protection of species and 
l 3  FTELD, ibid at p. 8-1 1 .  Reforms to the development review and regdatory processes 
reflects this cal1 for more rnultidiscliplinary and transparent processes, for exampIe 
requirements for socio-economic analysis of draft regulations, public hearings and dispute 
resolution in environmentai assessment, negotiated rule-making for standard setting and 
regulation drafiing. 
safeguarding human health. References to environmental law as one of the cornerstones 
of environmental protection are common in most international agreements relating to 
environment or sustainable development. l4 
For the purposes of this thesis the discussion of environmental enforcernent will focus on 
pollution control laws, although the arguments made regarding the inherent value of a 
basic hmework for effective enforcement apply equally to al1 environmental laws. The 
dtimate effectiveness of laws in effecting sustainable development is both a question of 
their design and the cornmitment of resources to ensure their observance. As will be 
posited, it is necessary in developing effective environmental laws to consider both the 
substantive environmental objectives and the sîrategies to ensure their implementation or 
enforcement. 
It is critical to start with a clear understanding of the tems "enforcernent " and 
"cornpliance" and their proper usage. Enforcement is d l  to kequently equated with one 
available response to non-comp liance, namel y the prosecution and incarceration of 
l4 It may be worth noting that al1 of these latter categories of environmental law are 
recognized under both Agenda 21 and the NAAEC among other international laws. The 
NAAEC provides that "...each Party shalI ensure that its laws and regulations provide for 
high levels of environmental protection and shalI strive to continue to improve those laws 
and regulations" and makes specific reference to the Parties ''tradition of environmental 
cooperation7' and "desire to support and build on international environmental agreements 
and existing policies and laws ...", supra. note 3, Preamble and article 3. 
offenders. However this is a fdse and extremely dated view of the breadth and variety of 
now commody available and exercised enforcement responses. It is this extrernely narrow 
characterization of enforcement, and its purported limitations, which is popularly referenced 
to support claims for the need for alternatives to traditional enforcement, derogatonly 
dubbed the "command and control" system. Consequently, a definition of enforcement is 
later provided more reflective of its full scope and purport. 
The term "cornpliance" has similarly been abused and misconstnied. Both regulaton and 
regulated industry alike share the blarne for the confusion. Many environmental agencies 
have adopted a practice of measuring and reporting environmental cornpliance using vague 
guidelines outside the constructs of the law.15 This practice has been fomented by wide- 
spread acceptance of the argument that most non-cornpliance is a rnere technicai blip and 
theregore more appropriately addressed through technical adjustments that the intmive acts 
of enforcement. Acquiescence by govenunent to this interpretation. and deferral or waiver 
of enforcement actions has contributed to the blurring of the tem! The effect is viewed 
'' For example, prbr to the adoption by Environment Canada of the Cmadian Environmenfol 
Proteclion Act (CEPA) Enforcement and Cornpliance Poficy: see also B. S r n a  Beyond 
Cornpliance: A New Indwtry View of the Environment (Washington; World Resources 
Institute, 1 992). 
16 See for example, E. Kupchanko, " A Case for Cornpliance through Administration of 
Licenses and Pemits", in Environmental Enforcement. Proceedings of the National 
Conference on the Enforcernent of Environmenfaf Law. ed. L. Duncan (Edmonton: 
Environmental Law Center, 1985). For example, pursuant to Part Five of the NAAEC, any 
party thereto may initiate consultations and ultimately formal arbitration and imposition of 
monetary penalties on trade sanctions against other parties and the agreement where there 
has been a persistent pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental law, supra, 
note 3; Clifford Lincoln. "The Lie of Cornpliance: Environmental Bill is Better", (Montreal 
Gazette, Feb. 19, 1996). 
by some as constructive deregdation by Whie of a persistent pattern of non-enforcement. 
Of late the definition of environmental compliance had been M e r  muddied by the 
introduction of private, non-regdatory systems for establishing and v e r i w g  "standards" of 
practice. " Of particular interest and import is the ISO 14000 environmental management 
systern which introduces a global systern of industry-negotiated, self-imposeci, non-binding 
guidelines for industry management under the shroud of regdatory terminology 
(%tandards", "certification", "c~rn~liance").'~ These private systems may import 
enforcement regimes where governrnents choose to retract fiom enforcement responses or 
strategies as a direct result of a policy shift towards reliance on these non-regdatory 
processes. 
Interestingly it is these actual and contemplated shih away fiom traditional regulation and 
enforcement which are fostering increased appreciation both for the need for a more 
consistent, stnictured approach to measuring and ensuring compliance with enwonmental 
17 For example, Responsible Care, ARET. See Commission for Environmental 
Cooperation, supra, note 7; Fourth Progress Reportfrom the Task Force on the Cunadian 
Automotive Mmufactwing Pollution Prevention Project MVUA Project, Env ironmen t 
Canada, Chrysler Canada, Ford, General Motors, Motors, Motor Vehicle Manufacturing 
Association and Government of Ontario (June 1996); B. Smart, supra, note 15. 
18 Benchmark Environmental Convention ISO Id001: An Uncornmon Perspective, Five 
Public Policy Questions for Proponents of the ISO 1400 Series (The European 
Environmental Bureau, Revised November 1995); Darlene Pearson, "ISO t 400: 
Opportunities and Programs", a background paper prepared for the August 22-23. 1996 
meeting of North Amencan Environment Enforcement Officiais, Mexico City, sponsored 
by the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (unpublished); Pierre Hauselmann, 
"ISO Inside Out: ISO and Environmental Management", A World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWf), International Discussion Paper, Lausanne, August 1996. 
standards and the need to institute a wider array of enforcement tools. The follawing 
definitions are rdective of the intensive discourse, in parîicuiar amongst environmental 
enforcement agencies, on altemative, more effective environmental enforcement regime~.'~ 
Among the most cornmon issues identifïed in these discussions is the need to clarifi the 
t e m  enforcement and compliance. The definitions drawn from this discourse are intended 
to provide a context for the thesis. 
Enforcement is any action or intervention2' taken to determine or respond to non- 
compliance. While enforcement is cornmonly equated with criminal prosechon, this is 
neither an accurate nor complete portraya1 of environmental law enforcement. For many 
jurisdictions, environmental enforcement now characteristically involves a wide array of 
administrative, criminal and mediative tools to effect compliance, and to mitigate or prevent 
environmental damage. 
For example, enforcement includes procedures to screen new or existing laws or pemiits to 
ensure compliance in the most cost efficient manner. Enforcement includes policies and 
19 See for exarnple, the Proceedings of the 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1996 Intemational 
Confrences on Environmentai Luw Enforcement, supra, note 4; Chapter 8 of Agenda 21, 
supra note 2. See also Technical Report No. 36, Industry Environmenlal Cornpliance 
Training Manual, United Nations Environment Programme, Industry and Environment 
(Paris: UNEP, 1996) at p. 0.6. 
20 This include actions or interventions by govemment or private parties. 
programs to encourage or recognize voluntary efforts towards compliance (e-g., audit 
privilege, seIf-reporting), govemment surveillance and pnvate enforcement action. Some 
have suggested enforcement also includes the means to establish liability or responsibility 
for harm." 
Enforcement is more than punishment after the fact. It includes the process of creating 
binding standards or imposing Iiability. It hcludes accountability for ensuring compliance, 
inclusive of the obligation to comply, and the duty to enforce. It includes the rights and 
responsibilities associated with exercising enforcement powers. 
Cornpliance is the achievement of a prescribed process or standard. For those governments 
operating within a system premised on the "Rule of Law", cornpliance is understood to 
mean observation of the law." Some enforcement and compliance policies have specifically 
endorsed this direct connection to adherence to law. For exarnple, the Canadiun 
Environmental Protection Act Enforcemeni and Compliance Policy States that 
21 C. Wasserman, Proceedings of the Third Intemational Conference on Environmental 
Enjimement, supra, note 4 at p. 1 6. 
Those who decry the inflexibility of law enforcers fail to comprehend that the tirne for 
negotiation is during the setting of standards through regulatory review processes or project 
assessments. Once the standards are agreed ta and imposed it is only logical within a system 
structured on the "Rule of Law" to expect that those standards will be observed, and where 
vioiations occur that those persons be made accountable. 
"[c]ompliance means a state of conforming with the law".* 
While such statements may appear axiomatic, stating the obvious rnay indeed be necessary 
to reverse any history of basing compliance ratings on imprecise guidehes or shifting 
technical objectives.'* II is now widely accepted that a more accurate and consistent 
measurement of compliance is adherence to a legdly imposed and consistent standard? 
Cornpliance objectives may be made binding through statute, regdation, license or p e h t  
compliance agreement (where provided for by law) or through administrative or court 
directives or orders. The various altematives are reviewed in greater detail Ui chapter 3. 
A determination of cornpliance is aiso not limited to the measurement of adherence to 
specified pollution standards. It is equally significant to regulations which implement 
alternative implementation strategies such as economic or market  instrument^.'^ For 
" Supra. note 15 at p. S. 
24 For example, ptior to introduction of the CEPA Enforcernent and Comptiance Poiicy 
Environment Canada published compliance reports using technicai guidelines for the purpose 
of measuring compliance. 
25 See L.F. Duncan, The Rule of Law and Sustainable Development" in Susfainable 
Development in Canada : Opfions for Law Refom (Ottawa: The Canadian Bar Association, 
1990) at p. 285; L.F. Duncan, "Trends in Enforcement: 1s Environment Canada Serious 
About Enforcing its Laws?", ed. D. Tingley, lnto the Future: Environmental Law ancl Poticy 
for the 1990s (Edmonton: Al berta Environmental Law Centre, 1 990); CEPA Enforcement 
and Compiiunce Policy, supra, note 15. Note that the development of an enforcernent and 
compliance policy is not sufficient if there is no cornmitment to implementing and observing. 
The USEPA adopts a similarly narrow or law-based definition of compliance. See USEPA 
Principtes of Enforcement (USEPA, Ofice of Enforcement, February 1992). 
26 L.F. Duncan, "Why You Can't Take the Regulation out of Pollution Control or the 
Necessary (albeit) Uncornfortable Interplay between Lawyers and Economists in the Quest 
for Sustainable Developrnent", Dalhousie Law School, December 1990 [unpublished]. See 
also discussion in Chapter I l l  on Market Measures. 
example, when ixnplementing a system of poilution control through trading effluent rights 
or opportunities, govemment must first estabiish minimum effluent standards and then 
estabiish a system for trading pemiits or marketing surplus, and maintain a monitoring 
system for both the poilution levels and an audit of the trading. There is a growing 
appreciation for the complexity of compliance assessments for market approaches? 
Cornpliance dso  relates to procedural d e s .  By way of example, compliance is achieved if 
a government agency responsibie for overseeing the conduct of an environmencal 
assessrnent of a proposed project ensures that the procedures dictated by law are observed, 
such as appointment of an unbiased and qualified panel, opportunities accorded to affected 
public to participate and recommended conditions are implemented." 
Accountability for compliance with prescribed codes of conduct is also recognised as a 
cnticai determinant for liability and compensation. Clear evidence of this can be fond  in 
27 uW~rkihop on Econornic Instmrnents" (Report), Third I'afionaf Conference on 
Environmentaf Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 193 
28 See for example the decisions of the Canadian Federal  COU^ and Suprerne Court and 
Indonesian courts and the Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
regarding failure of respective government agencies to ensure environmentai assessrnent laws 
were complied with in the process of approving major developments. Frienh of the Ofd Mm 
River W. Canada (Min. of Transport) [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3; The Indonesian Environmentai 
F o m  v. the State of the Republic of Indonesia (q.q.). The Central Investment 
Coordination Board and The Department of Interna1 Affairs, The Ministry of Industry, The 
Minister of Population and Environment, The Minister of Forestry and P.T. Inti Indorayon 
Utarna, Central Jakarta District Court, December 30, 1988, No. 820/PDT.G/1988 
PN.JKT.PST; Final Facrual Record of the Cnrise Ship Pier Project in Cornnael. Quintana 
Roo, prepared in accordance with Article 15, NAAEC, Secretariat of the Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation (Montreal: CEC, 1997) http://www.cec.org. 
judicial decisions on director liability for environmentai damages including deteminations 
on such factors as due diligen~e.'~ Sirnilarly, the courts have held that with the decision to 
impose standards cornes the duty to ensure compliance, that is to inspect and enforce.'O 
It is similady important to understand that the meanirement of an effective enforcement 
response or compliance strategy refiects more than the tdly of enforcement actions or 
compliance statistics (commonly referred to as "ban counting"). It also includes less 
tangible and more complex concepts such as environmental results and deterrence. As 
noted by one experienced United States Environmental Protection Agency enforcement 
official: 
The primary goal of environmental enforcement is to ensure compliance in order to 
protect the environment and public health. However, despite the central importance 
of compliance rates and the aggregate level of enforcement activity, they are not, by 
themselves, the only indicatoa of a heaithy enforcement program. Other measures 
may indicate whether or not the overall environmental benefits of laws and 
regdations are being achieved. While a lot has been analyzed and written about the 
US environmentai protection effort, we are still learning about the efficacy of our 
programs and our concept of environmental "success" continues to be bot.  dynarnic 
and evolving. As EPA's environmental enforcernent program has mahirrd, the 
concept of "success" itself has become more cornplex and multi-faceted. It 
encompasses not only the concept of high rates of compliance and aggregate 
numbers of enforcement actions, but aiso the important, albeit more difficult to 
measure, concept of environmental results and deterrence-JI 
'9 See for example R v. Bota IndiLFnies ( 1 992) 70 C.C.C (3d) 394 (Ont. Prov. CL). 
30 See for example Swanson Estate v. Cancrda (1990), 19 AC.  W.S. (3d) 8 10 (F.CT.D.); 
Kamloops (MunicipaIiv) v. Niefson [ 19841 2 S .C. R. 2; Tock Y. St. John 's Metropolitan Area 
Board [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1 18 1 ; it may be noted that nirther support for this connection is 
evidenced in the NAAEC which imposes the obligation on its Parties to effectively enforce 
their respective environmental laws (article S), supra, note 3. 
31 R. van Heuvelen "Successful Cornpliance and Enforcernent Approaches", Pmceedings of 
the Kbird hternationui Conference on Emironmental Enfarcement, supra note 4 at p. 1 63. 
Enfiorcement, then, is a means to achieve that end. Compiiance is the end objective or result. 
The process of putting in place the various components of the enforcement regime must be 
recognized as one of the steps to actualizing sustaioable development. Failme to understand 
the signifïcance of enforcement in the environment and development equation will, it is 
argueci, relegate sustainable development to a theoretical constmct. 
In Chapter II concrete arguments are presented for the indispensable role of enforcement to 
irnplementing the previously mentioned principles intrimic to Nstainable development. 
Chapter III then makes the case for establishing a consistent framework for effective 
enforcement, and provides a detailed analysis of the components of the fiamework drawn 
fiom the direct expenence of the writer and research conducted. Chapter IV surveys support 
expressed for the posited framework for effective environmental enforcement and provides 
elaboration of particular constraints which may be faced by Iesser developed nations in their 
effort to implement an enforcement regime. Chapter IV provides conclusions and some 
fial observations. 
II. WHY ENFORCEMENT IS NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 
While considerable energy continues to be directed to achieving sustainable development 
through the processes of developing indicators, assessing potential impacts and establishing 
standards to mitigate environmental impacts of development, far less attention has b e n  
given to the other side of the equation, that is, preventing or deterring impacts through 
effective enforcernerd2 
Yet while there appears to be growing recognition of the value of incorporating 
environmentai objectives into binding Iaw and more generally to the application of " d e  of 
law" to environmental protection, what is too ofien forgotten in the process of enacting the 
standards is the importance of addressing the means of achieving cornpliance. While much 
32 In his anaIysis of the barriers to sustainable developrnent Barry B. Boyer, "Building Legal 
and Institutional Frameworks for Sustainability", (1993) 63 BgaIo Env. Law JomaI 71 
appears to share this concem with the proclivity to stall at the front end of the process, 
"Experience provides some grounds for skepticism that these refonns, if enacted. would 
accomplish the desired results. Zero discharge of persistent toxic chemicals and universal 
achievement of fishable, swimmable waters have been gods of the U.S. CIean Water Act 
since 1972. Authority to ban or require pre-market testing of dangerous chemicals has been in 
place nearly as long, but only a handful of substances have been regulated under the American 
Toxic Substances Control Act. Thus, statutory regulation of harm fûl substances has developed 
far ahead of the political will for enforcement. In this field of pollution conbol, there is a need 
for a workable theory explaining the relatiowhip between the law on the books and the lads 
inaction. C.S. Diver "A Theory of Regdatory Enforcement", (1980) 28 Public Policy 257 
reiterates this concern that critics of regulation have tended to dwell on the policy making 
phase of regulation to the neglect of strategies for enhancing enforcement effectiveness. 
Another common example of the failure to move beyond the impact assessment or indicators 
process is the persistence of govemments in resourcing environmental assessment processes 
without simulates attention to institution of mechanisms to rnake the mitigating provisions 
binding in regulation or license. 
attention has been given to irnproving adherence to international ~aws;~ l e s  support has 
been given to the importance of domestic enforcement to achieving sustainable 
deve~o~ment?~ In this Chapter, a senes of arguments are made for recognition of the 
inherent value and contribution of this process. 
A. ENFORCEMENT IS INTRINSIC TO THE "RULE OF LAW" 
in the process of ensuring sustainable development it will be important to recognize that 
enforcement is intrinsic to the law. If governments are to actuaily operate within the 
"Rule of Law", thereby being made accountable for developrnent decisions and 
establishing a level playing field, there must be equal recognition of the intnnsic role of 
'' See for example, L. K. Caldwell, "Law and Environment in an Era of Transition: 
Reconciling Domestic and International Law", (1  99 1) 2 Colorado Journal of International 
Environrnental Law und Policy, P. Birnie, "International Environrnental Law: Its Adequac y 
for Present and Future Needs", The International Politics of the Environment Acturs. 
Interests and Zmtituîions, A. Hwrell and B. Kingsbury eds. (Mord: Clarendon Press, 1992); 
S. Bilderbeek, ed. Biodiversity and International Law: The Eflectiveness of Environrnental 
Law, (Amsterdam: Netherlands Committee for the IUCN, IOS Press, 1992); L. CI. Susskind, 
Environmental DipIomacy. Negotiating More Efectnle Global Agreements, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1 994). 
34 IncIuded among those few exceptions are for example the report by the Experts Group on 
Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environrnent and Development, 
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal Principles and 
Recommendations, (London: Graham & TrotmanlMartinus, 1986); Proceedings of the First, 
Second, Third and Fozath International Environmentai Law Enforcement Conferences, supra, 
note 4; L. F. Duncan, "The Rule of Law and Sustainable Development", supra,, note 25; E. 
Barr, Positive Cornpliance Program: Their Potential as Zns~rranents for Regdatory Reform, 
(Ottawa: Department of Justice, 199 1); K. Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement. 
Regdation and the Social Definition of Pollution, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 984); UNEP 
Industry and Environrnent Programme Activity Center, From Replations to Indmty 
Cornpliance: Building lnstitutional Capabilities, Technical Report No. 1 1 ( 1992) Paris, 
France; supra, note 5; and, a bnef mention in Agenda 21, Chapter 8, supra. note 2. 
eaforcement? While most progressive industrializing nations espouse support for the 
principle of the "Rule of Law", in practice many have failed in their responsibilities to 
effectively enforce or in other cases, to comply with their own environmental laws. 36 
To fail to understand the significance of enforcement is to fail to understand the essential 
purpose and workings of the law. The "Rule of Law" includes not only the "black letter 
law" but also the practise of law. Put simply, it prescnbes conducting the &airs of a 
- - -- 
35 "Rule of Law" is intended here to be defined in a much broader sense than that traditionally 
posited by Dicey, that is. any rule enforced by the courts. It is suggested that at least for the 
purposes of environmental regdation the principle should be understood as encompassing the 
process of enacting standards of conduct in law and the wide m y  of rnechanisms for 
achieving and imposing compliance inclusive of administrative, criminal and mediative 
measures. Support for this more expansive appmach can be found in H.W. Arthurs. 
"Rethinking Adminimative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business" (1979) 17, Osgoode Hall Law 
Journal. p. 1. 
36 The Republic of Indonesia, for exarnple, while making fiequent reference to the fact that i f s  
founding Constitution espouses this principle, in practice has extended m inimal financial 
support or delegated any substantive powers for the enforcement of its environmental laws. L. 
F. Duncan and M. A. Santosâ, BAPEDAL Development Plan. Appendu: 1-1, Regufatory and 
Cornpliance Program, Book 3. Govemment of the Republic of Indonesia, Environmental 
Impact Control Management Agency (BAPEDAL), prepared under the Japanese Trust Fund 
of the World Bank, Jakarta, December 1991. Canada while issuing a policy prescribing 
criteria for enforcement responses and dictating that "environment oficials will use rules, 
sanctions and processes securely founded in law", can similarly be faulted for enacting strong 
environmental laws, with significant penalties but under resourcing enforcement. See L. 
Duncan, "The Rule of Law and Sustainable Development", supra, note 25; L. F. Duncan, 
"Trends in Enforcement: 1s Environment Canada Serious about Enforcing its Laws?", supra, 
note 25; Frienak of the QZd Mm River. supra, note 28. In Argentins, one judge became so 
fi-ustrated by the Iack of enforcement activity by govemment, he intervened to bring 
environmental cases before his court, "Law is a project of social harmony that does not work 
automaticalIy. It is necessary to have action by the administrative officer demanding the 
function of the law ... and lately, judicial action, as a suppressive body for punishing the 
offender and also the indolent fbnctionary who does nor fûlfil hisher public obligation and 
enables the transgression of the law". Judge Daniel Hugo Llermanos, "Environmental Agony: 
My Expenence as an Argentinian Judge". in Proceedings of the Third International 
Conference on Environmental Law, mpra, note 4 at p. 247. 
nation through observation of the law. And yet, when one examines the conduct of 
nations in making decisions about the balance of development and the environment 
interests, it is not musual to observe the practice to be pointedly at variance with the 
stated policy or legal obligations?' 
To establish laws without sirnultaneous attention to the ways and means for seeking or 
achieving cornpliance is to create law in a vacuum.'* Yet this practice continues despite 
espoused support for enforcement. The later 1980s evidenced some improved political 
recognition of the need to address this dichotomy. In Canada, the dual tabling in 1988 of 
an enforcement and compliance policy with a consolidated federai environment act was 
37 Boyer, supraT note 32, at p.74, suggests that one of the reasons for failure to actually effect 
the "rule of law" may be partly attributed to the propensity of the bureaucracy to impose their 
own interpretations of the legislator's intent in implementing the provisions. "If these policies 
and programs [for decontamination of the Great Lakes] have k e n  incorporated into federal 
statutes for twenty years, why do they remain unfulfilIed promises? The short answer is that 
insiders in the field of polIution control did not support stringent requirements Iike the zero 
discharge goal, and did not believe that Congress really meant them to be implemented as 
written". Yet another example is that while international aid has concentrated on building 
capacity for environment assessment of proposed developments, minimal attention has been 
given to the mechanisms necessary to make recommended conditions legally enforceable 
such as regdations or permits. See L. F. Duncan, "Beyond international Standards for 
Environmental Impact Assessment: Requinng Legally Enforceable Operating Standards", a 
paper presented at the Intemtional Confirenece on Environmental Law, sponsored by the 
Asian Environmental Law Association, Bangkok, April 1990. 
38 P. Finkle and D. Cameron, "Equal Protection in Enforcement: Towards More Structured 
Discretion" (1989) 12 Dalhousie Law Journal 34. The authors pinpoint this problem of 
construing the law as only what is written on the books; The Law Reforrn Commission of 
Canada also identified this propensity of administrators to exercise discretion not to enforce 
the law regardiess of prescribed commands and penalties where they "feel that, although 
transgressions are taking place, private action seems to be improving or coming into 
compliance, and thus enforcement action is not necessary so far as, in the mind of the 
administrator, the policy objective is met." Law Reform Commission of Canada, Poficy 
Implementation, Compfiance and Administrative Law, (Working Paper 5 1) (Ottawa: LRCC, 
1986). 
intended to send a message about enhanced political cornmitment to enforcement : 
A good law, however, is not itself enough. It must be enforced - ruthiessly if need 
be. Accordingly, the new Environmental Protection Act will be accompanied by a 
plan to reverse the country's appding record of enforcernent and ~ o r n ~ l i a n c e . ~ ~  
Parallel transformations in attitude where observed in the European ~ o n t i n e n t ~ ~ ,  for 
example, and in the United e ta tes.^' 
This perspective about the place for enforcement in defining and instituthg " d e  of law" 
for environmental protection has been echoed by legal scholars: 
How often has it been said by administrators, politicians and members of the 
general public that a law is good, the problem is that it is not enforced? The very 
form of the question expresses the fact that for the general public and politicians 
alike, not to mention the legal profession, the law is usually thought of as that 
which is in the books. In reality, however, that written law is only part of a much 
broader legal process which includes the decisions of those charged with the 
responsibility of enforcement and, indeed, the activities of judges and juries as 
well. 
39 The Honorable Tom McMillan, supra, note 10. It may be noted that while the Policy did 
serve as a catalyst for more active enforcement at the provincial level, actual comrnitrnent of 
resources to federal enforcement agencies was slower in coming. 
JO As observed by Floris Plate, Director of Law Division, Rijkswaterstaat, Ministry of 
Transport, Public Works and Water Management, The Hague, Netherlands in "Enforcement 
of the 'Pollution of Surface Water Act' in Netherlands 1970- 1 99411, Third International 
Environmental Law Enforcement Conference, supra, note 4 at p. 239,  round 1980 sorne 
critical pollution scandals got nation-wide attention. Sudden ly every pol itician and 
administrator in the country realized that prohibition and Iicensing alone could not stop illegal 
discharges and that enforcement was the indispensable crowning piece of any effective 
policy. So both money and manpower became available for inspection, and, if necessary, 
enfor~ernent.'~ 
" C. Wasserman, Chief of Compliance, Policy and Planning Branch, USEPA Office of 
Enforcement stated in her address to the Third International Conference on Environmental 
Enforcemenf : "Growing interest in environmental enforcernent stems fiom a desire to ensure 
that environmental requirements Iead to real improvements in environrnental quality. 
Environmental enforcement-broadly defined as the range of actions govenunent and others 
may take to encourage and compel cornpliance with environmental requirements-is critical to 
achieving this objective,", supra, note 4 at p. 3. 
A serious, even critical, problem ensues when the law is considered to be only 
that which is written in the statutes and case books, and is severed fiom the 
enforcernent decisions of prosecutors and administrators. The fact is that the 
decisions made by these individuals breathe Iife into the law. Whether it is 
acknowledged or not, the de facto n o m  is of central concem to those who are 
subjected to the law. Indeed, it may be argued that the de facto n o m  is, in fact, 
the reai 
These observations illustrate clearly how the law as  written ("black letter law") can be 
significantly altered by the way in which it is enforced, or not, as the case may be. 
Throughout the world there has been a history of regulating pollution while tuniing a 
blind eye to ongoing violations of those standards, failure to adequately monitor 
compliance and worse, where violations are known, to re-negotiate compliance outside of 
the dictates of the prescribed law. In other words. the legislated standards are altered 
through the act of non-enforcement. 43 Put another way, deregulation can be effected 
either inadvertently or intentionally thr~ugh non-enforcement." 
" P. Finkle, supra. note 38. While the focus of the article is on the Canadian C h e r  of 
Righrs ami F r e e d m  (Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1 982. being schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 1 1) and the implications of unequal legal treatrnent, it provides a 
clear articulation of the Iinkage between the letter of the law and the de facto nom. 
"3 See J. Swaigen, Regufatory mences in Canada: Liability and Defences (Scarborough: 
Carswell, 1992). 
" B. M. Mitnick, The Political Economy of Regulatiion: Creating, Designing and Removing 
Regulaory Fonns, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980) at p. 42 1-422 argues that 
deregulation may be effected through quite insidious means including cuts to resources, 
expertise, facilities necessary to monitor and enforce: "A form of deregulation through non- 
enforcement can occur if a regulatory unit's budgetary or other support is cut, so that the unit 
is simply unable to enforce the regdation ... such a tactic couId successfully elude the 
dificulties of getting deregulation through the Iegislative process. Selective cuts in support, 
with consequently consecutive nonenforcement, or shift in enforcement priority, can therefore 
be a way to control regulatory performance and, possibly, to avoid major attacks fiom the 
Increasingly more effective lobbies have evolved for legd regimes for sustain-dble 
development laws to prohibit the -de in endangered species, to create parks or special 
protected areas, to prohibit export of toxic wastes or to require environmental assessment 
of foreign investment or aid. Yet al1 too often while adequate standards are instituted, no 
effective process is provided to enforce them. Where the powers and responses are 
provided there is failure, intentional or not, to exercise those powers, or in the case of 
govemment projects, a failure to observe the law. For many emerging nations, 
environmental law appears well advanced; what they sorely lack is the training and 
resources to enforce4'. In short, what is missing is not the law but its enforcement. 
Sirnilarly unappreciated is the potential domino effect of non-enforcement of one law on 
the implementation of other affiliated responsibilities. One obvious exarnple is the 
immediate negative impact of lax enforcement of laws regulating the front end of the 
regdatory process, for exarnple environmental impact assessment procedures on later 
associated processes such as Iicensing of emissions or mitigation requirements. Where a 
proponent provides incomplete or falsified information about the environmental impacts 
regulation's supportive clientele." 
45 See for example, L. Maslavova, "Legislative Changes for Irnproved Corn pliance and 
Enforcement: The Case of Bulgaria", Third International Conference on Environmental 
Enjorcemenrt, supra note 4 at 97; 2. Kamienski, "Process of Upgrading the Polish 
Environmental Enforcement Procedures", Proceedings of The Third International Conference 
on Environmental Enforcement, qpra,  note 4 at p. 55; G. Bendi, "Some MethodoIogical 
Aspects of Designing Regulation and Setting Priorities in Economies under Transition, 
Proceedings of the Thihd International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra. 
note 4 at p. 1 15; L. F. Duncan and M. A. Santosa, supra, note 36. 
of its project, the result may be technicdly unsound and ultimately unenforceable 
standatds. 
Al1 too often enforcement has been discounted on the basis that "it just doesn't ~ o r k " . ~ ~  
Yet there is surpnsingly little empirical research or constructive analyses of the success 
or failure of various enforcernent responses or ~trate~ies.~ '  Some legai thinken provide a 
more blunt rationale: 
Theorists of regulatory failure have paid much less attention to the enforcement of 
reguiation than to its promulgation. This relative neglect may reflect an unspoken 
belief that one cannot construct a theory of regulatory enforcement without fint 
having a theory of reguiation. But this argument contains a logical flaw that has 
not escaped the attention of astute observers: any usefd theory of regdation must 
reflect the realities of partial enforcement. What is needed is a theory of 
enforcement that explains not simply why enforcement is incomplete, but what, if 
any, systematic patterns it follows. 
The reai reason for comparative neglect of enforcement rnay be quite simple: 
enforcernent is difficult to s t ~ d ~ . ~ ~  
One noteworthy exception is a study conducted on the effects of prosecution or the threat 
of prosecution on the decisions of corporate directon and officers in complying with 
pollution control ~ a w s . ~ ~  The study results indicate that prosecution has "a strong, 
46 M. Rankin and R. Brown. "Persuasion, Penalties and Prosecution: Administrative versus 
Criminal Sanctions", in Sewi ty  Cornpliance: Seven Case Siudks. ed. M.L. Friedland, 
(Toronto: University o f  Toronto Press, 1990) at p. 325. 
47 For example D. Saxe, supra, note 7. Even in the study by Rankin which identifies certain 
failings in criminal enforcement, a strong case is made for the value of enforcement, ibid. 
48 C. S. Diver, supro. note 32 at p. 259. While Diver's analysis is rather dated his premise 
hoIds tme. 
49 D. Saxe, supra note 7. 
statistically signifïcant impact on the environmerital behaviour of c~r~orations". '~ The 
author concludes that regardless of the enforcement measure chosen, prosecution, civil 
action or market instrument, " there is an indisputable need for enforcement", a view she 
found, perhaps not surprisingly, supported by the courts: 
if the regdations were not enforced by the use of sanctions, they would corne to 
be perceived not as regdatory requirements but merely as statements of 
aspiration. 5 1 
As the popular phrase goes, you simply cannot have one without the other. The 
deveiopment of policy or law without giving equal thought to how you will ensure 
observance of the policy or cornpliance with the law is like a carriage without the horse. 
Who is driving the cart? A law or policy which cannot or will not be implemented (by 
political or administrative intent) remains hollow or without any real effect.j2 
50 Ibid at p.46. A good example of this is found in the response of indu* and the legal 
cornmunity to the case of R v. Bara, supra, note 29. 
5 1 Ibid at p. 26 citing Re Industrial mene Decision No. 167 (1975), 2 W.C.R. 234 at p. 
252. 
'* F. Plate, supra, note 40 at p. 241, provides a succinct analysis of this interconnectedness; 
"to this end it was emphasized that enforcement is no isolated activity, but that instead it is 
part of a complete regulation chain. This chain has the fo llowing elements; 
* policy making 
* Iegislation and regulation 




A11 parts of the chain should be in Iine with the others ... in other words, each element of the 
chah depends on the others. Only when a11 are in accordance with the others satisfactory 
results may be obtained. If one element fails, the whole chain fails and al1 efforts must be 
hitless. Enforcement is ofien the last and therefore somewhat neglected part of the chain, but 
without an effective and tailor-made enforcement no policy can be successfÙ1." 
As will be outlined in Chapter III the process of law-making must of necessity aiso 
consider whether and how the standard can actuaiiy be complied with, must incorporate 
tirnelines for achieving complimce, specim responsibilities for monitoring cornpliance 
and prescribe the result if the law is not obsewed. How a law will be enforced is intrinsic 
to its value and ultimate effect. The capacity to enforce is as important as the action taken 
to make laws in realizing the legislative or policy intent. 
B. EQUITY AND FAIRNESS - ENSURING A LEEL-PLA YING FfEW 
The enforcement of laws is essential to ensure a level playing field for development. The 
way in which the law is enforced shapes the reality of the law for those who are both the 
nibject " and the intended benefactors (including non-human species). Failure to enforce 
environmental standards c m  have the perverse effect of pwshing both the victim (polluted 
environment or resource depletion) and those who have voluntarily complied. 
Where regulatees are allowed to violate agreed standards with no recourse, those 
who have expended resources on complying with the standards may be prejudicially 
afTected. Those who violate the laws gain an d a i r  market advantage. The practical 
effect is subversion of the legal intent." 
53 P. Finkle, supra, note 38 at p. 4 1. 
54 C. Wasseman, supra note 4, daims a consistent and effective enforcement program helps 
ensure that companies afkted by environmental requirements are treated fairly. Facilities 
will be more likely to cornply if they perceive that they will not be economically 
disadvantaged by doing so. See also USEPA Principles of Environmental Enforcement, 
supra, note 25 at p. 14. See also UNEP, supra, note 19 at p. 1.2. As Finkle et al supra, note 
38 point out: 
"IN]ot everyone may be aware that a lesser level of cornpliance is required, ~sult ing in 
unequal application of the law. Indeed, the fact that a fesser standard is required is somethes 
deliberately concealed From the general public. Hence, the less knowledgeabIe or more naive 
Legal equity then requins not only that the letter of the law apply equally to al1 parties but 
that the law be consistently applied or enforced. For exarnple, recogninng that enforcement 
agencies may be subject to challenges of arbitrary, unjust or hequitable enforcement 
actions:5 the Canadian fideral govemment amended environmental statutes to prescribe 
appropriate and consistent inspection, investigation and enforcement procedures. The 
govemment also issued a guide for the preparation of compliance strategies and policies 
with the suggestion that officids give greater attention to how laws are implementea j6 
The govemment has recognized that it needs to change the way it does business. Its 
Regulatory Reform Policy calls for departments and agencies that have justified the 
need for regdation to show that compliance and enforcement policies have been 
aaiculated and resources have k e n  approved and are adequate to discharge 
enforcernent responsibilities effectively and to ensure ~orn~liance.~'  
Most Canadian regdatory agencies have subsequently revised their enforcement policies 
and practices to at a minimum reflect these Charter requirernents.58 By way of example, 
may adhere to the black letter law with the result that they are penalized compared with those 
who follow the 'de factor' nom as compliance with the black letter law will require a greater 
expenditure of effort and resources." 
'' The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees quai  protection and treaünent 
before the law (section 7) and fundamental faimess in application of the law (section 15). 
Supra, note 42. 
56 A Strategic Approuch to Developing Compliance Policies: A Guide, (Regulatory Affain 
Series Nurnber 2) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1992). 
58 For exarnple the CEPA Enforcement and Complirce Policy, supra. note 15; Enfrcement 
and Compliance Policy for the Environment Act, (Govemment of the Yukon, 1993); nie 
Review P d  on Environmental Law Enjorcernent, An Action Plan for Environmental Law 
Enforcement in Alberta (Edmonton: Govemment of Alberta, IWO); British C o h b i a  Forest 
fractices Code: Rules, (Victoria: November 1993). 
Environment Canada has issued an enforcement and compliance policy which rnakes direct 
reference to the significance fair, consistent enforcement, 
Canadians expect their government to provide good laws and regdations, in order to 
protect them and their society. Good legislation must be enforced. Enforcement 
must be fair, nationally consistent and predictable.59 
Still, the problem remains of ensuring adherence to such policies. Some have suggested the 
need for judicial intervention to ensure fundamental fairness and equity in the exercise of 
criminal and administrative powers in applying the lawe6' In the very least, greater 
transparency in the exercise of administrative discretion by those persons with the power to 
" breathe life into the law" '' may be necessary to instil a higher level of accountability for 
enforcement or more pointedly, non-enforcement. 
Further evidence of acceptance of the need to create a more level playing (or trading) field 
through improved accountability for environment law enforcement is evidenced in recent 
multilateral and bilateral trade agreements. For exarnple, the NAAEC includes within its 
objectives the enhancing of compliance with and enforcement of environmental laws and 
regdations as a means of avoiding trade distortions or barrierd2 Under the NAAEC, the 
59 CEPA Enforcement and Compiiance Policy, ibid, p. 1 .  
60 P. Finkle, supra, note 38 at p. 42. 
Ibid at p. 34. It may be noted that punuant to N M C  the Parties commit to the legal 
enactment of environmental procedures which provide greater transparency and participation 
in enforcement proceedings, supra, note 3, articles 4,5,7, lO(5) and 12. 
62 fiid article I . 
Parties undertake to enforce their domestic environmental laws and to ensure that their 
respective environmental law enforcement practices are fair, open and equîtable.63 The 
Agreement M e r  provides for sanctions or punitive measures to be taken against any Party 
for failure to effectively enforce its own environmental laws? One of the undedying 
rationdes for irnplementing the NAAEC was to ensure a level playing field for trade by 
requiruig the Parties to eEectively enforce their respective environmentai laws. Evidence of 
contin~ed cornmitment to this principle is the establishment by the CEC Councii of the 
Enforcement Cooperation Program and creation of the North American Working Group on 
Environmentai Enforcement and Cornpliance Cooperation to guide the Parties towards 
effective enforcement of the respective environmental lawd5 
The EEC has adopted similar processes to ennire the accountability of its member states to 
enact and enforce Community environmental laws? 
- - 
63 fiid, article 7. This provision is intended to give effect to obligations irnposed under article 
11 14 (2) of the NAFïA which prohibits any of the three Parties from waiving or derogating 
from their respective environmental laws so as to attract or maintain investment. For a more 
detailed review of the implications of this agreement see H. Mann, "The North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: Implications for the Enforcement of 
Environmental Law", Report submitted to the Office of Enforcement, Environment Canada, 
1994. 
64 Supra, note 3, Part Five. 
65 See CEC Council ResoIution #96-01 and CEC 1995, 1996, and 1997 Workplans and 
Budgets. 
66 L. Kramer, "The Implernentation of Environmental laws by the European Economic 
Communities" in the Proceedings of the IntemationaI Conference on Environmental 
Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 1 83. 
There is support, and some limited empincai evidence,6' for the position that enforcement 
provides a significant trigger for voluntary compliance. 68 Enforcement action sends a clear 
message that environmental standards are to be taken seriously, thereby building credibility 
for both environmentai protection institutions and their re@ernent~.6~ 
Once credibility has been established, continued enforcement is essential to the 
maintenance of that credibility. Credibility means that society perceives its 
environmentai requirements and the institutions that implement them as strong and 
effective. Credibility encourages compliance by facilities that will be unlikely to 
comply if environmentai requirements and institutions are perceived as weak. The 
more credible the law, the greater the likelihood of compliance and the likelihood 
that other govemments efforts to protect the environment will be taken seriously. 
In other words, enforcement has a domino effect, lending often under-recognized benefits to 
less coercive programs. Where the govemment earns a reputation of taking cornpliance with 
its laws senously, it also attracts greater interest in the process of standard setting and a 
68 C. Wasserman supra, note 4, in her address to the n i r d  International W e r e n c e  on 
Environmental Larv Enforcemeni stated that the USEPA premises its enforcement strategy on 
the basis that while 20% of regulatees will comply voluntarily, the agency focuses its 
enforcement strategy on the 75% who are watching what they do to the 5% who never 
comply. She suggested that an effective enforcement strategy plays on this equation. A 1994 
survey of Canadian industry reports that for 95% of respondents, compliance with regulations 
is the most important motivating factor for instituting effective environmental management 
practices, followed by 69% due to directordofficer liability. The survey shows minimal effect 
of voluntary government programs (16%) or trade consideration (10%) as triggers for giving 
more attention to environmental practices. Canadian Environmentaf Management Swey 
(Toronto: KPMG, 1994) 
69 UNEP, Technicd Report, supra, note 32 at p. iv. 
concomitant cornmitment to voluntary compliance and technological innovation.'* 
Voluntaiy "standards" (i.e. guidelines) may provide a niendly alternative where everyone 
abides by the agreed parameters. A problem arises when one or more of the parties fails or 
refuses to 'bcomply" leaving no recourse for govemment intervention against these "free 
There is similar evidence that certainty of detection and response are equally as important, if 
not more important, than the severity of the potential penalty. It would be fair to presume 
that it is the intent of legislators when enacting laws that the law will be ~ b e ~ e d . ' ~  It then 
logically follows that the regulatory objective will be best served by ensuring that an 
effective surveillance and enforcement program is put in place to ensure compliance, if for 
70 The USEPA in its 1992 Report The Principles of Enforcement, in anaIyzing the relative 
impacts of the market and regulatory measures for the lead phase down program discovered 
that, "Although the emissions reductions tiom direct enforcement were large, the sharp 
decline in new violations afker 1986 suggests that enforcement had an even Iarger impact 
through deterrence." Cited by G. Bendi, supra, note 45. 
" See "Voluntary Cornpliance", A Background Paper prepared for the Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation Joint Public Advisory Cornmittee sponsored North American 
Consultations. Montreal, 1997, supra note 9. 
72 D. Saxe, supra, note 7 at p. 45-54; D. Chappell, supra, note 10 at p. 24; J. Gnisec," 
Sanctions and Rewards: The Approach of Psychology" in Sanctions and R e w d  in the Legai 
Svstem: A Mulridkciplinary Approach, ed. M.L. Friedland (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 19891, at p. 12 1. 
73 As D. Chappe11 supra, note 10 at p. 23, states : "[A] belief in the effectiveness of deterrence 
lies at the very core of sanctioning strategies applied to polluting behaviour. This belief is to 
be found in environmental statutes; in judicial statements when sentencing polluters; in 
political speeches about the environmenc in comment. by those involved in regulating 
pollution; in the outpouring of environmental scholars; in the utterances of indiv idual citizens 
about pollution; and even in the confessions of polluters themselves." 
no other reason than maintainhg credibility of the regulatory initiative.74 Consequently, the 
need for effective enforcement. 
More laws do not automatically necessitate more enforcement. Many agencies have found 
that they c m  achieve greater deterrent value kom a more strategic use of sanctioning 
powers. In such cases agencies have refocused their enforcernent and cornpliance strategies 
to place less emphasis on the number of enforcement actions and more emphasis on 
targetuig enforcement action to gain greater leverage for added deterrence and improved 
environmental result~.~~ In this way enforcement action can be utilised for prevention or 
deterrence and if strategically directe& as a catalyst for voluntary initiati~e.'~ 
74 See C. Diver, supra. note 32 at p. 297 where he concludes. "Enforcement, happily, is not 
the sole means of assuring cornpliance with regulatory directives. Businesses obey 
regulations for a host of reasons- moral, intellechial cornmitment to underlying regulatory 
objectives, belief in the fairness of the procedures that produced the regulations, pressure 
fiom peers, competitors, costomers, or ernployees, conformity with a law-abiding self image- 
in addition to fear of detection and punishment. it is a common place that no regulatory 
command will succeed without substantial voluntary compliance. But the distinction can be 
distracting. Enforcement is necessary not only to control the abhorrent lawbreaker but also to 
defend the legitimacy of govemrnent intervention that sustains voluntary cornpliance." 
'' R van Heuvelen, supra, note 3 1 at p. 163; E. Devaney, "The Evolution of Environmental 
Crimes: Enforcement at the United States Environmental Protection Agency" in the 
Proceedings of the mird Conférence on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 457; 
L. Peterson, "The Great Lakes Enforcement Strategy: Using Enforcement Resources to 
Maximize Risk Reduction and Environmental Restoration in the Great Lakes Basin", in the 
Proceedings of the Third Inlemational Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra. 
note 4 at p. 181. 
76 North Arnerican experience with voluntary compliance suggests that threat of regulatory 
intervention may be the most significant triggen for bbvoluntary'' action by regulated 
industry. See Clifford Lincoln, supra, note 1 6. 
As valuable as economic instruments may prove to be in controlling pollution and 
environmental damage, they will not and cannot operate without regulatory and 
enforcement meanires. Market measures are in fact reliant on a working regulatory and 
cornpliance regime for their very implementation and operation. 
By way of exarnple, a market regime such as emissions trading is premised on 
establishment and maintenance of base level standards. In addition, market instruments each 
require their own specialized systems for monitoring, one system to meanire ambient and 
point source emission levels, and the other, to audit systems of trading or charges. 
Experience to date indicates that some types of economic instruments, especially the 
more complex ones such as tradable perrnits, cm requùe at least as much 
enforcement and monitoring as do the more traditional command and control 
regulations. Economic approaches in fact require good information and monitoring 
systerns which can also raise costs for regulated e n t i t i e ~ . ~ ~  
It must be kept in mind that the effectiveness of economic measures as instruments for 
environmental protection is directly dependent on the maintenance of base pollution control 
levels. The maintenance of a fair trading system or effective rates for emission charges will 
require surveillance of the impacts on the environment and an audit of accounts. Regdatory 
supervision and intervention will be necessary to guarantee fair operation of the market 
77 S. Hennan and P. Verkerk, "Closing Remarks for the Third Intenarional Conference on 
Environmental Enjorcement", supra note 4 at p. 256. 
systerns such as penalties for fdse reporting, for failure to pay discharge fies or to ennire 
accurate set 0~s.'~ This view appears to be endoned by the signatories to Agenda 21 which 
provides: 
8.13 Laws and regdations suited to country-specific conditions are arnong the most 
important instruments for M o r m i n g  environment and development polices into 
action, not only through 'command and control' methods, but also as a normative 
fkmework for economic planning and market rneasure~.'~ 
Monitoring systems are also necessary to instil accountability and fairness in govemment 
incentive and subsidy programs. Audit provisions, including the right to inspect, m u t  be 
enacted to monitor cornpliance with the ternis and conditions of grants or subsidies. While 
some responsibility for reporting on tax relief or subsidy programs can be transferred to the 
polluter, dtirnately the govemment remains accountable. Consequentiy systerns must be 
instituted to detect and punish abuses.80 
78 G. Bendi, supra. note 45 at p. 1 1 7 suggests that wh ile in principle there may be a difference 
in the regulatory and market approaches, in practice, they cannot be dissociated as "No 
market economy can Iive without regdation, and an absolute fiee market does not exist. The 
regulatory element is even greater in the field of environmental protection than any other 
regulatory area. It is obvious that the use of strong market incentives cannot live without an 
existing enforcement system": See also D. R. Stewart and S. B. Weiner, "Environmenta1 
Policy for Eastern Europe: Technology-Based Versus Market-Based Approaches", December 
199 1 (as cited in Bendi, supra, note 45). 
79 As cited in Bendi, supra note 45. See also J. Rees "PoIlution Control Objectives and the 
Regulatory Framework", in Sustainable Environmental Monogement Principles and 
Practice, R. Keny Turner ed. (Boulder: Bellhaven PresdWestview Press, 1988). 
80 See K. Webb, "The Legal Framework for Financial Incentives as Regulatory Instruments", 
background paper prepared for the Symposium on "The Power of the Purse : Financial 
Incentives as Regulatory Instruments", Administrative Law Project, Law Reform 
Commission of Canada and Faculty of Law, University of Calgary, (October 1990, Calgary) 
at p.48; R Howse, " Shifiing to Incentive-oriented Instruments: Myths and Symbols, 
Dilemmas and Opportunities" , id. 
It serves no valid purpose to deny the necessity of regdation and compliance. "Smart 
regdation" does not mean no regdation. This may be al1 the more important for the process 
of impiernenting sustainable development in developing or emerging nations who have not 
yet had the opportunity to put in place effective regdatory and compliance regimes8' 
There are numerous reasons for improving the capacity to irnplement international laws 
through domestic regdation and enforcement. One important reason is the challenge of 
enforcing international law, including the Iack of sutficient powers in existing international 
82 bodies to secure compliance. Another is the difficulty in instituthg consistent compliance 
measures among parties to bilateral or multilaterai agreements due to inherent technical 
complexities, variances in capacity to monitor and enforce and unreliable country reporting 
'' R Howse, ibid at p. 36-37; S. Herman et al, supra. note 75; J .  Rees, supra note 79. 
82 The FIELD R e p o ~  for example, points out that the Rio principles while laudatory have at 
moa a "mixed legal status1' and admits that international standards for sustainable 
development will ultimately be implemented at the local level. Supra, note 12, at p. Il. L. 
Susskind shares this realization where he points out that while the Hague Declmation called 
for more effective international enforcement mechanisms, it appears to have faded from view 
and received almost no attention at the Rio Summit (at p. 107). He seriously questions the 
credibility of the deterrent effect of international sanctions: "Deterrence theory, as explained 
by Schelling and othen, requires that a threat have credibility. Given the experience of the 
past several decades, especially as it relates to noncornpliance with global environmental 
treaties, such credibility would be hard to muster. So, even if the scope of international law is 
expanded and nongovemmental organizations are given standing to sue noncornpliers in the 
World Court, it is not clear who would apply the requisite sanctions." (at p. 1 10) L. Susskind, 
EnvironmentaZ Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective Global Agreements, supra note 33 at 
p. 99- 12 1. See also Law-MaAttg and Lmu-Enforcement in Intenational Environmental Law 
u j k  the 1992 Rio Conference, Research Project no. 10106072, Beyerlin Marauhn. 
(Heidelberg, Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law) 
(Berlin: Erich Schmidt Verlag, 1997). 
partly due to sovereignty considerations? Consequently, support appears to be momting 
for effecting cornpliance by translation of international obligations for sustainable 
development into state laws thereby allowing for implementation through domestic 
enforcement action." A cogent case has been expressed for the expanded use of domestic 
courts and tribunals to enforce the principles in international environmental laws for, among 
other reasons, that it is the domestic courts which focus on the major sources of pollution, 
that is, individuals and corporations, as opposed to the inter-party focus of international 
treaties, and the limitation of responses to counter measures. 
Domestic courts already enforce a significant portion of international law. The idea 
of expanding the use of domestic courts for international environmental law 
enforcement against citizens and governments of other counûies is a more recent 
and interesting concept. ... 
The use of dornestic courts makes particular sense in the environmental area 
because domestic courts tend to focus on the more comrnon poliuters - individuals 
and corporations. The courts' clear authority over assets and persons is necessary 
for successfd enforcement. Most courts c m  issue injunctions which may prevent 
environmental damage before it o c c ~ r s . ~ ~  
83 L. Susskind shares the view that "[blecause international law enshrines the right of 
sovereignty, al1 efforts to monitor performance, establish the accuracy of claims or 
nonperformance, punish proven noncornplien, or impose remedial action must be accepted 
voluntary by the parties to a treaty. It is little wonder that the global environmental treaties 
signed thus far have such weak monitoring and enforcement provisions", supra note 33 at p. 
101; see also M. E. OYConnelI, "Enforcement and Success of International Environmental 
Law" (1 995) 3 Global Legal Studies Jotanul, at p. 47. 
8 4 FIELD, Supra, note 12 at p. 1 3; S. Bilderbeek, BiodNersity and International Law: The 
Emtiveness of Intemtional Environmental Lmu, supra note 33 at p. 96-99; P. Birnie, 
"Intemationat Environmental Law: Its Adequacy for Present and Future Needs", supra note 
33 at p. 70-72. A usefil discussion of the interface between obligations for enfornement of 
international obligations and domestic enforcement regimes is provided in the discussion of 
the impediments to effective enforcernent of the ocean dumping provisions of MARPOL V 
and relationship to domestic enforcement strategies in "Coast Guard: Enforcement Under 
MARPOL V: Convention on Pollution Expanded, Although Problems Remain", 
GAO/RCED-95- 143. 
85 M. E. OYConnell, supra. note 83 at p. 57. 
A second raiionaie for domestic edorcement of international agreements or obligations is 
the need to respect the rights of sovereign nations to establish their own tirnetables and 
priorities for implernenting these common undertakings which best refi ect their respective 
needs and ~ a ~ a c i t ~ . * ~  This is consistent with Rio principles supportkg increased 
oppominity for public involvement in the international legal order, including in the 
development and enforcement of environmental laws. As an adjunct to this local 
participatory process cornes a deeper commitment to ensuring adberence to the enacted 
laws and the institution of a community based accountability. 
If responsibility for ensuring cornpliance with international obligations is to remain with the 
sovereign states, then, by necessity, rights and powers rnust be created at the state Ievel. 
This includes the bundle of rights necessary to create transparency and public access to 
justice thereby making govemments accountable for implernenting these obligations." 
Similarly it requires an exercise of political will to implement basic framework for 
enforcement and commitment of the necessary resources . 
For example, the NAAEC while prescnbing a common obligation and framework for 
effective enforcement of the environmental laws of the respective Parties (Article S), 
similarly specifically reaffirms the sovereign right of the Parties to enact their own 
environmental standards and objectives and to enforce those provisions within their own 
temtones (Prearnble, Article 37), supra, note 3. 
87 See FIELD Report, supra note 12 at p. 1 1. These rights may be considered to include right 
of standing for private enforcement and administrative or judicial review; access to 
information; access to participate or scmtinise administrative bodies in standard setting, 
project assessrnent enforcing and the Iaw. 
The responsibility then Lies within the intemational community to provide support in 
financial kind to assist developing or emerging nations to build their capacity for 
environmentai enforcement and ~ o r n ~ l i a n c e . ~ ~  This need identifid in the Rio Declmotion 
and Agen& 21 has in part been effected through the recent efforts of govemments to 
exc hange expertise and approaches and redirecting of foreign aid.89 
Clear acknowledgement that political conmitment to effective enforcement of 
environmental laws is critical to sustainable development is found in a nurnber of recent 
multilateral agreements on the environment, most notably the North Amencan Agreement 
on Environmental ~ o o ~ e r a t i o n . ~ ~  The stated objectives of the NAAEC include both 
promoting sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually supportive 
environmental and economic policies and enhancing cornpliance with and enforcement of, 
environmental laws, regulations, procedures, policies and practices. 91 Further evidence of 
the weight placed on politicai accountability versus effective enforcement are the Parties 
89 For example the support by USEPA, UNEP, the Netherlands, Canada, the European 
Commission, and other govemments to the international conferences on environmental law 
enforcement; enforcement training and capacity building programs of CIDA, World Bank and 
üNEP. The North Arnerican Commission for Environmental Cooperation has committed 
substantial resources to building partnerships for more effective domestic enforcement of 
environmental laws in that region (1995, 1996, 1997 Prograrns and Budgets: Commission for 
Environmental Coo peration, Montreal). 
90 Supra. note 3; see also the Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection and 
Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area. August 14, 1983, US.-Mex., T.I.A.S. 
No. 10,827 (La Paz Agreement); Agreement Concerning the T r m s b o m d q  Movement of 
Hazardozrs Wmte, October 28, 1986, U.S.-Can., T.I.A.S. No. 1 1,099. 
9 1 NAAEC, supra, note 3, article 1. 
obligations to report anndly on thei environrnental enforcement activities; 92 the creation 
of an independent process for reviewing citizen aliegations of a Party's failure to effectively 
93 enforce their environmental laws; and, the introduction of ao inter-party cod ta t ion  and 
dispute resolution process regarding Party cornplaints of persistent pattern of failure to 
enforce. 94 
Finally, enforcement is necessary to maintain credibility in govemment policy and 
initiatives? Before the public will support any shift from "command and control" to 
voluntiiry or market measures, govemments must first establish credibility for the 
commitment to an environrnental protection regime . This commitment c m  be readily 
illustrated by a solid record of enforcement. A reputation of non-enforcement will discredit 
cornmitment to the "Rule of Law" and weaken support for other initiatives by 
environmental agencies. 
Lawyers and econornists have both devoted too littie attention to the importance of 
restoring symbolic order and to enforcement techniques required to maintain it ... 
Forgiving non-cornpliance, employing insignificant sanctions and failing to enforce 
payment of fines [or levies] are al1 acts which M e r  undermine order, creating 
moral outrage and demand for action which will nght the moral irnbalance. 
Pt NAAEC, ibid, article 12 (2)  (c).  
93 NAAEC, ibid, articles 14 and 15. 
94 NAAEC, ibid, Part Five. 
95 See L. F. Duncan, supro, note 26. 
Regdatory over control is likely to result as the pendulum swings b a ~ k . ~ ~  
Public skepticism towards innovative initiatives can best be dissipated by first eaming 
credibility t h u g h  a record of conmitment to enforce cornpliance, regardless of whether 
the system of control is a regdatory standard or payment of a charge or levy. Regardless of 
the mechanism, the objective is a bdancing of interests which in many instances involves 
the remedying of potential social harms. The tangible impact of govemment action or 
inaction (nsk or harm to the environment or human health or Ise) demands solid 
cornmitment. 
" E. Barr, supra note 34, at p. 187. 
111. A FRAMEWORK FOR EFFECTIVE NVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 
In Chapter II arguments were presented for the constructive role enforcement can play in 
achieving sustainable developrnent. Among the more repeated reasons given for the 
purported fdure of enforcement action is that it simply does not work. The intent in this 
chapta is to rebufY that misconception by presenting a h e w o r k  through which 
enforcement can be (and in many cases has ken)  made workable and effective. 
The hmework and illustrative cases are drawn fiom the writer's twenty plus years of 
experience advising governments in Canada, the United States, Mexico, Jamaica and 
hdonesia on the developrnent and delivery of their respective environmentai enforcernent 
regimes. The material is also drawn extensiveiy fiom personal discussions with and written 
documentation b y enforcement officiais and thinken around the globe. Extensive insight 
was also hm fiom participation in international conferences of environmental 
enforcement officiais. 
Recognition of the need to enforce the Iaw is not enough. There is a growing consensus that 
efforts to achieve cornpliance will f ~ l  unless the minimum basic components of an effective 
enforcement and cornpliance regime are recognized and implemented w i t b  a carefully 
developed strategy and fn~nework.~' 
97 Evidence of broad international cornmitment to a basic fiamework of actions for 
enforcement is made in Chapter 8, Agenda 21, " Integrating Environment and DeveIopment 
in Decision Making" (United Nations, 1992). Agenda 21 specifies that each country should 
[Wlhen developing a policy fiamework for environmental protection, govemments 
have fkquently failed to devote nrfncient attention to providing practical 
institutional means of ensurhg that its policies and standards are complied with?* 
Most countries now have environmental Iaws and regdations in place to provide at 
least minimum environmental standards to which industry is expected to adhere ... 
But to ensure the effectiveness and equity of environmental protection laws, 
govemments need to take the necessary institutional measures, consistent with the 
cultural, sociai and economic fabric of the country, to realize these standards and 
ve* that all companies equally comply with them ... [wlhile there is no one 
common" recipe for success" ... seps can be taken even with minimai personnel and 
resources when there is sufficient politicai w i ~ ?  
While recognizing the inherent differences in countries' legai systerns, institutional 
structures and environmental, sociai, cultural and economic contexts, it is regardless widely 
accepted that they share the cornmon challenge of achieving compliance with their adopted 
sy stem. 
While there may be no one " right way" to achieve compliance, there is considerable 
develop a strategy for maximizing compliance with laws and regdations relating to 
sustainable development including enforceabIe, effective laws, appropriate sanctions, 
mechanisms to promote compliance, institutional capacity and mechanisms for public 
involvement in the making and enforcing of laws on environment and development. Canada 
Mexico and United States have restated cornmitment to a basic framework for effective 
enforcement as Parties to the NAAEC, supra. note 3, article 5. For a more detailed review of 
the perspectives of countries in Eastern and Western Europe, the Arnericas, Afnca, Caribbean 
and Asia see Proceedings of the Internationai En$orcemenf Worhhop. and Praceedings 
International Conferences an Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4; See also 
iUCN/UNEP/WWF, Caring for the Earth, A Strategy for Sustainable Living (Gland: 1991)- 
supra note 12 at p. 67-69. 
98 UNEP From ReguZafions to Industry CompIiance: Building Institutional Capabilities 
(Paris: 1992) at p. 1 5. 
99 UNEP, id at p. 7. 
agreement on the need to evaluate the efT'ectiveness of a compliance regime against a basic 
frsunework, without which enforcement actions will inevitably fail.''' Enacting laws 
without simultaneous and equai attention to the process of achieving compliance may be 
compared to making a declmation of war without fkt ident img the enemy, developing a 
strategy, critical targets, strengths or weaknesses of the enemy. or building a complement of 
adequately armed and trained forces and outfitting command posts. 
This is not to suggest that enfolcement is equitable only to tmditional "command and 
controi" responses. Environmental enforcement involves far more than taking poiluters to 
court or shutting down a facility. The rnechanisms for achieving environmental cornpiiance 
are extremely complex and require thorough understanding and careful consideration early 
on in the process of developing laws and policies for achieving sustainable development. 
Incentives and coercive measures are closely linked and to be used effectively must be 
integrated.'O1 Raiher than evaiuating the relative success of enforcernent responses based on 
the number of coercive actions, agencies are shifting more towards a blending of coercive. 
preventive and incentive rneasure~.[~' They are similarly exploring mechanisms which 
provide alternative routes to compliance, focusing on performance or results. 
100 Even USEPA oficials who have expended considerable effort on devising a universally 
workable framework admit that there is "no single enforcement 'modei' or strategy which 
guarantees success". R. van Heuvelen, Proceedings of Third Intemationd Conference on 
Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 163. 
101 See Section: Enforcement Responses/Sanctions. 
102 R. van Heuvelen, Proceeclings of the Third International Conference on Environmental 
Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 163. 
Enforcement cannot be effective if it is considered only after the fact. The process of 
achieving compliance begins with the making of laws. A Iaw developed through a process 
of broad participation invariably increases the probability of v o l u n t ~  compliance. Without 
the cornmitment of senior policy makers, administrators, and politicians, the will may be 
lacking for adequate resources and powers for necessary enforcement action. Similarly, 
fiont-end consultation with regulatees improves chances of a practicable standard and 
enhances the cornmitment to cornpliance. This is al1 the more important where a significant 
role in monitoring and reporthg is assigned to the regulatee. Finally, it has been the 
experience of many agencies that the enforceability of laws can be strengthened by public 
scrutiny in the development stage. 
Equally critical are decisions about the choice of instrument to regulate pollution control. 
Too often policies for protection of the environment are rnanifested in very general 
statements of duty or broadly worded prohibitions.'03 For effective, econornical 
enforcement, compliance objectives must be preciseiy stated, enabling h e l y  detection and 
response. Similarly, the definition of compliance must be readily understood by the 
regulator, regulatee and target community if it is to be measured and reported. While there 
I O3 For example the Canadian Fisheries Act, RSC 1985, c. F-14 which has attracted 
controversy because of its broad prohibition against any act which may cause harm to fish or 
its habitat. Equally troubling for the Republic of Indonesia has k e n  the broad prohibition in 
their Law no. 4. 1982, Regmding Basic Provisions for the Management of the Environment, 
wepublic of Indonesia] until recently considered unenforceable due to its vagueness. In 
1997 Indonesia arnended their laws to provide greater clarity. [Interview with Mas Achrnad 
Santosa, S.H., Executive Director, Indonesian Center for Environmental Law (ICEL), 
October, 1 9971. 
is growing acceptance of the concept of flexibility in irnposing standards and compliance 
schedules, the public expects accountability and meamble  results. 
An econornical compliance regime requires a concerted effort to promote compliance. A 
direct correlation, it has k e n  suggested, exists between the degree of understanding and 
awareness of a law and the record of ~ o r n ~ l i a n c e . ' ~ ~  A compliance strategy must be tailored 
to fit the special character of each law. The method chosen to promote compliance will 
depend on the nature of the Iaw, the targeted parties and the beneficiaries of the control. In 
those instances, for example, where the objective is general protection of public or workers 
health (Le. safe use and handling of pesticides), the preferable method of prornoting and 
measuhg compliance may be a targeted information program with intermittent spot checks 
or user surveys to assess compliance. By way of cornparison. where the target of the law is 
a more narrow category of regdated parties and the beneficiary a threatened public 
resource, a more direct, coercive approach may be more appropnate. In such cases, 
voluntary cornpliance may be efTected through cornmitment to standards through 
consultation, technology transfer, tax incentives to incorporate new technologies, negotiated 
compliance schedules, and timely enforcement responses, as the ultimate compliance 
incentive. ' Os 
- - 
104 B. Seigal, A Review of Compfimce - Relafed Issues in Reguhory Program Evahtion, (a 
study for the CompIiance and Regulatory Remedies Project). (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 
1990), Department of Fisheries and Oceans Appendix, at p. 1 1 .  
105 See for example, the proceedings for the four InternutionaZ Conferences on 
Environmenfa1 Enforcement, supra, note 4; Agenda 21, supra note 2; North Amencan 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra, note 3, article 5. 
Decisions must be made about who will be responsible for the various processes of 
enforcement - setting the standards, monitoring compliance, promoting compliance and 
taking necessary enforcement action. Similady the issue wiIl be faced of who will pay - 
govemment agencies or the regulated party ? What is the role of the public and how directiy 
should they be ùivolved in the enforcement process? What is the capacity and role of the 
regulated party in compliance ? An effective enforcement strategy must address al1 of these 
issues. The remainder of the chapter presents a framework for effective results. 
8. THE COMPONENTS OF AN EFFECTNE FRAMEWORK FOR ENFORCEMENT AND
COMPUA NCE 
There is broad consensus that any framework for effective enforcement and compliance 
shouid address the following minimum components: 
1. Political and institutional cornmitment to enforcement; 
2. A compliance strategy; 
3. Imposition of Iegdy binding standards providing a clear, consistent definition of 
compliance; 
4. Mechanisms to promote voluntary compliance, to deter violations and to prevent 
environmental damage; 
5. Mechanisms to determine compliance and to detect violations; 
6. An alternative array of sanctions and penalties; and, 
7. An evaluation process which enables review and revision of compliance strategies 
premised on compliance and protection objectives. 
Each of the components of the framework are mutually interdependent; consequently, 
failure to give equal aîtention to each component may have the e f k t  of decreasing the 
chances of effective enforcement and ultimately compliance. 
For example, the enactrnent of strict legal standards and appointment of a fully qualified 
inspectorate will not be d c i e n t  to achieve compliance if the officiais are not granted the 
necessary powers to inspect and enforce. Similady, implementation or endorsement of 
private voluntary compliance programs without p d e l  effort to ensure verification and 
response against violators, will ultimately effm the credibility and success of any voluntary 
initiatives. Those companies who expend monies on compliance or performance beyond 
compliance reasonably expect enforcement action will be taken against those who fail to 
make the effort to comply. 'O6 
1. POLITICAL WILL AND ~NSTITUTIONAL COMMITTMENT 
First and foremost of the prerequisites is political will and institutional cornmitment to 
environmental enforcement. Without poli tical support for environmental enforcement, the 
'O6 A Polish enforcement oficial advises that investors have expressed the need for clear and 
consistent d e s  and strong enforcement against these who do not comply. See P. Syryczynski, 
"Environmental Cornpliance Issues During the Privatization Process in Poland", Proceedings 
of the mird Intentational Conference on Environmentut Enforcement, supra, note 4, at p. 
103. 
best efforts by agencies to take successfid enforcement action will ultimately fai1.[07 Before 
cornpliance can be anticipated, responsibility for environmental enforcement must be 
clearly understood Most importantly, governments must understand and assert their 
constitutional and legislative mandates for environmental protection.'oS 
It makes litîie sense for national govemments to endorse international agreements for 
sustainable development and protection of the environment unless those sarne govemments 
are committed to taking the necessary domestic regdatory and enforcement action. To this 
end, where environmental regulatory powers are shared between national and regional 
govements, it may be necessary to give ptior consideration to how international 
environmental obligations are going to be delivered (including shared hancing,  legislahg 
of standards and enforcement) before making political commitments to global initiatives. ' O9 
'O7 In Poland for example, environmental laws rernain unenforced despite the creation of a 
watch dog agency and enactment of criminal and administrative sanctions. J. Jendroska, 
"Compliance Monitoring in Poland: Current State and Development", Proceedings of the 
International Conference on Environmentta1 Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 352, of the 
Research Group on Environmental law, institute of Law, Polish Academy of Sciences. 
Wroclaw, advises that "Govemors were empowered to halt activity endangering the 
environment and to impose non-compliance fines. Govemors, however being primarily 
msponsible for the economic developrnent of their voivodship, were extremely reluctant to 
halt any economic activity and limited themselves to imposing fines. Bearing in mind that 
non-compliance fines were very low and oflered a cheaper option than cornpliance, there is 
nothing surprishg that environmental Iaws were in practice unenforceable". See also R. 
Greenspan Bell and S. E. Bromm, "Lessons Leanied in the Transfer of U.S. - Generated 
Environmental Compliance Tools: Compliance Schedules for Poland", E.L.R. News & 
Analysis, 27 E. L. R 10296- 10303, at p. 10303. 
'O8 For a discussion of actions by the Govemment of Canada to assert its will. set L.F. 
Duncan, "The Rule of Law and Sustainable Development", supra note 25 at p. 286. See also 
iUCNAJNEP/WWP, supra. note 12 at p.67; Friendr of the W M a n  River, supra, note 28. 
109 For example Canadian provincial govemments concemed about the purported Iack of 
reflection of provincial powers and interests in NAFTA, negotiated provisions in the side 
agreement (NAAEC) which limit the effect of the obligations on provincial jurisdictions. See 
Indicators of political commitment to enforcement are reflected not just in "bean-counting". 
that is, the number of environmental prosecutions or directives. The measure of a 
government commiûnent to effective enforcement Lie in the relative pnority given to 
irnplementing environmental legislative or regdatory agendas, budgetary ailotments for 
enforcernent programsl'O, support for policy directives which remove the potential for 
political or senior policy interference in individual enforcement responses as well as 
specifjmg circumstances in which Ministerial sanctions should be exercised"', and the 
-- - 
the Canadian Intergovernmental Agreement regarding the North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation, signed by Alberta August 1995, Quebec in December 1996 and 
Manitoba in December 1996. it is noteworthy that no consideration appears to have been 
given to the ovemding obligations pursuant to multi-lateral agreements such as NAFTA, 
NAAEC or the Biodiversity Convention during the federal-provincial negotiations on the 
Harmonization Agreement, regardless of the effect of that agreement which transfers a 
significant portion of responsibilities for standard setting. environmental impact assessment, 
inspection and enforcement to the provinces, with no precise mechanism for oversight. See 
CCME, "Statement of Interjurisdictional Cooperation on Environmentai Matters", CCME- 
1 C-26E. 
110 An exarnp le of threatened cred i bi 1 ity assoc iated with under resourcing is the Septem ber 
1994 media coverage of "pacific salmon reportedly inadequately monitored because of lack 
of staff and resources at a critical time in the monitoring prograrn". "Fishery Controls Left 
Gaping Holes; Fraser River Management Compromised Report says." Globe and Mail. 
September 20, 1994. 
' ' ' As detennined in a Canadian Department of Justice review, B. Siegal, supro. note IO4 at 
p. 7, "As some evaluation studies find, the lack of certainty about the balance of the program 
activities or the priority of enforcement in the regulations ofien Ieads to compliance activities 
which lack direction or are inconsistent. The evidence of this found in evaluation studies is a 
jack of national policy direction for undertaking inspection, incomplete enforcement manuals, 
the use of a narrow range of compliance activities, inadequate training for compliance and 
enforcement staff and. a lack of adequate data for assessing effectiveness. The ultimate 
evidence is the lack of political commitment to use Ministerial sanctions for non-cornpliance 
which are currently available in the legislation. mhis lack of certainty of role and 
cornmitment of prograrn management to enforcement activities is detrimental to the 
effectiveness of the cornpliance and enforcement activities, and may undermine their 
credibility with the regulated public." See also L. Muslavova, "Legislative Changes for 
Improved Cornpliance and Enforcement: The Case of Bulgaria, supra note 4 at p. 97- 102. 
degree of reticence to dekgate enforcement pwers. ' l2 
' I2 Proposed criteria for the ranking of the relative propensity of nations to accept the concept 
of delegation of authority is provided by Hofstede, Culme and Organizatiom: Sofiware of 
rhe Mnd (London: McGraw Hill, 1991) cited in Lewicki and Litterer, et al, "lntemational 
Negotiation", in Negotiation, (2nd ed) (Irwin: 1994) 407 at p. 4 17. 
As a precondition to effective enforcement, it has been suggested that it is important that the 
mandates and powers of individual govenunent departrnents and agencies and any other 
relevant parties should be clearly defhed in law: 
Without a stmight - fornard legislative mandate with a solid political base and clear 
standards for the regulator or administrator, compliance policy is foredoomed. 
Regulator - client negotiations will falter; political support and ministerial backing 
will be evanescent. Judicial enforcement wi11 be haphazard, convictions difficult to 
secure, and penalties seldom serious. Consistent expectations will not be generated, 
and regulatory failure is the predictable outcorne. ' l 3  
This includes detennining a policy on centraiization and decenûabtion prescribing in law 
nghts, powers and procedures for inspection, investigation and enforcement actions 
including powers of inspectors (search, seizure), dariQing roles of senior managers such as 
the Director of Enforcement, the Regional Director and Ministers (closure or shutting down 
of a site or plant, cost recovery), the judiciary (sentencing alternatives), and the public (right 
to compel an investigation, or to litigate). This view is supported by the provisions of the 
North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation which in prescribing the 
obligations of the Parties (Govemments of Canada, Mexico and United States) to 
' 1 3  Law Reform Commission of Canada, Smctiom, CompIiance Policy und Administrative 
Lao (Ottawa, August 1 98 1 ) at p. 1 5. As well in its 1988 drafl report Regulatov Compliance: 
Implementing Policy Objectives Fair&, Effectivefy and. Eflciedy,  (Ottawa: Compliance and 
Regulation Remedies Project, 1988) at p. 23 the Law Reform Commission reiterated the need 
for clear reference to an enforcement mandate in law and policy stahng that "an effective 
compliance strategy begins with the regulatory legislation itself' and adding that "an 
uncertain mandate can lead to imprecise policy objectives and unfocussed corn pliance 
strategies". The Law Reform Commission suggested that this lack of clarity often arises 
because those players making Iaw and policy rarely have direct experience with enforcement 
or enforcement oficials are consulted only late in the process. 
effectively enforce their respective environmental laws, also clearly enumerated the 
necessary associated powers, measures and sanctions, as well as requiring the legislation of 
private rïght of access to remedies. 1 14 
Assuming that legislators enact laws ïntending that they should be observe4 it is important 
that they be infiomed of the costs and benefits associated with alternatives modes of 
achieviig compliance including the legal implications of failure to enforce' 15. If effective 
laws are to be enacted, politicians must be competently briefed not only in the substantive 
aspects of a proposed law (for example, redressing human health or environmental 
impacts) but also on the necessary enforcement powers, sanctions and penalties, meanires 
to knplement incentive programs, and other alternative pathways to compliance. As has 
k e n  suggested by one writer, a shift to "more goal-oriented legislation" as opposed to laws 
which merely reference objectives in a preamble, may be required to improve the record of 
116 compliance. Put simply, there is littie point in enacting new laws without p d l e l  
cornmitment to ensuring compliance. This includes providing sufficient personnel and 
financial resources to the enforcement agency or department. 
I l 4  Supra, note 2, article 5,6  and 7. 
' I S  There is ample Canadian legal precedent for irnpoçing civil liability on the governrnent for 
faiIure to take reasonable action to enforce the law. See Swanson, supra note 30; Tock supra, 
note 30; J .  Z. Swaigen, supra, note 43. 
'16 Prof. E. Reuben, "Legislating for Cornpliance: Law and Legislation in the Administrative 
State" as cited in the Law Refonn Commission of Canada Repoc Regulutory Campliiznce: 
Iwementing Policy Objectives Fair&, Effeiveiy, Efiientfy, supra note 1 13 at p. 24. 
Reuben furiher suggests that the actual orga&itional structures which facilitate or promote 
cornpliance should be legislated. 
Before any effective enforcement action can be anticipated, inter-jurisdictional, interagency 
and hh-agency roles and responsibilities must be clarified. Similarly, where jurisdiction is 
shared among central, regional and local levels of govemment and among the various 
institutions within the respective govement bureaucraties it will be important to delineate 
clear lines of responsibility . Finail y, classification of ro les may be necessary within 
agencies to both foster tirnely enforcement responses and to avoid unnecessary conflicting 
policies or actions. Where enforcement requires transboundary response, it may be 
necessary to also =lari@ the roles and responsibilities arnoog nations."' 
i )  INTERJURISDICTIONAL RESPONSIBILIW - NATIONAL VERSUS LOCAL DELIVERY 
A decision to centralize enforcement authority or to delegate it to regional or local 
authorities is dictated both by constitutional division of powers and prevailing political 
philosophies. For example, the fact that a constitutional power is vested in a central or 
national government to regulate the environment, does not automatically mean that in al1 
i 17 The need for promoting transborder cooperation is clearly recognized in the North 
Ametican Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, article 10 (1 0) prescribing that the 
Council [of North American Environment Ministers] "shall encourage (a) effective 
enforcement by each Party of its environmental laws and regulations; (b) cornpliance with 
those Iaws and regulations; and (c) technical cooperation between Parties". In furtherance 
of this obligation the Council in 1996 fonnally established the North American Working 
Group on Environmental Enforcement and Cornpliance Cooperation to advise the 
Commission on these matters and to serve as the regional forum for exchange of expertise, 
joint training and cooperation in enforcement action. See CEC Annual Reports 1995, 1996, 
Montreal, Quebec. 
cases national agencies will choose to assert those powers. in practice each nation has 
adopted its own unique politid repime for enacting and enforcing to enforce 
environmentai laws. In some instances the powers for environmental regulation are reserved 
to the national govemment and in other instances the powes are diverted to other 
govemment levels, on in still other instances, shared. Regardless of where the legislative 
powers is vested, a myriad of alternatives exist for delineating responsibility for 
enforcement. 
As discussed earlier in Chapter II, it is important to clariQ responsibility for enforcement to 
ensure public accountability and to avoid potential liability for failure to initiate tirnely 
responses. Any enforcement and cornpliance strategy must reflect these basic constitutional 
divisions of powers and political realities. The existence of a power of paramountcy or 
oversight does not necessady mean that centralized delivery of an enforcement program is 
necessary or appropriate. For a variety of reasons, many countries have adopted 
decentralized or deconcentrated approaches to program delivery. Depending on the 
constitutional division of powers, the following are some of the choices which may be 
available: 
national laws and centrdized enforcement (centralized); 
centraiized legislative enforcement policy with delegated responsibility for enforcement 
of regional offices of centrai agencies (deconcentrated); 
centralized legislation and development coupled with delegation of enforcement powers 
and responsibilities to regional or local governments (decentralized); 
legislation by centrai and regional or local govemments, with or without consistent 
national policy (shared responsibility). 
state or provincial legislation with local enforcement (local) 
In negotiating agreements arnong govemment levels for the delivery of enforcement 
responsibilities, care should be taken to consider ultirnate liability. Where the law imposes 
a duty on government to enforce, some agencies have decided it wise to retain a power of 
oversight with necessary review and intervention rnechanisms, in those instances where 
enf'orcement hctions have been delegated to other levels of govemment.' l8 
Nonetheless, within the confines of these jurisdictional boundaries govemments have found 
avenues for cooperative resolve of potential overlaps and conflicts and for imposing 
measures for accountability for enforcement. In the United States, for example, regadess 
of parallel responsibilities held by national and state govemments, the majonty of 
environmental enforcement actions are assigned to and exercised by state agencies.l l9 The 
USEPA has estabiished national implementation standards where responsibility for 
enforcement of national Iaws are delegated to the states. The USEPA has additionally 
retained the power to intervene to enforce where the national standards are not met. Clear 
118 For a discussion of oversight responsibilities see L.F. Duncan, "Trends in Enforcement: 1s 
Environment Canada Serious about Enforcing its Laws", supra note 25 at p. 54-56; C. 
Wasserman, "The Principles of Environmental Enforcement", in Proceedings of the 
international Conference on Environmental EnfoTcement, supra, note 4 at p. 1 12. 
119 C. Wasserman, Chief Cornpliance Policy and Planning, USEPA advises that since 1991 
about 70-90% daily inspections and 70% formal enforcements actions were by state agencies, 
ibidatp. 1 1 1 .  
criteria have been established to guide the exercise of the oversight power. in some limited 
cases the national govemment has reserved the power to directly implement universai 
prograrns with cnteria established for dictating these circumstances warranting national 
intervention, such as cases having national significance, evidence of inadequate state action 
or impacthg multiple  tat tes.'^' 
In Canada, powers to regulate the environment are divided between federai and provincial 
governrnents with potentid duplication or conflict in enforcernent re~~onses . '~ '  While no 
broad power of oversight exists, the federal govemment does have a paramountcy power 
where Iegisiative responsibility is shared. For the rnost part, federal officiais have exercised 
thek national mandate through national objectives and through influen~e. '~ In practice each 
order of govemment has developed their own distinct approaches to achieving 
environmentai cornpliance. This has left both orders of governrnent open to public crïticisrn. 
Efforts taken to avoid unnecessary conflict or duplication have hcluded development of 
minor legislation,'* consultations towards harmonization of  standard^,'^" equivalency 
120 fiid at p. 1 12. See also Commission for Environmental Cooperation supra, note 9. 
12' A succinct review of Canadian constitutional division of responsibilities over the 
environment is provided by the Supreme Court of Canada Friendr of the Old M m  River 
Society, supra. note 28. See also A. Lucas 'Naturd Resource and Environmental 
Management: A lurisdictional Primer", Environmental Protection and the Canadian 
Constitution, Proceedings of the Cmiodun Symposium on Jwisdiction and Respomibility for 
the Environment, (Edmonton: Environmental Law Center, 1987) at p. 3 1-43. 
" For example, to claim equivalency, Canadian provinces must prepare "equivalent" 
enforcement and corn pliance policies and enact "equivalent" citizen rights. Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act, R.S .C. (1 985) c. A- 1 2. 
'" See discussion in Environrneni~l Protection and the Cmradan Constitution, supra. note 
1 13 at p. 57-70. 
agreements where only "equivaient" provincial laws are enfor~ed'~* or administrative 
agreements for the enforcement of federd laws by provincial agencies 126. 
A third approach can be evidenced in the Netherlands. While legislative authority rests with 
the national govemment, responsibility for implementation (licensing and enforcement) has, 
to a large part, k e n  delegated to provincial and municipal authorities. As the regional and 
municipal roles are sigrilficant, intermunicipal cooperative associations and Regional 
Environmental Fonuns represent the core of enforcement activity. Al1 three orders of 
govemment contribute to the national cornpliance strategy with financing of 
124 This initiative by the Canadian Council of Environment Ministers (CCME) is purportedly 
directed at reducing unnecessary inte jurisdictional conflicts through harmonized standards 
and administrative arrangements by one of the levels to enforce. See report of the CCMT 
Hamonization Workshop, January 2 1-22, Toronto 1996, Summary Report prepared for the 
CCME; "Statement of tnterjurisdictional Cooperation on Environmental Matters, CCME. 
CCME-IC-26E, Winnipeg. 
125 Equivalency agreements may be created pursuant to S. 34 of the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act, supra, note 114; To date no agreement has ken signed for among other 
reasons a reluctance by provinces to recognize federal jurisdiction over environmental 
impacts of provincial econornic developrnent or to subject themselves to federal scmtiny of 
provincial enforcement actions. For a discussion of this issue see A. Lucas, iiJurisdictionaI 
Disputes: 1s Equivalency a Workable SoIution?", in Into the Future: EnvironmentaZ Law and 
Policy for the 1990's (Edmonton: Environmental Law Center, 1990). 
126 For example, a number of federal - provincial agreements facilitate provincial 
administration and enforcement of the federal Fisheries Act, supra note 103, notably the 
"Canada-Alberta Deleterious Substances Agreement", in efiect since September 1, 1994. For 
a discussion of the effectiveness of intergovernmental agreements see Environmental 
Protection unci the Canadian Comtiiution, Supra, note 2 1 at p. 7 1 -98 and A. Lucas, "Federal 
Concerns and Regional Resources: Harmonization of federal and provincial Environmental 
Polices: The Changing Legal and Policy Frarnework", Canadm EmrironmentaZ L m ,  A. 
Lucas ed. (Scatborough: Butterworths, 1978); F. Gertler, "Interjunsdictional Processes in 
Canada: Lost in (Intergovernmental) Space: Cooperative Federalism in Environmental 
Protection, in Law and Process in Environmental Management, (Calgary: Canadian Institute 
of Resources Law, 1993). 
irnplementation cost-shared by dl three orders. Supplemental funk h m  the national 
government are contingent on adherence to the national strategy, annual progress reports 
and on implementation deadlines. 12' 
In deciding which order of govemment will be made accountable for enforcement, 
consideration should be given to matching a goal of national consistency with asnirance of 
financial and institutional capacity to actuaily deliver programs. A popular response has 
been to retain central responsibility for standard setting, development of enforcement and 
cornpliance policy and assistance and direction in training and to assign local and regional 
governments responsibility for permitting, inspection and enforcement a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~  
Experience has shown, however, that delegation of authority may in some cases be more 
refl ective of a desire to download responsibilities without adequate transfer of the necessary 
resources to enable local enforce~nent.'~~ Any strategy for local delivery rnust ensure actual 
empowerment of local officiais through adequate training and resources, if enforcement is 
1 27 J.A. Peters "The Relationship between Central Govemrnent and ProvinciaVMunicipal 
Authorities with Regard to Enforcement", Proceedings of the Third International Confrence 
on Environmental ENorcement Vol 1, supra, note 4 at p. 269-275. 
178 For cornparisons of approaches taken to resolve inte jun'sdictional division of powen see 
A. Adegoroye, "The Challenges of Environmental Enforcement in Afnca: The Nigeria 
Experience", at p. 43 and O. Kaae, "A Decentralized Approach to Inspection and 
Enforcement Done by Communities and Municipalities in Denmark" in Proceedings of the 
Third international Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 73; C. 
Wasserman, "Principles of Environmental Enforcement", Proceedings of the International 
Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra. note 4 at p. 1 1 1- L 15. 
1 29 See World Bank, World Development Report 1992: Developrnent and the Environment, 
(The World Bank, 1992) at p. 93. The Report provides exceptions to this rule including China 
and Columbia whose laws assign a portion of hydro power sales to local govemments for 
training and implementation and in some instances an apportionment of emission fees. 
in the initial developmental stages of a compliance program some centrai intervention rnay 
also be necessary until local government agencies have tirne to buiid skills and experience. 
in some cases national intervention is made necessary due to the propensity of regional 
govemrnents to defer environmental objectives to economic development priorities. A 
second problem is the tendency to sacrifice environmental enforcement obligations to the 
maintenance of relations between central and regionai or local govemme~ts. To buttress 
against such pervasive influences it may be necessary in the early phases of development of 
an enforcement program to reserve an oversight power to a central govemment authority 
clearly mandated and resourced to push the environmental compliance agenda While 
ultimately the exercise of enforcement power is subject to the influence of prevailing 
politics. This pervasive influence can be deflected to an extent through legislation, 
transparency and accountability mechani~rns.'~~ 
Regardless of the division of powen arnong ordes of government, benefits will corne from 
efforts to reach consensus on the best approach to exercise of their respective powen for 
enforcement. Mechanisms which have been used to institutionalize this division of powers 
''O For example the legislative enactment of rïght of standing for private civil and criminal 
action, the right to petition on enforcement response, the right to trigger a parIiamentary or 
other public review of enforcement action. Examples of these accountability provisions are 
found in the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, supra, note 1 14, sections 108, 109 and 
136; the Yukon Environment Act, S.U. (1991) CS, Part 1; and in the North American 
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 2, articles 6, 7, 14 and 15. 
include intergovemmental agreements, couperative standard setting and review procedures 
(harmonization), intenninisterial commimications, and interagency consultations. ' ' 
ii) AVOIDING INTERAGENCY CONFLICTS 
Experience has s h o w  that, it is equally important to clari@ roles and responsibilities within 
govemment bureaucraties. inevitably the issue will arise whether enforcement programs 
shouid be cenûaiized or decentralized. This involves not only division of responsibilities 
among national, provinciaVregional and local govemments but also arnongst government 
agencies. In the process of establishing environmental control programs, attention must be 
given to existing related programs and authorities and the need for redistribution of 
fünctions for the most effective and economical delivery. Control through the "Rule of 
Law" requires close working relationships among legislators, administrative officiais and 
the judiciary. 
An important process in developing an environmental cornpliance regime is the 
identification and resolution of overlapping mandates and the need to consolidate or 
coordinate laws and programs to avoid unnecessary conflict or duplication in enforcement 
action. Mandates impacting the successfd delivery of an enforcement program include 
powers: 
to impose standards by reguiation, permit or agreement; 
13' A. Lucas, supra, note 12 1. 
to regdate activities through incentives, grants or economic measures; 
to monitor and inspect regdated facilities; 
to investigate or othenivise respond to cornplaints or incidents; and 
to take enforcement sanction non-cornpliance through administrative or criminal action. 
Most agencies have suffered the occasional embarrasment of enforcement action stymied 
by the contrary actions of their coileag~es~ redting in at a minimum regdatory confusion, 
and at worst, failed enforcement action.'32 The best preventative response, is advance 
consideration of this potential problem and adoption of institutionai mechanisms to avoid 
unnecessary conflicts. 
Once a decision is made on the distribution of enforcement responsibilities, agencies must 
be granted necessary legal authority. For example, where the decision is made to assign 
responsibility for inspection and administrative enforcement response to regional agencies, 
the necessary powers of intervention and the available responses must be similarly specified 
in law. Where a decision is reached to assign national enforcement policy direction to the 
central office or headquarters of an environmental agency, laws and policies must be 
revised to authorize policy preparation and to require observance by irnplernenting officiais. 
132 In Canadian law, evidence of official endonement of the offending activity has resulted in 
an acquitta1 based on the defence of officially induced or government induced error. See, 
Regina v. CmcoiZ Z%ermaZ Corporation and Parkinson ( 1  %6), 27 C.C.C. (3d) 295 (Ont. 
C.A.). 
in the absence of consolidation of enforcement responsibilities, measures must be taken to 
coordinate legislative drattUig, hold joint training programs, and build team work to ensure 
enforcement policies and strategies are fully comprehended by al1 hvolved 0fficia1s.l~~ 
Overlapping responsibilities shouid be identified and clarified through legislative 
arnendments or administrative arrangements. 
Experience has shown that clarification of enforcement roles is also important to ensure 
public accountability and to facilitate voluntary cornpliance. Regulated industry is often the 
fim to cornplain of costs of multiple reporting requirements and can be depended on to 
raise the issue of codicting standards of operation when faced with enforcement action. 
Practically speaking, if the public is to be expected to provide a monitoring and reporthg 
role they need to know who to contact. Nothing can more effectively discourage public 
involvement than "buck-passing" on responsibility to take enforcement action. 
As with any law, voluntaq compiiance with environmental laws can be fostered by clear 
communication of enfimement and compliance objectives and e ~ ~ e c t a t i o n s . ' ~ ~  Among the 
'" D. Bryson and D.A. Ullrich, "Legal and Technical Cooperation for Effective 
Environmental Enforcemen~", Proceedings of the Internufiortuf Enforcement Workrhop, 
supro. note 4at  p. 141-149. 
134 For exarnple, the CEPA Enforcement and Cornpliance Poiiq supra, note 15, states in its 
introduction that the purpose of the policy is to "let everyone know what to expect from 
Environment Canada and the officiais who enforce the [Act and its regulations]. It also 
clearly states that " compliance means the state of conformity with the law" and that 
more effective and concise instniments found for communicating expectations to dl 
affected parties is an enforcement and cornpliance policy.135 
An enforcement and compliance policy sets out the manner in which a government intends 
to enforce its laws. It provides a useful accountability mechanism for the concemed public 
to measure political cornmitment to require compliance with environmental standards. It 
sen& a clear message to regulated sectors about anticipated official responses to a violation. 
It provides a policy fiamework for the various departments responsible for enforcement 
action to ensure fair, consistent and officially sanctioaed responses. Enforcement and 
cornpliance policies generally tend to include: 
a statement of the intent to enforce; 
clarifkation of powers to enforce ( inspection, search, seinire); 
description of the players and their respective enforcement roles( inspectors, prosecutoa, 
Minister); 
prescribed cntena for exercise of enforcement responses; 
rneasures taken to prornote voluntary compliance. '36 
compliance is "mandatory". 
13' For a more detailed review of the value of using enforcement and cornpliance policies and 
explanation of the different roles of a policy and strategy see, A Strategic Approach to 
Developing Cornpliance Policies: A Guide, supra note 56 at p. 1-3. See also B. S iegal, supra, 
note 1 04 at p. 1 8. 
136 Examples of enforcement and cornpliance policies include the CEPA Enforcement and 
Cornpliance Policy, supra note 15; British Columbia's Environment, Plunning for the Future: 
Ensuring Effective Enforcement, B .C . Ministry of the Environment; British Columbia Forest 
Pracrices Code, Changing the Wuy We Manage Uur Forest. Tough Enforcement, Discussion 
paper, November 1993, supra note 58; Enforcement Princbles, Alberta Environmenta1 
Protection Departmeni, 1994. 
Public c o d t m e n t  to an enforcement policy can be fiirther increased by ensuring 
participation by concemed and affiected parties in its de~elo~rnent.'~' As stated earlier it 
may be equdly important to confer with responsible officials in parallel agencies, for 
example justice or custorns, to ensure that their respective roles are also agreed to and 
accurately conveyed. 
Political statements of cofnrnitrnent for strict enforcernent of environmental laws will have 
minimum credibility if sufficient resources are not committed and clear direction and 
support given to officials to enable timely and effective enforcement action. Governrnents 
all to fiequently enact laws without adequate attention to how they will h a n c e  compliance. 
While potential financial implications for private parties to achieve compliance is usually 
scrutinized, in the major of cases, minimal attention is given to the net benefits of 
compliance, govenunent costs in enforcing the law and long term public and environmental 
cost of non-cornpliance. 13' 
13' The federal governrnent and the province of British Columbia govemment held public 
consultations on their policies prior to finalization and wide pubtic reIease. 
13' For example, it has been estimated that the clean up cos& for the plastics fire at the 
Plastirnet waste facility in Ontario ranges fiom $2 to $4 million, excluding health costs. 
Prior to the fire, the regional budget for the Ministry of Environment and Energy was 
reduced by more that $1 million coupled with significant reduction in enforcement staff. 
The Gallon Environmental Letter, Canadian Institute for Business and the Environment, 
Vol. No. 13, October 2, 1997, Montreal. 
Full cost accounting for irnplementation of an environmental standard requires 
consideration not only of socio-economic costs of implernenting or not implernenting the 
proposed control but also the cost of ensuring compliance. This should include costs to 
govemment, regulated industry and where appropriate, to the 13' 
A thorough costing exercise for compliance should consider at a minimum the following 
issues: 
the costs of ensuring compliance, Le. permitting, inspection, and surveillance, 
investigation and enforcement action, education/technology transfer; 
the costs of non compliance or non enforcement, Le. potentid liability for darnages; 
who will bear the cost, Le. governrnent or industry ; 
what alternative mechanisms are available for M l  or partial cost recovery of 
enforcement, i.e. taxes, fees, charges, penalties, cost recovery proceedings; and 
the most cost effective alternative to achieving compliance and deter violators. 
The costing exercise should involve an exhaustive review of government needs and 
programme costs. These include staffùig, training, equipment, supervision, drafting 
139 The Crmadm Federd Reguloory Plan, for example, requires completion of a regulatory 
impact analysis statements (RIAS) for each proposed regulation which is published in the 
Canada Gazette for public review and comment. The RIAS is supposed to include costs to 
each of the parties including enforcement coçts. For a review of this process see RL4S: A 
Writer's Guide, (Regulatory Affairs Series, Number 1) (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and 
Services Canada, 1992). In its training programs for enforcement and compliance, UNEP 
recommends also giving consideration to reserving funds for enforcernent and cornpliance 
through cost recovery or establishment of trust fùncis. üNEP, supra note 18 at p. 15. 
enforceabie permit conditions, screening for edorceability, development and delivery of 
inspection programs, review of self monitoring reports, spot checks, preparation of 
compliance data bases, compliance promotion programs, and where appropriate caiculation 
of lost revenues fiom incentive or grant programs.'40 The importance of technicd and legal 
training to effective enforcement cannot be overstated.14' 
It has also been recommended that in the process of imposing regdatory requirements 
consideration also be given to the practicality and financial feasibility of enfor~ernent.~" 
Failure to adequately consider the costs of enforcement can senously affect the credibility 
of the program. Cost saving meamres found to be practicable have included targeted 
inspections and enforcernent 143; interagency agreements to share equipment and facilities 
140 J. Mayda, "Environmental Legislation in Developing Countries: Some Parameters and 
Constraints", (1 985) 12 Ecotogy L. Q. 997 at p. 10 19; L.F. Duncan, "The Rule of Law and 
Sustainable Developrnent", supra, note 25 at p. 292-94; L. F. Duncan and M. A. Santosa, 
BAPEDAL Development P h ,  ReguIatory Cornpliance Programme (Jakarta, B AP E D AL: 
199 1 ), supra note 36. 
141 See Experts Group on Environmental Law of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development, Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development: Legal Principles and 
Recornmendarom, supra note 34 at p. 2 1; G. Rodland and A. Miller, "Nonvay's Experience 
in Building an Inspecter Corps: Education and Financing", Proceedings of the Third 
International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 66-68. 
142 An example of the need to look ahead to enforcement costs is a lesson shared by the 
Netherlands where they were required to rescind a waste management law which when 
implemented was determined to require the hiring of 200-300 additional inspectors to enforce 
the new requirements. See C. Wassennan, International Conference on Environmental Law, 
supra, note 4 at p. 53. 
143 For example Environment Canada prepares annual inspection plans in which prionty 
inspections are identified; The USEPA has adopted a strategy of targeted enforcement 
actions. 
1 44 for example laboratones; institution of joint training programs; cross appointment of 
inspectors. Some jurisdictions fiaance thek enforcement programs fkom the proceeds of 
any charge or penalty rather than the common practice of directing those revenues to a 
consolidated revenue h d .  14' 
Decisioas about expenditures on enforcement should be premised on an understanding by 
146 policy maken and legislaton of potential liability for non-enforcement. The cost of 
enforcemenf therefore, mut  also be weighed against the potentid costs (direct and indirect) 
of non-enforcement. It has been suggested that the act of non-enforcement may itself attract 
liability . 14' 
It wil1 aiso be important to decide whether to tramfer ail or part of the costs of enforcement 
to the regdated party. Where a decision is made to transfer the costs, consideration shouid 
- 
'" For example in the United States, four regional associations of state (and in some cases 
federal) enforcement agencies jointly design and deliver training programs. More recentiy, 
Canadian agencies are now also collaborating in these cost shared initiatives. 
145 See for example Gro Rodland, "Cornpliance Monitoring in Norway", in Vol. 1 of the 
Proceedings of the International Cogerence an Environmental Enforcement, supra. note 4 at 
p. 3 19-323; G. Bandi, "Some Methodological Aspects of Designing Regulations and Setting 
Priorities in Economics Under Transition", in Vol. 1 of the Proceedings of the infernafional 
Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 118; V. Mezricky, 
"Environmental Inspection in Transition in the Czech Republic", ibid at p. 81: G. Rodland 
and A. Miller, supra, note 141, Proceedings of the nird International Conference on 
Environmenfa1 Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 66. E. Barr supra, note 34 at p.2 1 1 
recomrnends using proceeds of fines to reduce enforcement deficits and to speed action to 
reduce past h m .  
14' For example Canadian courts have found govemments legally liable for damages arising 
fiom inadequate inspection or enforcement responses, see comments, supra. note 47. 
147 J. Z. Swaigen, supra note 43 at p. 18 1. 
be given to relative capacity of large or smali entities to bear the costs and ensuring 
flexibility in the compliance regirne to d o w  for flexibility. In some jurisdictions, specific 
guidelines have been ins t i~ed  to guide administrators or courts in rnakuig detennination 
about relegating enforcement costs to the regulated facility. 14' 
Cost recovery alternatives have included fees and charges, imposition of self monitoring 
and reporting requirements, administrative or judiciai orders for recovery of costs of 
cleanup, investigation, enfiorcement, penalties which consider economic gain boom non 
compliance. Pnor to implementing any economic incentive or cost recovery initiatives, 
countries wodd be wise to consider the experiences of other j~risdict ions.~~~ 
2. AN ENFORCEMENT AND COMPL~ANCE STRATEGY 
A commonly held but none the less inaccurate presumption is that once environmental 
I J 8  A study by the Law Refom Commission of Canada recommends that in sentencing 
environmental offenders, the courts give consideration to among other factors, ability to pay, 
size and wealth of the corporation, the social utility of the enterprise and tax consequences of 
the fine. JZ. Swaigen et al, Senrencing in Environmental Cases, Protection of Life Series, a 
Study Paper prepared for the Law Reform Commission of Canada (Ottawa, 1985). See also 
Bara, supra, note 29 and R v. Norrhern Metdlic Sales, Reasons for Judgement, Judge Bany 
Stuart, Temtorial Court of the Yukon, September 13, 1994. 
1 49 For a review of experiences with economic or market measures see in Vol. 1 and II of the 
Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Emtironmentul Enforcement, supra. 
note 4; Organization of Economic Development, Environment Cornmittee Group of 
Econornic Experts, Economic Insimments for Environmental Protection in the United States, 
(Paris: OECD, 1 986); S. Webb, "Managing the Market to Achieve Ecologically Sustainable 
Development" (Kew : 1 99 1 ); The Polhfer P q s  Principe: Definition, Analysis, 
Implemenration (Paris: OECD, 1975); "An Assessrnent of the Implementation of the Polluter 
Pays Principlet', [unpublished] (OECD, 1982). 
standards or objectives are impose4 compliance can be automaticaily anticipated. 
Experience has shown that this is rarely the case. To enhance rates of compiiance in pardel 
with processes for setting standards. attention shouid be given to the preparation of a 
cornpliance strategy. ' " 
As previously outlined, an enforcement and compliance policy is a public affirmation of 
basic principles underlying the enforcement regime for any law or regulation. It espouses 
officia1 - either political or administrative - cornmitment to enforce and ofien restates the 
duty to comply. It clarifies roles of government officiais, covering the full spectnim of 
playen nom Ministers to field uispectors, regulated industry and community. It often 
specifies policies for responding to government violators. An enforcement policy specifies 
the criteria for selection of enforcement responses and sanctions. Many policies also state 
government positions on voluntaq compliance initiatives. 
An enforcement strategy, on the other hand, represents the intemal bureaucratie framework 
or work plan for implementing an enforcement policy and exercising related enforcement 
powes and alternative mechanisms for fostering compliance, to respond to violations 
including the exercise of alternative powen of intervention and sanction. A strategy 
incorporates decisions about necessary m g ,  skills, training, inspection protocols and 
I5O For example, since 1992 the Governrnent o f  Canada has required preparation and 
reporting in the Canadian Gazette of a compliance strategy as a component o f  the regdatory 
impact assessrnent o f  any proposed regulation. See A Sharegic Approach to Devefoping 
Cornpliunce Policies: A Guide, supra note 56. 
procedures to institute enforcement policies. It refiects decisions to target specified sectoa 
or regulatees. It clarifies mechanisms for evaluating the chosen strategy, inclusive of the 
various indicators of success or failure. Most importantly, it enables an agency to 
implement an enforcement program in a thoughtful, consistent manner. 
A compliance strategy c m  be used as both a preemptive and reactive tool. It can be used to 
assist government agencies in scheduling necessary Iegislative and regulatory refom to 
provide more effective measures to deter offenden or to enable more timely response. It cm 
assist agencies in their reactions to non-cornpliance by establishing protocols for response 
to cornplex interagenc y or transboundary enforcernent pro blems. ' ' 
Strategic choices are made by govemments in the selection of control insûuments 
(regdation, permit, compliance conûact), the scope of powers, the nature of the regulated 
Party, use of incentives, moni to~g  prograrns and sanctions and roles assigned to the 
pblic. 'j2 
In designing an enforcement sûategy, it has ken  suggested that it may be important to also 
recognize banien, deficiencies and special influences on the potential success of various 
"' For example, in response to significant transborder illegal trade in hazardous wastes 
and chloroflwocarbons (CFCs) the enforcernent agencies of the United States, Canada and 
Mexico have been developing and implementing a strategy to improve their capacity to 
detect and respond to violations. 
152 Supra, note 149. 
enforcement actions. These can include the capacity of the regulatee to comply; the ready 
enforceability of the pdcular  law; the capacity of the agency to enforce (training and 
empowerment); societal and attitudinal and, relative political priorities.'" 
Decisions made in each case may be critical to the ultimate success and credibili~ of an 
enforcement program. It is therefore critical to the future success of individuai enforcement 
actions that govemments give early attention to addressing major policy issues and adopt a 
specific strategy towards ~om~liance. '*~ It must dso be recognized that while there rnay be 
wide avenue for flexibility in individual enforcement respooses, ultimate credibility of the 
strategy requires that boundÿries be placed on exercise of discretion including adherence to 
statutorily imposed standards and procedures and officia1 compliance policies. ' 56 
153 The attitude of govemment is as important as the attitudes of the targeted parties. It has 
been the experience of Dutch oficials that the " attitudes of the administration strongly 
affects the success of enforcement. An administrator with a negative attitude wiIl be unwilling 
to equip the enforcement department of his organization with the power it requires. He is also 
likely to impose many administrative sanctions (recognizance, closure). In short, an 
enforcement official may work as hard as he likes, but without the support of the 
administration, he will achieve Me". J.A.M. Van Ekeren et al, "Information Campaigns 
Benefit Enforcernent of Environmental Laws", Proceedings of the International Confe~ence 
on Environmental Law, supra, note 4 at p. 287. See also D. Saxe, supra, note 7. 
1 54 Supra, note 142. 
155 The USEPA for example have recently revised their compliance strategy to give pnority 
to pollution prevention, and risk reduction, and to target " significant non-cornpliers". See R. 
van Huevelen and P. Rosenburg "Successfbt Cornpliance and Enforcement Approaches", 
Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Errvironmental Enforcernent supra, 
note 4 at p. 163. See also H. Versteeg, kamining the Cment und Proposed of the Canadim 
Environmental Protection Act to Incorporate Pollution Prevention and Strategies, Final 
Report, (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 1993). 
156 AS pointed out by Canadian govemment strategies report, extra-legal responses rnay 
ensure a cooperative working relationship between regulator and industry but if premised on 
turning a blind eye to IegaIIy ùnposed standards they wiIl ultimately h m  the credibility of 
the agency, supra. note 142 at p. 9. 
A compliance strategy has been found to assist government agencies in detemiining critical 
questions about the uttirnate delivery of the intended environmental or developmental 
control.ls7 Strategic choices must be made in the seiection of control instruments 
(regdation, permit, compliance, contract), use of incentives, monitoring programs and 
~i~11ctions. Each decision is criticai to the success of a compliance program and each is 
affiected by the other. It is therefore critical to the future success of individual enforcement 
actions to address major policy issues and to adopt a specific strategy which remains 
responsive to changing times and priorities. Is8 The following are arnong the criticai issues 
agencies have found usehi to consider in formulating an enforcement and compliance 
strategy. 
A determination of the capacity to comply shouid be based on independent studies of the 
157 A useful review of the purpose and method of preparing of a compliance strategy is 
provided, in the report of the Canadian Regdatory Compliance Project, ibid; See also C. 
Wasserman, supra, note 4. 
158 The USEPA for exarnple have recently revised their enforcement and compliance 
strategies to give greater priority to pollution prevention and risk reduction and to target 
"significant noncornplien". See R. van Huevelen et al "Successfil Compliance and 
Enforcement Approaches", Proceedings of the Third International Conference on 
Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 163; USEPA, Enforcernent in the 1990% 
Project: Recommendatium of the Analytical Workgroups (USEPA: Washington, 1 99 1); In the 
NetherIands, the National Coordination Committee for Environmental Law Enforcement 
(LCCM) prepares annual national enforcement programmes. See J. A. Peters, sqr4  note 56, 
at p. 274. 
targeted group, research into the available control technologies and anticipated costs and 
159 revenues. Consultations with the regulated indwtry can improve the probability of 
redistic controls and rimelines in ~ o r n ~ l i a n c e . ' ~ ~  It can help counter p s t  regdatory 
arguments by ind- regarding the technical or £inancial viability of the control. 
Enforcement costs can Vary for each particular statute or regdation. A full cost accounting 
for irnplementation of an environmental standard or objective requires that consideration be 
given to al1 necessary costs, not only those bom by the regulated party (Le. retrofitting, 
training,). Cornpliance costs borne by govemment include personnel, training, equipment, 
investigations, educational programs and matends as well as lost revenues through grants 
or tax incentives. Costs of implementing and administering market measures are another 
fkequentiy forgotten or underestimated COQ l 6  ' 
1 59 Pollution control obligations atso can be profitable to the regulated industry, for example 
the sale of sulphur as a by product of sour gas processing. Pollution controls can mate an 
economic opportunity. Legal requirements to properly treat and dispose of toxic wastes 
support the growth and innovation in the waste management and control technology 
indussies. 
160 Supra, note 142 at p. 15. 
161 S. A. Heman and P. Verkirt, "CIosing Remarks for the Third International Conference on 
Environmental En forcement", VOL II, Pmceedings of the nird International Conference on 
Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 256; E. Cowan (Rapporteur) "Enforcement of 
Economic Instruments", Vol. Il, Proceedings of the Third Internaiional Conference on 
Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 197. 
A compliance strategy can clan@ w h ~  can and should bear the costs of implementation. 
Where the decision is made to impose al1 or part of the costs of compliance on the targeted 
industry, the "polluter pays" principle can be manifested through a variety of mechanisms 
including pollution fees and charges,lg requirements, or sentencing powers. 163 The strategy 
may propose legislative reforms to implement these measures or recommend preferential 
use. 
A compliance strategy ensures that decisions about choice of coercive vernis econornic 
measures are premised on full consideration of practical experiences with the alternative 
instruments and anticipated costs to both govemment and the regulated parties (large and 
srnail industries).164 In this way care can be take to ensure incentives directed at reducing 
impacts on one medium (e.g. water) do not resuit in increased impacts on another (e.g. land 
or ,). lS5 
162 The Czech govemrnent has legislated a fee scale for waste disposition calculated 
according to risk of harm and individual record of compliance, K. Velek, Tome Information 
on Enforcernent concerning Solid and Hazardous Waste Disposal in Czechoslovakia". 
Proceedings of htemational Conference on Environmental Enforcement, szpru, note 4 at p. 
5 17. Norway apparently charges back to regulated industry the costs of its inspection and 
audit program. See G. Rodland and A. Miller et al, supra note 14 1, Proceedings of the ntird 
Internutionaf Conference on Environmental Enfrcement, supra note 4 at p. 66. See also 
Petea et al. "The Enforcement of Environmental Charges in the Netherlands", ibid at p. 487; 
Rasnic, "Enforcement of Economic Instruments in The United States", ibid, p. 495 for a 
detailed discussion of problems in effectiveness and costing of economic measures. 
163 For example, the CEPA empowen the court to order an offender to post a bond or pay 
money into court is an arnount necessary to ensure compliance; to cornpensate the 
govemrnent for remedial or prevention action; to pay monies to research improved disposal 
methods. Supra, note 1 17. 
164 Supra, note 53.  
1 65 For a discussion of the need for a multi media approach to regulation and enforcement see 
R.B. Cheatham, J.R. Edward, W.H. Frank, R.J. Satterfield, "Innovative Multi-media 
Where a variety of compliance measriles are proposeci, safeguards shodd be instituted to 
prevent or avoid potential impacts on enforcement actions. A compliance strategy cm 
incorporate consultative mechanisms between permitting and enforcement agencies to 
ensure approaches are integrated and coordinated. 
cl WHO ARE THE TARGETED PARTIES? 
A strategy for enforcement shouid address whether the targeted parties are public or private, 
individual or corporate. Similarly it will be important to consider the efficacy of 
surveillance for all regulated parties or only those with poor compliance records. It has ken  
recommended that these issues be addressed at the deveiopmental stage for any standard or 
law. 1 66 
In the standard-setting process a decision must be made about imposition of legal liability, 
that is, will responsibility for operathg standards be imposed on both private and public 
Cornpliance, Enforcement and Pollution Prevention Approaches to Environmental 
Cornpliance at Federal Facilities in the United States of America", Proceedings of the nird  
International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 34 1 ; "Summary 
of Workshop: Integrated Perrnitting and inspection", ibid, p. 33 5. 
IM It should be noted that Parliament cm bind the provincial and federal orders of 
government (e.g. s-4, CEPA, & s.3(2) of the Fisheries Act). This means that govemment 
departments and agencies can be prosecuted. For example the USEPA focus their 
enforcement responses on "significant non-cornpliers". The USEPA have found this targeted 
approach to be both more cost effective and to yield better results. They advise that the 
existence of a list of "significant non-cornpliers" also has encouraged listed parties to be more 
proactive in compliance. See van Huevelen and P. Rosenbrug et al, supra, note 154. 
facilitie~.'~' Where public facilities are also subject to the regulations, it will be important 
to consider the liability implications of failure to enforce the law against public violators 
and the overall impact to the credibility of the enforcernent program.168 A strategy which 
involves potential enforcement actions against govenunent faciIities necessitates advance 
review and consideration by senior policy officials, as it will most certainly attract 
considerable controversy within the bureaucracy. 
Whether the party targeted by the control is an individual, srnail family enterprise or major 
corporation should be factored in the compliance strategies. A conscious decision should be 
made at the t h e  of development of a law or regdation whether targeting corporate 
directors and officers will improve compliance rates.16' Similarly the choice of sanctions 
and penalties should reflect the special character of potential offenders and legal or political 
limitations to their exercise. For example, in some jurisdictions while criminal prosecution 
cannot be commenced against corporations, directors and officen can be charged. "O Where 
16' For a review of various 
operated facilities see E.F. 
Facilities, Proceedings of the 
supra, note 4 at p. 476; A. 
approaches to seeking com pliance by governrnent-owned and 
Lowry, " Enforcement at Govemrnent Owned or Operated 
Third International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, 
Delong (Rapporteur) "Enforcement at Governrnent-owned or- 
Operated Facilities", ibid, p. 1 89- 190. 
168 Environment Canada prepared a separate policy document and held special briefing 
sessions for other federal departrnents in advance of the enactment of the CEPA. 
169 It also should be recognized that in some instances flexibility in choice of target for 
enforcement action may be Iimited by prevailing laws. For example in the Republic of 
Indonesia, criminal proceedings, with the exception of economic crimes, may only be 
initiated against real persons, not corporations. See Law no. 8. 1981, regmding the Criminal 
Law of Procedure, Republic of Indonesia. 
public facilites are also targeted, a more appropriate response may be control or cleanup 
orders rather that imposition of monetary penalties. 
Care should be taken in exercising inconsistent enforcement responses based solely on 
hancial c q ~ a c i t ~ . ' ~ '  A more effective path to compliance rnay be targeting educationai 
programs to srnaller companies and encouraging self audit by major corporatims. On the 
other hand, variances in response may be more appropriately at the time of sentencing or 
order.' 72 
Finally, while the standard may apply to a broad category of parties, it may be more cost 
effective to target enforcement actions against a specific sector or a select group. For 
example, the development of a compliance data base will enable officials to target 
inspections and response to those with a known record of non ~ornpliance.'~~ The same data 
base will enable better management of compliance incentives program.'74 
'" E. Barr, supra  note 34. 
172 See J. Swaigen, supra, note 
supra note 57. 
f74 For example, Czech officials reportedly factor compliance records into their calculation of 
pollution charges See K. Velek, "Some Information on Enforcement Conceming Solid and 
Hazardous Waste Disposed in Czechoslovakia", Vol. 1, Proceedings of the Internafional 
Conference on Environmenfal Enfrcement, supra note 4 at p. 5 17. Poland rewards timely 
response by polluters by allowing reduction in allotted fines where the offendea complete an 
ecological investment within a prescribed time period. 2. Kamiefiski. "Pnxess of Upgrading 
the Polish Environmental Procedures", Vol. 1, Proceedings of the W d  Intemational 
Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supru, note 4 at p. 56. 
d) WHA T1s AN APPROPRIA TE RULE FOR THE VAMOUS PUBLICS OR DIRECT 
BENEFICIARIES OF THE CONTRUL? 
A compliance strategy should also address the intended role for the public in fostering 
compliance or triggering enforcement action. A wide variety of non-govemment entities 
can be identified as providing potentiaily beneficiai contributions to enforcement and 
compliance programs including speciai interest organizations (environmentai, development) 
indutrial associations, unions, professional societies (engineers, lawyers. auditos), 
universities and private consultants. "' 
In some cases enforcernent agencies have expanded their capacity to deliver monitoring and 
enforcement functions through a concerted strategy to facilitate public involvement. Private 
legal action can supplement efforts of enforcement agencies where political or inter- 
jurisdictional problems constrain government response. This may require legislative 
arnendments to extend private 
responses to private actions. 
nghts of action and policy decisions regarding official 
For some nations the enactment of citizen enforcement 
175 For a more thorough list see C. Wasserrnan , "Principles of Environmental Enforcement", 
international Conference on Erwironmentaf Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 1 17. The North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation provides for the establishment of both 
regional (Joint Public Advisory Cornmittee) and national advisory committees. The Parties of 
the Agreement have appointed representatives of ENGOs, indusûy associations, municipal 
and tribal govemments to advise them in the delivery of their obligations, including effective 
enforcement. See articles 16, 17. See also S. Casey-Lefkowitz, et al, "The Evolving Role of 
Citizens in Environmental Enforcement", Vol. 1, Proceedings of the Fowth International 
Conference on Environmental Enjorement, supra note 4 at p. 22 1; Special Topic Workshop 
H: Public Role in Enforcement: How to Go About Creating and Supporting Effective Citizen 
Enforcement, ibid, pp. 509-528. 
1 76 Many junsdictions have a policy of public intervention to stay private action or to 
discourage cooperation in case preparation. For a review of issues involved in private 
prosecutions see L. F. Duncan, Enforcing Emtironrnental L m  A A i d e  to Privale 
rights is required by international law.'" 
Community based organizations can provide a wful watch dog role supplementing limited 
resources for goveniment surveillance. Strategies for facilitating comxnunity watch have 
included legal requirements to submit monitoring reports to specified cornmunity 
organizations, and public hotlines for cornplaints or incident reporting. In some instances 
the establishment of comrnunity monitoring teams are made ternis of operatkg licence. 
Constructive participation requires a conscious effort to lend support to community to build 
effective linkages. Cornmitment to provide technical training and communication channels 
Industnal associations can also provide a useful conduit for information to regulated parties 
on regdatory and cornpliance initiatives as well as technology tramfer. In some instances 
mentoring programs have been instituted to foster exchange of environmental management 
and technological expertise between larger corporations and small to medium facilities. 
Prosecution (Edmonton: Environmental Law Centre, I 990) 
1 77 ibid, article 6 .  The NAAEC requires the Parties to provide legal right to compel 
investigations, and private right of access to administrative, civil, and cnminal proceedings 
and remedies. supra. note 3. 
178 For example, the Texas National Conservation Authority has given support to a 
community-based monitoring program for sampling and reporting on potable water quality. 
A training program was initiated by the Alberta Environmental Law Centre in 1997 to 
support community involvement in monitoring and reporting on environmental offences. 
The Commission for Environmental Cooperation, North American Environmental Fund 
has provided grants to a series of community based projects throughout North Arnerica 
establishing community monitoring programs. 
Cooperation of workers, including govemment employees, can be encourageci through 
"whistie blower" provisions.'79 The expanded use of environrne11tal and compliance audits 
by industry and govemment has created a significant niche for private consultants in 
directing voluntary cornpliance efforts. A number of govemments have adopted policies of 
supporthg protection of information from private audits to help facilitate private efforts to 
180 comply . 
The development and implementation of an effective enforcement and compliance program 
also depends on a constructive relationship among govemment officials. Any strategy must 
address the degree of independence to be accorded to enforcement officials as well as 
measures for coordinating responses. This may be particularly cntical to avoid conflicts 
between those managing incentive programs and those exercising enforcement responses. It 
will be important to employ measures to ensure close coordination between regdators, 
prosecutions, judiciary and politicians.18' 
Any effective enforcement and corn pliance strategy will also address enforcea bili ty in the 
179 See for example, Yukon Environment Act* S.Y. (199 1 ) CS, S.20. 
180 See CEPA Enforcement a d  Compliance PoIicy* supra, note 15 at p. 29. 
18 1 E. Barr, supra. note 34 at p. 63; L.F. Duncan and M. A. Santosa, BAPEDAL D e v e l o p ~  
P h ,  Regulctory and Compliance Program, supra note 36. 
instrument which establishes standards, compliance promotional programs, compliance 
monitoring, choice of sanction and program evaluation. The rernainder of the chapter will 
discuss these components in greater detail. 
The backbone of any effective enforcement regime is the implementation of clear measures 
to determine compliance and to detect violati~ns. '~~ This requires the imposition of legally 
binduig, precise, measurable and readily understood standards. It is equally important that 
those standards be integrated and consistent Standards must be kposed in a timely fashion 
and in consultation with the afTected Contrary to a popular assumption that the 
regdatory process is cost prohibitive, taking the effort to impose legally binding standards 
cm provide a cost efficient route to compliance, 
Environmental agencies c m  increase compliance by developing regulations and 
permïts that are enforceable. A system which combines enforceable regulations with 
the promise that the governrnent will respond firmly to violations ultimately 
encourages a high level of voluntary compliance. M e n  industry is motivated to 
control its own operations in order to achieve environmental standards, the need for 
public expenditure on inspectoa and bureaucrats cm be reduced, thus, enforceable 
standards contribute to efficiency as weil as achievement of environmentai goals.184 
182 World Commission on Environment & Development, supra. note 7; Agenda 21, Chapter 
8, supra, note 2; Fomdex Report, Environment und Devefopment, (International 
Conciliation), January 1972 at p. 22. 
1 83 C. Wasserman provides a detailed review of  factors to consider in standard setting in C. 
Wasserman, " Principles of Environmental Enforcement ", Vol. 1. Proceedings of the 
Intentational Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra. note 4 at p. 67, at p. 43-63. 
For a helpful reference to check lists for drafting enforceable regulûtions and permits, see S.F. 
Fulton and E.J. Gilberg " Developing Enforceable Environmental Regulations and Permits ", 
supra, note 4 at p. 253. 
1 84 S. F. Fulton, lbid at p. 253. 
This section reviews lessons leamed about the value of founding an enforcement and 
compliance regime on a sound system of precise, legally binding environmental standards. 
The enactment of clear, legally binding standards sets the stage for more effective 
enforcement targ eting . The imposition by iaw of pollution control standards and procedures 
sends a clear message to regulated industry that compliance means compliance with the 
law. The law should speciQ who is bound, the precise standards, deadlines for compliance, 
self -monitoring or reporting obligations, assign enforce powers and prescribe sanctions for 
noncornpliance. 185 
The establishment of clear binding standards will be critical regardless of the choice of 
compliance tool, that is, "command" and "control" or market instrument. Prescribed targets 
provide the foundation for a fair and consistent inspection and enforcement regime. They 
provide the minimum requirements for design and operation of facilities in a cornpliant 
manner, targets for self motivated technological innovation and for the calculation of 
185 See C. Wasserman. Proceedings of International Conference on Environmentul 
Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 54-56 and 60-62 for a more detailed list of recommended 
provisions of an enforceable law or permit. See also Environmental Protection and 
Sustainable Development Legal Principles and Recommendutions. adopted b y  the Expert 
Group on Environmental Law of the Worid Commission on Environment And Developrnent, 
Article 4, "General Principles conceming Natural Resources and Environment Interferences" 
(London, June 1986) at p. 24. 
effluent charges and taxes.'86 They also provide a measme of accountability. 
While considerable effort is kquently expended on establishing ambient objectives and on 
monitoring background contaminant levels, to be legdy enforceable, standards must set 
clear targets for specified sources. Each jurisdiction explains its own unique means of 
irnposing standards including legislation, regulations, licenses or perrnits and contracts or 
agreements. l" In stiil other cases the standards evolve fkorn an intensive facility-wide audit 
process. For example, Mexico, while establishing some standards through common means 
such as statutes or pemiits, have also introduced a unique standard setting process through 
intensive facility specific audits. 
In most jurisdictions statutes are the selected instrument for imposing general rights and 
prohibitions and duties for a standard setting process (including the right of affected parties 
to participate in standard setthg or to appeal).188 Similady, statutes have proven the 
186 Agenda 21, article 8.13 supports this position. "Laws and replation suited to country- 
specific conditions are among the most important instruments for transforming environment 
and development policies into action, not only through 'command and control' rnethods, but 
also as a normative framework for economic planning and market instruments", as cited in G. 
Bendi, supra, note 45, in the Proceedings of the Third international Conference on 
Environmen tal Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 1 1 5. 
187 For a more detailed review of the use and relative advantages of each mechanism see C. 
Wasserman, supra note 4 and the Report of the Auditor General of Cunada to the House of 
Comrnons, Chpter I I ,  (Ottawa: Department of the Environment, Conservation and 
Protection, 1 99 1 ). 
188 See for example the CEPA, supra. note 122; Alberta Environmental Protection and 
common instniment for imposing legal liability for non-cornpliance. Ig9 Where the greatest 
variances occurs, is in the choice of instrument to impose more precise standards specified 
pollutants or facilities. 
A common pmctice where environmental regimes are newly established is to emct basic 
umbrella statutes enshrining environmental principles such as the duty to protect the 
environment or a general prohibition against Many such umbreiia laws were 
speedily enacted leading into the 1992 Rio UNCED  onf fer en ce.'^' What is ofien missing 
however are the parallel instruments to impose site specifïc operating standards. This has 
led to failed and costly attempts at enfiorcement, with additional side effects of damage to 
the credibility of enforcement agencieç.lg2 
Enhancement Act, S.A. (1 992) c. E- 13-3; Law No. 4, 1982, regarding Basic Provisions for 
Mmagement of the Environment, [Republic of Indonesia] supra note 1 03. 
IB9 It rnay be noted that enforcernent actions have floundered where governments have not 
clearly prescnbed liability for damage from polluting activities. See for example S. 
Haryanto," Environmental law enforcement needs improving", Jakarta Post, April23, 
199 1 ,  p.6 in which he identifies various inadequacies of the Indonesian Environmental 
Management Act including failure to precisely define strict liability. It  may be noted that the 
new law enacted in 1997 purportedly addresses this gap (Interview with M. A. Santosa, 
Montreal, October 1997). 
''O Examples of this type of inaugural legislation include the Canadian Fisheries Act, supra 
note 103, which enacted a general prohibition against the deposit of any substance into 
waters fiequented by fish which may be deleterious to the fish or their habitat, or human 
consumption; Indonesia Act no. 4 of 1982, supra, note 103, creates a right to a healthy 
living environment and a general obligation on every person to prevent and abate pollution 
(sections S(1) and (2)). 
19' For example, Indonesia's Environmental Mmagement Act, ibid; Mexico's General Law 
of Ecological Equilibrium and Emironmental Protection, Diario oficial d e  la Federacion, 
28 January 1988, amended by decree published 13 December 1996. 
192 For exarnple the Indonesia Case no. 122/Pid/B/I 988/PNSda ugainst Bambung Gunawan 
a. R a Oei Ling Gwat and no. I42/Pen. Pi& 988/PNSda, Sidoarjo Disiricf Court. 
One way to prevent this kind of scenario is to contain these broad obligations or 
prohibitions by the creation of more precise standards through associated approvals, 
authorizations, regulations or pexmits.'93 This of course necessitates parallel action to 
M t u t e  the necessary administrative systems for implementing these ancillary 
instruments. lw 
Also often disregarded is the propensity of legislation to ûigger a concomitant 
responsibility to ensure cornpliance. The act of creating a legislated standard may not only 
impose a duty on the p d e s  specified to comply with the obligation and but also a duty on 
govemment to enfor~e.'~' Consequently care rnust be taken by regdatory agencies in 
enacting standards to ensure that they have given equal attention in program development 
and budget processes to mechanisms for both detection and response. 
Legislation is also an appropriate tool for prescribing a consistent standard-setting process, 
and according participatory and appeals rights. It may also be worth restating the need to 
pay similar heed to the binding nature of legislated procedural d e s ,  for example for 
-- 
19' See for example, Yukon Environment Act, supra, note 179; Canadian Fisheries Act, supra, 
note 103; Indonesia's Environmental Management Act, supra note 1 03. 
f 94 L. F. Duncan and P. Moestadji , "Appendix: A Critical Path for Implementing Pollution 
Control Legislation", in The Licensing System for Environmental Pollution Contrd in the 
Republic of Indonesia (Jakarta: Indonesian Ministry o f  Population and Environment, 1992) 
(Studi Perizinan Pengendaliaw Pencemaran Ling Kungan di hdonesia, N i d  1 dan Jilid II). 
195 For a review o f  Canadian law on the duty to enforce see Swunson, supra, note 30; 
Kamloops, supra, note 30; Tooke; supra. note 3 0; Swaigen, supra, note 43 at p. 148. 
envkomnentai impact assessment, emergency response, or emissions trading d e s .  Where 
procedural d e s  are prescribed in law, the need will arke to enforce. Expenence has shown 
that it may be preferable to legislate ody  the minimum procedurai d e s  dlowing for more 
flexible response purniant to guidelines or iderior Iegd instruments. This can help agencies 
in avoiding an otherwise unmanageable enforcement load.'" 
ii) REGULATIONS 
As previously mentioned, regdations have generally been found useful for establishing 
minimum national or regional standards for specified substances or for sources of pollutants 
by sector. Regulations c m  provide a consistent prescribed standard for negotiation of site- 
specific licenses or permits. They can also be used to provide more detailed cntena for 
review and approval of development applications. However, the regulation making process 
can prove to be extremely costly and tirne consuming , resulting in unnecessary delays in 
prescribing technical operating çtandar~is.'~' A more practicable alternative can be the 
enactment by law or regulation of licensing or permitting requirernents and procedures 
leaving the site-specific standard setthg process to the latter process . 
196 For example, the Republic of Indonesia in its first enactment of an environmental 
impact assessment process sstablished the legal obligation to conduct assessments of not 
only proposed but existing facilities. This created what became an overwhelming and 
basically impossible task of enforcing the impact assessment law against virtually hundreds 
of thousands of parties. The Iaw has been since arnended to lirnit the application of the 
requirement. See also C. Wasseman, supra, note 137. 
197 The RepubIic of Indonesia for example, has faced considerable delays in attempts to 
prescribe site specific standards through the regulatory process. See L. F. Duncan and P. 
Moestadj i, supra, note 194 and I. C. E. L. News Bulletin, June 1996, Jakarta. 
iii) LICENSE OR PERMIT 
Once minimum standards are established, agencies have found that flexibility in site 
specific standards can be accommodated through the licensing or permitting processes198. 
This af5ords greater flexibility in determining site-specific standards such as sensitivity of 
receiving environment, cumulative impacts from loading of other adjacent sources or age of 
the facility. The imposition of these site-specific control standards, monitoring requirements 
and inspection schedules also facilitates ready parameten for self-monitoring and 
enforcement activities. As will be discussed later on, care should also be taken to integrate 
licensing processes to ensure consistency in approvais and in later enforcement 
199 responses. 
As a b a l  consideration for the standard setang process, perhaps among the more hstmting 
experiences for an enforcement officid is the discovery at the tirne of the attempted 
enforcement action that the alleged violated "standards" are in fact not legally enforceable. 
As a preemptive measure, some jurisdictions incorporate an enforceability screening 
process for draft regdations and pennits. Varied approaches have adopted including 
198 See C. Wasseman, supra, note 137 at p. 59. 
199 See "Special Topic Workshop C : Integrated Permitting and Inspection" and "Special 
Topic Workshop L : Creating Enforceable Permit Programs and Requirernents: Discussion 
Focus on Water Pollution and Contamination of Drinking Water Supplies". Pmceedings of 
the Fourth International Conference on Environmental Cornphce and Enforcement, 
supra, note 4 at p. 333 to 378; 61 1 to 654. 
establishment of drafting teams which combine technical and legal experts; preparation of 
mode1 conditions; interna1 review processes enabling feedback among regdatory and 
enforcement officiais including debriehgs following enforcement action. It will be equally 
important to ensure that permïtting agencies have the necessary training and skills to ciraft 
enforceable provisions?oo 
iv) NEGOTIATED S ~ L E M E N T S  AND COMPLIANCE AGREEMENTS 
In other instances, agencies have ut i lkd negotiated settlements or compliance agreements 
as mechanisms to negotiate binding schedules for implementation of new standards. 201 In 
such cases the exercise of discretion to waive or defer enforcement action is replaced by a 
process to superimpose tailor-rnade standards by way of contractual agreernent?02 Such 
agreements have established site-specific or party specific standards with renegotiated 
cornpliance d e a d l i n e ~ . ~ ~ ~  The rnove to legally enshrine the use of compliance agreements 
200 See L. F. Duncan, et al, supra. note 18 1 ; C. Wasserman check list, supra. note 185. 
20 1 Environment Canada has recently introduced upgraded standards for puIp and paper mi11 
effluent through negotiated cornpliance agreements and has proposed amendments to its laws 
to introduce the use of negotiated settlements in tandem with administrative penalties. Such 
agreements imposed by adrn inisbrttive order wouId purportedly enable the agency to revise 
monitoring requirements, and impose pollution prevention or production processes 
requirements. Pu@ and Paper Mill Defoarner and Wood Chip Regulations, SOR 192-268; 
Pulp and Paper Mill Efluenr Chlorinated Dioxin and Furms Regulutiom, SOR 192-267. 
See Response by Environment Canada, to the Pariiamentary Committee Report. For a more 
lengthy discussion of these instruments see North American Report on Voluntary 
Corn pliance, Commission for Environmenta2 Cooperation, supra, no te 9. 
202 In at least one jurisdiction, Alberta, special legislation has been enacted to facilitate 
negotiations with regulatees for the opting out of otherwise binding standards of operation. 
203 Canadian agencies have in many cases only recently replaced informai waivers with 
legally binding compIiance targets and schedules: See for example the Pulp and the Paper 
Regulations, supra, note 20 1. In other instances where the need for more fonnalized 
variances is recognized, the current law does not enable the negotiation of these negotiated 
has been triggered by concems raised about the legal veracity of the practice of waiving 
compliance requirernents based on infornial underiakuigs by indu*. 
Concem has b e n  expressed that this process of renegotiating compliance schedules and 
technical compliance targets belongs more appropriately in the more public process of 
standard sections or regdation making. 204 
Where the negotiated settlement approach is adopted public confidence in the process 
would undoubtedly be enhanced by enabling greater public scruthy of the negotiation 
process at a minimum for cornpetitors and or directly afTected cornmunities. A 
disadvantage to this instrument may be the inability of persons who are not parties to the 
contract or agreement to enforce the terms thereby precluding any right of recouse for 
third parties.20s This type of "opting out" mechanism may also raise concerns about 
regdatory fairne~s"~ and usefulness as instruments for general deterren~e.'~' 
compliance schernes. See response by Environment Canada to the Report of the 
Parliamentary Cornmittee on the Reforrn of the Canadian Environmenta[ Protection Act. 
For a discussion of public concerns about the deregdation process see Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation, Proceedings of the North Arnerican Dialogue on 
Environmental Law, (Montreal: CEC, 1997) and background papers. 
*O5 For a discussion of this approach see Bany J. Barton et al, A Contract Modelfor Pollution 
Control, (Vancouver: Westwater Research Centre, University of British Columbia, 1984). 
206 For Canadian agencies this raises the specter of constitutional challenges relating to 
rights of due process or discriminatory application of the law under the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, supra note 42. 
207 See "Canada Country Report", Commission for Environmental Cooperation, supra. note 
7. 
AchieWig cornpliance requires that the standards be readiiy understood, measurable and 
achie~able."~ Uncertainty can hamper voluntary efforts to cornply and effective 
surveillance and enf~rcernent .~~ Standards of conduct therefore should be drafied in 
language that is clear to both the operator and inspecter, including where appropriate, 
methods for calculation of the concentration and loading of effluent and the timing and 
location of effluent monitoring. 
The standard setting process should include review processes which ensure that standards 
and requirernents are scientifically defensible and technologically and economically 
feasible. This is important for both the regulator and the reguiated sector. For example, 
standards which require complex calculations on concentrations or loading may be 
inappropriate for enforcement agencies with limited technicd or scientific capacity 
including lirnited laboratory expertise.210 Similady, where self-monitoring and reporting is 
208 For example, in one case a penalty was set aside by the United States Federal Court when 
they held the standard to be ambiguous and confusing. R o l h  EnvironmentaI Services OV.1). 
Inc. v. EPA, 937 F.2nd 649 (D.C. Cir., 1991) as cited in S.F. Fulton and E.J. Gilberg, supra. 
note 183 at p. 255. 
209 S. F. Fulton, ibid at p. 254; J. E. Calfee and R. Crasweil, "Some Effects of Uncertainty or 
Cornpliance with Legal Standards", (1984) 70 Virg. L. R 965. 
210 As J. Mayda, supra, note 140 at p. 1019 points out, "Pif standards are set that monitoring 
requires overly complicated and costly equipment, they and their parent law will not be 
implemented. Technically complicated statutes, may in fact be a ploy to avoid effective 
environment regulation; there c m  be Little doubt that this tactic has been used in sorne cases. 
More fi-equently, however, complex laws represent an infatuation with technical gadgetry 
required, the regulated sector must have the capacity to institute the controls and to perform 
the monitoring tasks. 
Consideration should also be &en to the relative compiexity of the standard.2'' This is 
important both in achieving the prescrïbed objective and in detemiining compliance. For 
example, enforcement of a general prohibition generally requires complex procedures 
including costly laboratory analysis and use of experts to prove deposit, causation and harm. 
This requires a high level of expertise and training in an inspectorate to cootdinate the 
action and access to scientific, technical and legal experts. Consequently, where the capacity 
and resources are not yet sufficient to mount highly technical enforcement actions, 
governments may be wise to avoid prernising their enforcement strategy on legal 
mechanisms which aigger a significant burden of technical proof by the governrnent. *'* 
In the altemative, where compliance is measured by adherence to operating or effluent 
standards as conditions to a pemit, inspection and enforcement is more straight forward. It 
rather than the more realistic principle that the simplest 'adequate' technique is probably the 
best. 
21 1 See L. F. Duncan, et a:, supra, notes 44 and 184. J.M. Tindemans, " Collaboration in 
"Environmental Enforcement: Experiences with the Build-up of a Cwrdinated Enforcement 
Structure", Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Environmental 
Enforcem, supra, note 4 at p. 2 1 5. 
212 The Republic of Indonesia's Law no. 3 year 1982 regurding Management of the 
Environment, for exarnple created offenses which required a burden of proof on the part of 
the enforcement agency beyond its technicaI and resource capability. The govemment 
consequentIy punued more practicable avenues for imposing standards which imposed a 
lesser burden on the government to enforce, supra note 188. L. Duncan et al, ibid. 
is similady m l e r  for regulated sources to undertake self-monitoring and take precautions 
to comply. 
It has k e n  the experïence of a number of enforcement agencies that targeting single 
pollutant medium (hazardous waste law or waste water standard) in inspection and 
enforcement can resuit in increased enforcement and cornpliance costs and regdatory 
confusion. As an alternative some agencies are adopting a multi - media approach to 
standard setting and enf~rcernent.~" This integrated approach avoids the result of 
transferring impacts fiom one medium (e.g. water) to another (e.g. land or air) through 
regdation or control of a single medium (e.g. waste water effluent standards). It also 
enables enforcernent agencies to adopt an integrated approach to enforcement and allows 
regulated facilities to institute a more holistic environmental management system. 
To enforce single medium laws, authorities naturally respond by developing a 
system of single medium enforcement. Inevitably, this causes a situation where 
those enforcing air pollution laws are at odds with those enforcing water pollution 
laws. Cornpliance with air pollution standards, for example, might lead to reduced 
air pollution emissions but increase effluent for water authorities to deal with. A 
single medium approach also means that different agencies are inspecting the same 
plant, requiring facilities to fil1 our forms and provide much of the s m e  
information. This can cause confusion ... added paper work, duplication of effort and 
disregard for public authorities administrative complexity and incon~istenc~.~ '' 
213 UNEP provides a listing of 1 1 European nations who have instituted or propose to institute 
an integrated permitting system. A number of jurisdictions are revising their laws and 
procedures to implement this approach, supra note 22. For a review of these experiences see 
supra, note 197. 
'14 UNEP, ibid at p. 22. 
ii) INSTITUTIONAL l NTEGRATION 
To ensure enforceability of standards it will also be important to integrate standard setting 
with other management and review processes. For example, recornmendations on standards 
arising from an environmental assessrnent process should be integrated with pemiitting 
processes to ensure that they are made legally enforceable as  conditions to pennits or 
binding agreements. In some cases it may be necessary to undergo institutional 
reorganktion to facilitate this more integrated approach. An added benefit would be 
economization of resources assigned to standard setting and enf~rcernent."~ 
iii) CONSISTENT STANDARDS 
Effective enforcement requires consistent and compatible standards. Conflicting laws? 
operating conditions or instructions or contradictory advice b y inspectas or other O fficials 
c m  al1 lead to failed enforcement  action^."^ It is therefore important that efforts be made to 
implement and apply consistent, compatible standards. 
Governments have utilized a number of mechanisms to improve interagency coordination. 
One approach is to undertake rnulti jurisdiction consultation in standard setting (including 
regdatory development and environmental screening and review processes) towards 
215 G. Bendi, supro. note 45 in "Proceedings of the nird Internc~rional Conference on 
Environmental Enforcernent and Cornpliance, supra, note 4. 
216 This defence termed "oficially induced error" or "govemrnent induced error" has been 
successful as a defence in Canadian courts. See J. Swaigen, supra, note 43 at p. 202-206. 
harrnonized standards and processes.2'7 Another option is to uistitute a "one-window" 
process for standard setting. Care should be taken however in attempting to consolidate 
standards across jurisdictions to ensure that legislative obligations and constitutional powers 
are king ob~erved.~'~ 
Improved consistency can also be furthered through technical assistance, training and 
prescribed formats for permits, and administrative orden. In some instances processes 
which require interagency consultation in standard setting may be legally required as a 
means of avoiding later ~onfl icts .~ '~ 
It can be similarly problernatical if a conflict exists arnongst jurisdi~tions.~~ In çome 
- - - -- - 
217 For example Canadian national, provincial and temtorial oficials have initiated processes 
through the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME) for the 
harmonization environmental policy, pollution control standards and assessrnent review 
processes, supra, note 1 03. In 1990 the Netherlands implemented a model for collaboration 
among the provinces, rnunicipalities, and water boards, police, public prosecutions and 
Ministries of Interior, Justice, Transport and Agriculture which indudes annual joint 
programming, and the adoption of an integrated rnulti media approach. J. Peters, "The 
Relationship between Centrai Governent and Provinciail Municipal Authorities with regard 
to Enforcement", Proceedings of the Third hternationd Conference on Environmental 
Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 272. 
21 8 Frienu5 of the OId M m  River, supra, note 28. 
219 For example, section 54 of the CEPA requires the Canadian Minister of Environment to 
gain the concurrence of the Minister responsible for the administration of the federal works, 
undertaking or lands intended to be regulated prior to imposing any standards for pollution 
control or waste management afFecting those areas. Supra note 1 14. 
no A prime example is the issuance by provincial agencies of licenses to pollute water 
courses regardless of the paramount fderal law which prohibits the deposit of deletenous 
substances into any waters fiequented by fish. Canadian Fisheries Act, supra. note 103. 
couneies the national govemment is granted a power of pararnountcy or oversight which 
can be exercised to ensure con~is tenc~ .~~ '  As discussed previously, to avoid regdatory 
confusion and politically sensitive intervention by national governments, some 
goverrunents have instituted processes for harmonization of standards uicluding 
equivalency, harmonization, or minimum national 
To be enforceable a standard m u t  have a clearly prescribed deadline. Cornpliance deadlines 
c m  be imposed in the regulation, or on a site specific basis through pemits or by way of 
compliance agreement. Where allowances are made for phasing in of new standards, target 
dates should be specified for each stage of any necesçary upgrade or retrofit to provide 
clear, binding rneasures of compliance .= This will be critical for rnaintaining credibility in 
the regdatory process. It will also provide concise targets for monitoring and surveillance 
and potential enforcement action. 
It is afso important in setting timelines for achieving compliance to consider the tirne 
necessary for regulated parties to comply and for officials to be able to effectively enforce. 
=' For example as previously discussed, the USEPA holds a power o f  oversight which 
enables this national agency to both prescribe minimum standards for states and to intervene 
where they fail to abide by these standards. In Canada, where powen overlap, for exampie for 
the regulation of impacts to inland fsheries and waters, the federal law has paramountcy. See 
Lucas, supra, note 5 1, 
" See also J.A. Peten, supra, note 206. 
See for example, Canadian Pu& and Paper Regulrfim, supra, note 20 1 ; S.F. Fulton. 
supra, note 183 at p. 258. 
Industry may need to acquire new technology and upgrade operating skills. Government 
may require special skiils and equipment to inspect and enforce. In other instances there 
may be legislated pmquisites to the +rtandard sening process." 
[n addition to considering compliance tirnelines it is also important that regulations should 
be updated by amendments as new technologies are developed, to better reference standard 
testing methods for lab analysis. This will take account of newly understood or discovered 
environmental and health risks. In effect rather than implementing outdated regulations it is 
more important to update the regulations. 
A nurnber of alternative planning rnechanisms can be used for timing standard setting and 
enforcement. Any planning ma& for standard settuig for example should also incorporate 
timing of staffmg, training with phasing of compliance deadlines .-' Sorne jurisdictions 
establish tirnelines for standard setting on the b a i s  of risk exposure or public ~oncern."~ 
Care should be taken in establishing unrealistic expectations through overzealous regdatory 
or licensing activity unless similar attention c m  be devoted to enfor~ernent.~' 
224 For example, the Indonesian Regulat ion for water pollution contro l requires classification 
of receiving water quality prior to the imposition of source specific waste water effluent 
standards. See L.F. Cuncan et aI, supra, note 44. 
"' See L.F. Duncan and P. Moestadji, supra, note 194 which provides a mode1 critical path. 
226 For example the CEPA Pnority Substances List provided for in CEPA, supra. note 1 14; R. 
van Heuvelen et al, supra, note 4. 
227 See 1991 Report of the Audilor General of Cmada to the House of Commons. ch. 13, 
supra note 187. The Netherlands allocated extra h d s  in 1989 and 1990 to eliminate the 
backlog in proper standard setting. J.A. Peters, "The Relationship between Central 
Governrnent and ProvinciaVMunicipal Authorities with Regard to Enforcement", Proceedings 
The process of standard setting c m  also be critical to compliance. Consultation with 
regulated industry, technical and scientSc experts and environmental lawyers can ensure 
that standards are technicaiiy and scientificdy defensible, economically feasible and legally 
enforceable. Consultation with special interest groups and affkcted comrnunities can build 
public awareness, involvement and comrnitment to the standards particularly where the 
input is given serious consideration. A broad array of rights to participate have been granted 
to facilitate public involvement including right to consultation in regdation making, and 
permit review, opportunity to trigger standard reviews and dispute resolution processes.*8 
There is little dispute that the most cost efficient route to compliance is voiuntary action. 
With this in mind many jurisdictions have incorporated into their compliance strategies 
mechanisms to promote cornpliance including information and education programs, self 
audits, incentives and rewards for voluntary cornpliance and publicking voluntary efforts 
and enforcement action (to encourage detenence). More recently, partnerships have been 
forged between government and indu- and in some instances non-governrnental 
of the Thid Intemiionai Conference on Environmentai Enforcement, supra. note 4 at p. 269. 
228 See for example Canadian Environmental Protection Act, supra. note 1 14, Yukon 
Environment Act, supra. note 179, Alberta Errvironrnental Protection and Enhancernent Act, 
supra, note t 88. 
organizations to h d ~ e  programs which foster investment in environmental protection 
which have as their objective exceeding ~ o r n ~ l i a n c e . ~ ~ ~  
As with other components of the strategy, promotion of voluntary compliance should be 
considered at the earliest stages of regdatory action. References to promotion programs 
should be included in any policy or strategy document. In some instances it may be 
necessary to include special powers in enabling statutes, for example the power to expend 
resources on promotional programs or to institute h c i a l  charges or in~mtives?~ 
It has been argued that there is a direct correlation between the record of compliance and the 
level of understanding or awareness about the law2)' It is therefore important that any 
infornation strategy target al1 aEected parties, including regulated industry, governrnent 
(including enforcement O fficials, senior mangers, and govemment facility operaton) and the 
229 See for example B. Smart, supra note 15. 
230 For example, the Indonesian Environmentai Mmagement Act, supra, note 20 1 ,  Sections 8- 
10, imposes an obligation on the govemment to promote efforts to " sustain the capability of 
the living environment to support continu& development", as well as to " cultivate and 
develop the public's awareness of its responsibility in the management of the living 
environment by means of information, guidance, education and research ..." and the power to 
regulate environmental taxes and retribution. 
231 B. Seigal, supra, note 104; D. Saxe, supra, note 7. 
232 The Netherlands follows a triple-tracked strategy including in foming and motivating 
enforcement oficials, motivathg administraton and informing companies. Recognition is 
RecogniPng this need, many countries have instituted special programs within their 
enforcement agencies mandated to promote cornphce  through the introduction of speciai 
incentive programs and the dissemination of information on the consequences of 
n o n ~ o m ~ l i a n c e . ~ ~ ~  Useful communication channels to industry and public have included 
advance notice through regdatory codta t ion  processes, information packages on new 
laws, wide distribution of enforcement and compliance policies and use of existing 
communication packages such as business or trade periodicals.234 
From a strictly pragmatic perspective, it may be necessary to target resources to assisting 
smailer businesses leaving large corporations with their normal coterie of in-house tecbnicd 
also given to the need to inform legislators and judiciary. LM. Van Ekeren and M. Van De 
Voet, "Information Campaigns Benefit Enforcement of Environmental Laws", Vol. 1. 
Proceedings of international Conference on Environmental Law, supra. note 4 at p. 287. 
233 For example in 1994 the United States Environmental Protection Agency created the 
Office of Compliance specifically rnandated to promote voluntary compliance. (Interview 
with USEPA April, 1995). In 1995 the Canadian Office of Enforcement, Environment 
Canada was reorganized to create a separate office of Compliance Promotion. (Interview 
with Dale Kirnmett, Director, Ofice of Enforcement and Compliance, June 1995). 
234 For example, simultaneous to tabIing its Canadian Environmental Protection Act in 
Parliament, Environment Canada also tabled an Enforcement and Compliance Policy 
which incorporated voluntary compliance initiatives; United States President Bi 11 Clinton 
in March 1995 launched a regulatory reform policy "Reinventing Environmental 
Regdation" which included a 180 day enforcement grace period for small businesses and 
reduced penalties for al1 those companies who voluntarily disclosed and corrected 
violations as well as the establishment of a Small Business Cornpliance Assistance Centers. 
President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore in, "Cornmon Sense Compliance Policy" 
in, the Press statement," Reinventing Environmental Regulations", March 16, 1995; 
"Interim Policy on Compliance Incentives for small Businesses", United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, June 1995; USEPA "Fact Sheet on Compliance 
Assistance Centers". 
and legal experts to track regdatory and policy reforms. When those king regdated are 
neither governments nor large corporations, the design of compüance and enforcement 
measures developed by the govemment should be based on the premise that most lack 
knowledge of their legal obligations and therefore will likely assign a low priority to 
environmental compliance. Non-cornpliance should be assumed to be the nom. in iïght of 
this assumption, when the cost of compliance is low and complex knowledge is not 
required, regdators can lirnit promotion activities to wide dissemination of information 
about the laws. However, when the cost of compliance is high and effective design requires 
speciai expertise, then considerable invesûnent in educating regdatees and changing their 
assumptions and priorities, is likely to be required?' 
Some agencies have implemented programs dedicated to transmitting information about 
technologies, training opportunities and technical assistance for pollution prevention."6 
Among the more unique approaches for assisting small businesses is a mentoring program 
in which companies with good compliance records serve as mentors for those in need of 
technical a~sistance.~' 
"' E. Barr, supra, note 34 at p. 208. Recognizing the special needs of small and medium 
businesses (SMBs) the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) in August 1996 
established a fùnd to support the transfer of information on clean technologies to these 
entities, the first phase concentrating on Mexico. 
z6 The USEPA issues an annual Refeeece Guides to Pollution Prevention Resomes and a 
newsletter Pollution Prevention News. They have also cosponsored with Mexico and more 
recently with Canada and the CEC, voluntary compliance information seminars targeted to 
the US-Mexico border area industries (maquiladoras). 
237 Programme instituted by the USEPA Office of Compliance which also includes the 
provision of gants to those States willing to institute a mentor program. (Interviews with 
EPA Office of Compliance, August 1995). 
Educating and motivating governent can be an even greater challenge. Yet inconsistent 
enforcernent respooses for govemment violators can impact on the credibility of 
enforcement actions against pnvate operaton who may validly cornplain about a double 
standard.u8 As a preventative meanire some countries have enacted special laws or 
adopted policies for ensuring consistency in response to public aad private regulatee~.~~ 
Effective means of promoting compliance by public facilitates have included briefings for 
politicians and senior managers, information to public senrice unions (operaton may be 
liable) and where necessary, special briefings on govemment compliance duties and 
coilaboration between enforcement officiais and other departments in training."0 
Infornation on technical cornpliance alternatives cm be facilitated through programs for 
technology transfer. Care should be taken however to ensure clear separation between 
239 For example, the United States has enacted the F e d d  Faciiities Compliance Act of 1992, 
Public Law 102-386 and Sovereignty WaNer 42 U.S.C. f 6961; Environment Canada oficials 
have suggested that the Govemment of Canada has a moral obligation to show leadership in 
environmental compliance. See Paul Cuillerier, "Enforcement of Canadian Laws of 
Environmental Protection as App lied to Federal Faci lities"; Proceedings of the international 
Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 448. Towards this objective 
Environment Canada in 1984 issued a separate Enforcement and Compliance Policy 
D o m e n t  for Government Operated Faciliries for the CEPA. 
240 AS an illustration of ingenuity in effectively comrnunicating the implications of 
govemment noncornpliance with regulatory statutes (including environmental), a serninar 
series sponsored by the Canadian Department of Justice on Crown liability for enforcement 
reportedly had an appreciabie impact on raising the consciousness of  the implications of 
failing to enforce the law or to ensure compliance. (Interview with Lyle Fairbaim, Justice 
Canada, June 1994). 
information roles and enforcement responsibilities in addressing technologicai issues. Some 
agencies have adopted more indirect cbannels to offer technid advice through indirect 
means including hanciai support to private technical j o d s ,  training sessions and trade 
shows.241 Othe15 continue to prefer to limit official technical advice to conditions to officiai 
directives. 
Among the more effective tools for facilitating voluntary compliance is the use of self 
242 audits for assessing compliance . Use of this form of audit is generally encouraged for 
both private and govemment facilities and can be usefbi for identiwg compliance 
problems, weaknesses in management systems and areas of significant ri~k."~ In the case of 
public facilities, identification of problems prior to an inspectors visit can dso help avoid 
embarrassment Audits are also useful indicaton of potential liability and a measure of due 
"' One example of an indirect support to technological innovation is the substantial financial 
support provided by the Canadian govemment to the annual clean technology transfer 
conferences, the first called Globe 90. 
242 For example. the Repvblic of Mexico's Environmental En forcement Agency 
(PROFEPA) bases its enforcement and compliance strategy almost exclusively on a 
program of comprehensive environmental audits which entail an official program for 
certification of independent auditors, oficial approval of the audit program and some 
degree of deferral of enforcement action pending cornpletion of the audit. Presentation by 
Jose Luis Calderone, Subprocuradoria, ccEnvironmental Audit Program, Seminar on 
Voluntary Cornpliance and PoIlution Prevention", Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, June, 1995; 
CEC, supra, note 9. 
243 CEPA Enforcement and CompIiance Policy, supra, note 15 at p. 29. 
diligence? To promote the use of self-audits some jurisdictions have adopted audit 
privilege policies which provide specified waivers or variances to enforcement action as 
incentives for disclosure and correction of violations.245 While there appears to be a fair 
degree of consensus on the value of these self audits as incentive measures, considerable 
difference of opinion remah on the degree to which self audits shodd replace or defer 
enforcement action.246 
4 TARGET~NG DETERRENCE 
Some jurisdictions also find value in a more direct approach to promoting compliance 
244 Canadian case law now defines due diligence as including activities undertaken by a 
regulated party to cornply with legal standards as well as recognized standards of practice 
inclusive of efforts to train and educate employees and corporate directors, conduct of audits, 
preparation and communication of compliance plans etc. See Bata, supra, note 29. For a 
review of the American approach see C. Wassennan, Proceedings of Intemafional 
Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 77. 
245 See for example the CEPA Enforcement and Compliance Policy, supra. note 15. 
246 For example, in the United States the debate remains heated among regulatory 
authorities over the subject of immunities. In June 1995 the USEPA issued an interirn 
Nafional Policy on Environmental Azuiif Privilege with the express intent of countering the 
effects of state level legislation which extended broad irnrnunity protection fiom civil and 
criminal prosecution to companies who completed self audits. The EPA Policy offered 
more limited immunities in the form of elimination or reduction in civil penalties, 
limitations in criminal action referrals and more limited disclosure protection. See 
"Voluntary Environmental Sel f-policing and Self-disclosure Interim Policy Statement". 
Federal Register, Vol. 60, No. 63, Monday April3, 1995, 16875. The U.S. government has 
asserted its oversight power by launching legal actions against those state governments 
refusing to follow the federal policy (conversation with International Enforcement Office, 
USEPA, June 1996). See also E.S. Schaeffer, "Encouraging Voluntary Compliance 
without Compromising Enforcement: EPA's 1995 Auditing Policy", Proceedings of the 
F w t h  International CoNerence on Environmental Cornpliance and Enforcement, supra, 
note 4 at p. 45 1. 
through targeted, high profile criminal prosecutions.247 It has k e n  suggested that 
enforcement responses, in pdcular prosecution, have "a statistically significant impact on 
the behaviour of corporations".248 The level of deterrence is reportedly increased where 
corporate directors and officers may be found (and have been found) perso~liy ~ i a b l e . ~ ~ ~  
Further, empirical studies indicate that corporate directon and officers premise their 
compliance expenditures on the likelihood of enforcement action both against their 
corporations and themselves 250 Whether or not deterrence plays a significant role 
reportedly depends as much on the perceived possibility of apprehension as the liability and 
severity of sanction or penalty.25 * 
Other jurisdictions attempt to foster voluntq compliance by wideiy publicking significant 
or repeat offenders a s  well as significant voiuntary compliance  effort^:'^' 
247 The USEPA, consistent with its view that the publicity associated with successful criminal 
prosecution of serious violations has a more significant deterrent effect than generally higher 
penalties gained through administrative proceedings. in 198 1 created a separate centralized 
Office of Criminal Investigations. See C. G. Wills and D. C. Gripe, "US Experience and 
Differences Between Civit and Criminal Investigations and Use of Centrai Elite Force to 
Supplement Local Inspections", Vol. 1, Proceedings International Conference on 
Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 329; Lee Paddock, "Developing EfFective 
Enforcement Programs at the State Lever, ibid, at p. 382. 
248 D. Saxe supra note 7 at p. 46. 
249 Results of an empirical study of corporate directors and officers indicates that both threat 
and actual prosecution of those parties has a significant effect on their decision to initiate 
voluntary action to comply with environmental laws. D. Saxe, supra. note 7 at p. 45-54. 
250 Ibid. 
251 B. Seigal, supra, note 104. 
252 For exarnple the British Columbia Ministry of Environment, Park; and Lands issues 
annual reports of compliance with its environmental laws. The Indonesian Minister of 
Environment reguiarly issues public statements to the media including the narnes of violators. 
If deterrence is an important element of program strategy, the information cornmunicated 
can include not only educatiod material but also reports of enforcement activities. This 
helps create an " enforcement presence" and an atmosphere of deterrence. This atmosphere 
wili help provide an incentive for sources to seek assistance and comply?" 
d) INCENTIVE' AND ~ W A R D S  
Strategic use of incentives and rewards c m  aiso facilitate cornpliance. As discussed 
previously in the section on Cornpliance Strategy. in deciding to use market-based 
approaches consideration must be given to the close interrelationslip with cornmand- 
control mechanisrns. This necessitates at a minimum close consultation among officiais 
delivering the respective programs and in some instances involvement by enforcement 
O fficials in surveillance and enforcement of market rneasures.'" 
Examples of the factoring of cornpliance in the application of market rneasures include 
proportionai discounthg of ecological fees (charges for use of resources) where efforts are 
made to use more enWonmentally benign technologies ("ecological inve~tments)~~', 
253 C. Wassennan, supra, note 1 75 at p. 73. 
254 G. Bendi, supra. note 45 at p. 117: See also D.R. Stewart et al, supra, note 70. 
255 2. Kamieiiski: "Process of Upgrading the Polish Environmental Enforcement Procedures". 
supra, note 45 at p. 56. 
reduction in fines for timely ecological in~eshnents~~", relaxation in waste deposition fees 
for good compliance records 257 and offsets, that is, approvds for new facilities (pollution 
sources) prernised on pollution control improvements at existing facilitie~."~ Other 
compliance rewards have included reduced self monitoring requirements or reduced 
govemment surveillance of facilities with a good compliance record and as previously 
mentioned, specified periods of amnesty nom enforcement action where violations are self- 
identified, disclosed and ~orrected.~*~. In yet other instances, companies with good 
compliance records are given the freedom nom the technological specifications of existing 
regdatory systems to explore alternative environmental management systems which 
provide superior environmental performance.260 
256 Ibid 
257 K. Velek, supra. note t 62 at p. 5 1 7. 
C. Wasserman, supra. note 4. Vol. 1. Proceedings of the International Conference on 
Environmental Enforcement at p. 76; L.F. Duncan, supra, note 25 at p. 292-294. 
259 ln June 1994, the USEPA Environmental Leadership Program (ELP) introduced 
providing similar kinds of incentives to select industries who are considered environmental 
leaders according to prescribed criteria, including a good compliance record and in place 
environmental management and audit systems. The intent of the program is to encourage 
innovative audit and compliance programs and to reduce the risk of non compliance 
through pollution prevention. The incentives are prescribed in Memoranda of 
Understanding with the Agency. As an added incentive the selected companies benefit 
fiom public recognition of their participation. Federal RegisferNol. 60 No. 63/Monday, 
April 3, 1995Motices "Voluntary Environmental Self-Policy and Self Disclosure Interirn 
Policy Statement" and "Notice and Press Release" April7,1995 announcing the selected 
participants (EPA). 
160 See for example the description of the USEPA Project XL in Commission for 
Environmental Cooperation, supra. note 7. 
As previously stated, voluntary compliance efforts are directiy related to the risk of 
dete~tion.~~'  In addition, if the objectives of an environmental regulatory and cornpliance 
prograrn include reduced environmental risk and prevention of damage or harm then any 
effective program must incorporate mechanisms to enable tirnely detection of incidents or 
vi~lations?~ Without an effective strategy for monitoring compliance enforcement 
decisions will be reliant on conjecture and credibility may slide when targets are not met. 
Cornpliance monitoring ensures that those who fail or refuse to comply receive no unfair 
competitive advantage (profit fiom pollution) over those who make the effort to comply.263 
Failure to inspect or to determine compliance by some other means may dso trigger 
liability. In some jurisdictions the act of legislating standards triggers an accompanying 
duty to i n ~ ~ e c t . ~ ~  
26 1 B. Seigal, supra. note 104 at p. 10. 
362 This is, of course, premised on the presumption that standards are set at a level of accepted 
risk. Embarrassment, for exarnple, experienced by the Canadian Fisheries Departrnent in loss 
of one million salmon due to faulty monitoring equipment has dealt a major blow to the 
credibility of their conservation and regulatory program. Toronto Globe and Mail September 
16, 1994. Numerous other examples of failure to implement effective targeted inspection 
programs as a factor in poor compliance results are docurnented in Seigal, supra, note 104: 
See also Report of fiperts Group on Environmental Law, supra, note 34, which recommend 
that States "establish systems for the collection and dissemination of data and requires 
observative of natural resources and the environment in order to permit adequate planning of 
the use natural resources and environment, to permit early detection of interferences with that 
resource and the environment and ensure tirnely intervention, and to facilitate the evaluation 
of conservation policy and rnethods" (at p. 26). 
363 L.F. Duncan, supra, note 25 at p. 295. 
264 Supra, note 27. 
Options for deteaion include self monitoring or seif audit, govemment inspection, 
investigation and surveillance and cornmunity watch. In designing a monitoring program 
consideration must be given to the viability of the options (including relative technical and 
financial capabilities) and distribution of c~sts.*~ '  
Most jurisdictions have at least partiaily instituted a pduter pay mode1 through obligations 
on regulated industry to rnonitor, record and report?" Self monitoring can have a dual 
effect of facilitating voluntary cornpliance through self audit and consequent reduction of 
govemment expenditures through minimized surveillance and enforcement. Self-audits can 
also provide an effective rneasure of due diligence.267 Where self-monitoring is utilized the 
law, should aiso specify obligations including points and fkquency of monitoring and the 
requirements for record keeping and reporting. As previously discussed, many jurisdictions 
have aiso introduced policies and programs to encourage the practice of self-audits. 
265 UNEP, supra note 32. 
266 For example Canada, USA, Norway, England, Poland. For a review of the Nonvegian 
system of self-monitoring see Gro Rodland, supru, note 14 1 at p. 320. 
267 See Bat4 supra, note 29. 
Regardless of the wilhgness of companies to conduct self-monitoring and self-audits, 
government involvement will remain necessary but may be reduced. Review of monitoring 
reports, follow up inspections or compliance audits 268 to verify compliance or reliability of 
the self reports and investigations in response to reports, incidents (e.g. ernergencies) or 
cornplaints are d l  necessary and unavoidable components of a compliance program. 
Govemment programs can, however, be made more efficient and effective through adoption 
of certain basic tools. These include development and maintenance of a compliance data 
base, preparation and delivery of an inspection plan, issuance of an inspections and 
investigations protocols and targeted technical and legal training. 
Among the more useful tools for targeting enforcement action is a cornpliance data base?9 
It generally contains information about regulated facilities, compliance profiles on owners 
and operators drawn fiom inspection and investigation reports and any enforcement actions 
(wamings, directives, orders) and records cornpliance re~~onses."~ It c m  be differentiated 
frorn other information bases in that it is directly tied to actions of individual parties and is 
268 Norway supplements inspections and self reporthg with audits to determine the reason for 
non-compliance including more detailed infornation about management and control systems. 
This information helps to direct effective sanctions or orders. See Gro Rodland supra, note 
141 at p. 321, 
269 B. Seigal, supra, note 104 at p. 1 5; UNEP, supra, note 32 at p. 4 1. 
270 Some jurisdictions refer to this as a management information system. A compliance data 
base is often a part of a iarger information management system. 
generally treated as confidentid data. The data base enables officiais to target inspections 
and to ensure consistent and appropriate responses. A compliance data base is equaily 
useful as a reference for incentive/ reward programs 271 and for assessing staffing needs to 
rneet legal obligations.2R 
A second important tool is an inspection plan, generally considered the "backbone of most 
enforcement programs"?73 An inspection plan helps to focus enforcement activities by 
providing a frame of reference for inspections instead of reliance on ad hoc responses not 
triggered by objective, fair and consistent cnteria. A plan helps focus inspections on 
regdatory requirements and compliance records. To reduce inspection costs many agencies 
attempt to target inspections by focusing inspections on known or consistent violators, new 
facilities and untested technologies, and in other cases on facilities posing the greatest 
environmental riskO2" 
Planning for inspections involves more than making a lists of sites to visit. It requires 
advance pl&g for special training needs, acquisition of special equipment and 
- 
27 1 For exarnple the North American Working Group on Environmental Enforcernent and 
Cornpliance is exploring the potential for inter agency exchange o f  cornpliance data to 
determ ine qualifications for incent ive or voluntary programs. 
272 E. J. Swanson et al., The Price of Pollution: Erwironrnental Litigation in Canada 
(Edmonton: Environment Law Centre, 1 990). 
273 C. Wasserman, Vol. 1,  Proceedings of  the International Conference on Environmental 
Enforcement, supra. note 4 at p. 79. 
274 ïbid at p. 83-86; C. G. Wills, supra, note 247 at p. 325. 
development of laboratory protocols.27s It also involves coordination with technicd 
experts, prosecutors and in some instances other enforcement z~~encies.~" 
An inspection plan can bring major cost savings by integrating inspections. With advance 
planning inspections c m  be coordinated to cover multi media - air, waste, water Stream. 
Cost savings across agencies and government levels cm be achieved through consolidated 
inspection plans and sharing of inspection reports and data bases.277 
A third, equally valuable tooi is an inspections manual which prescribes a consistent 
methodology for the conduct of inspections including right of entry. search, seinue, 
statements and enforcement responses. The manuai should clearly differentiate between 
inspections and investigations and the respective powers and actions. Associated with this 
procedural manual is an investigations protocol which clarifies roles of involved parties 
(e.g., inspecter, prosecutor, manager, politician). It may also be important to include a basic 
training programme in legal awareness for personnel such as scientists, lab employees and 
other officiais who adrninister the programme but are not "enforcers" as such. This will 
Uicrease awareness of the importance of enforcement and also rnay help avoid "officially 
induced emor" problems. 
275 C. G.  Wills, ibid at p. 335. 
276 For example, in some juridictions police assistance rnay be necessary for issuing 
warrants, taking statements or gaining entry to facitities controolled by uncwperative owners. 
"' R. van Heuvelen, supra, note 67 at p. 168. 
While the process of inspection and investigation can be prohibitive, many jurisdictions 
have instihrted emission or product charges, resources user fees, taxes and penalties to help 
d e h y  costs. 278 Some jinisdictions have h m c e d  their inspection programs by assessrnent 
of fees based on the class of polluting act i~i ty.~ '~ 
It will be important to differentiate between the fïnancing of inspections and investigations. 
Greater public sensitivity generaily &ses nom any attempts to finance investigations 
through penalty assessments although some jurisdictions empower the courts to consider 
investigation costs in assessing penalties. 
A useful parallel tool for instilling consistency in enforcement response is an investigations 
protocol.280 Protocols cm prove helpfd within an environmental agency to clan@ the 
respective ro les of field inspectors, reg ional program managers, senior po lic y officials and 
politicians. It can also provide a b d e r  against extemal attempts to influence enforcement 
action through contact with senior officials or politicians. A formaliy endorsed protocol can 
serve as a valuable reference point for erforcement officials trying to keep enforcement on a 
278 In France, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic and Poland fees are calculated to cover 
inspection costs. See UNEP, supra, note 32 at p. 42. 
279 See for example the fee structure irnposed by Norway in Gro Rodland, supra, note 14 1 
at p. 320. 
*'O 1991 Reporr of the AAudir General of Canada to the H o m  of Gommons. Chciper I I .  
supra note 1 87 at p. 270 -27 1, 
As discussed previously, resourcing for effective enforcement includes providing adequate 
budgets to hire and train qualified staff. Protocols and procedural manuals are only a 
supplement to an adequate complement of experienced and adequately resourced and 
rnandated ~ b f f ? ~ '  Failure to recognize these basics can seriously undennine the credibility 
and effectiveness of any enforcement regirne.282 
While most jurisdictions recognize the significant contribution made by the public in 
reporting suspected violations, a limited few have actually revised their laws and programs 
to facilitate this r01e.~" Some nations have encouraged public involvernent by enacting 
legal rights to notice of incidents or spills and permit applications, and the right to report 
and compel investigation of pollution ~orn~laints.'" In other instances the public watch dog 
281 C. Wassenan, supra, note 4 at p. 13 1. 
282 fiid; L. Mastarova, supra. note 45 at p. 99. A September 2, 1994 Canadian Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans memo also corroborates this view," [Clrackhg down on the flagrant, 
wholesale poaching by ail user gmups was next to impossible for the enforcement oficers in 
the Vancouver Island District. Since 1989, staff had been cut fiom eleven to four. Local 
tishery officers are extremely fnstrated and demoralized with their inability to work 
effectively due to severe rnanpower shortages." Toronto Globe & Mail, October 8, 1994. 
283 For exarnple, in Poland citizen involvernent reportedly plays a key role in monitoring 
environmental cornpliance despite the lack of official recognition or facilitation of their 
involvement. J. Jendroska, supra, note 107, at p. 354 in International Conference on 
EnvirontlfentaI Enforcement, supra, note 4.  
2" CEPA supra, note 1 14. ss. 108, 109; For a review of citizen rights in Canada see S. Elgie, 
role is encouraged by providing access to monitoring data 285 and by communicating 
reporthg charnels to the 
6. ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES AND SANCTIONS 
Strict standards aione will not ensure pollution control. They must be enforced. There is 
wide support for the view that one of the more effective means to foster voluntary 
compliance is timely, effective and strategic enforce~nent.~~' This requires attention to the 
- - - -. 
"Environmental Groups and The Courts: 1970- 1992" Environmental Law and Business in 
Canada ed. G. Thompson, M. McConnell and L. Huestis (Aurora: Canada Law Book 1993); 
For a review of citizen rights and their contribution to monitoring in USA see R. van 
HeuveIen and L.K. Bregger "Citizen Participation in US. Environmental Enforcement", 
International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra. note 4 at p. 574. and Paul 
Keough and N. Willard "Use of Public Disclosure in Environrnental Protection Prograrns to 
Enhance Cornpliance and Change Behaviour in the United States" id. p. 61 1 .  See also L.F. 
Duncan, supra, note 1 68. 
285 S. Elgie, supra. note 284. For a review of the public watch dog role in the United States; 
see E. Roberts and J. Dobbins "The Role of the Citizen in Environmental Enforcement", Op. 
Cit, at p. 534, 550. For the Netherlands see R. Hallo, "Citizens Role in Enforcement: A Spur, 
A Supplemenq and a Substitute", International Conference on Envimnmental L m ,  supra. 
note 4 at p. 562 to 565. For Flanders, Belgium, see Rik de Baere, "Free Access to information 
and the Licensing Procedures for Industnal Plants: the Flemish and Belgian Situation" Op. 
Cit. at p. 605. 
286 In the USA increased public awareness has resulted in greater willingness by the public to 
provide "tips" concemirig environmental crimes. C. Wills, supra, note 247 at p. 329. 
287 As stated by the European Council in a 1990 Bulletin of European Cornmunifies, 
"Community Environmental Legislation Will Only Be Effective if it is Fully Implemented 
and Enforced by Member States"; cited by Richard MacRory, in "Membership in the 
European Economic Community: M a t  it Means for Environmental Requirernents and 
Enforcement". Proceedings of Second International Conference on Environmentai 
Enforcement, supra. note 4 at p. 171; As stated by the then Canadian Minister of 
Environment, Tom McMillan "A good law, however, is not itself enough. It must be enforced 
-ruthlessly if need be. Accordingly, the new EnvironmentaI Protection Act will be 
accompanied by a plan to reverse the country's appalling record of enforcement and 
compliance," supra, note 10; C .  Wasserman has posited that serious sanctions are critical 
previously described strategic actions, that is, a clearly prescribed enforcement mandate and 
clarified roles, legaiiy binding standards, mechanisrns to detect violations, and measures to 
promote compliance. ERkctive enforcement, however, also requires an adequate anay of 
enforcement responses and sanctions and the requisite powers to use thern. 
Enforcement requires advance planning to ensure that the necessary specialized measures 
are implemented well before standards become law. These measures include an adequate 
array of responses and sanctions, delegated powen to exercise the sanctions, an 
enforcement and compliance policy (as previously discussed), an investigations protocol, 
and an enforcement strategy.288 
As previously discussed, enforcement can be made more effective and cost efficient through 
development and observation of an enforcernent and compliance strategy. While the 
adopted strategies Vary arnongst jurisdictions, a nurnber of strategic tools and approaches 
have been proven to heighten effective action as the environmental enforcement programs 
289 evolve. One common strategy for more effective, coordinated response has been the use 
since 70% of regulated parties premise their compliance activities on how govemment 
responds to the 5% who violate, supra, note 261. Regarding the reactions of corporate 
directors to enforcement actions against peers, see van HeuveIen, Supra, note 277. For a 
review of Canadian experience, see D. Saxe, supra, note 7. 
288 It may be necessary to establish separate strategies to meet particular geographic, 
hansboundacy circumstances or peculiarities associated with each regulation or industrial 
sector. 
289 See Section B.2 "An Enforcement and Cornpliance Strategy". See also Review Panel on 
Environmental En forcement, An Action Pian for Environmental Enforcement in Alberta 
(Edmonton: Govemment of Alberta, 1988), supra note 58; British Columbia '.s Emtironment: 
Planning for the Fume, the Eninaing Eflective Enforcement, (Victoria: B.C. Environment, 
of interdepartmental team building for planning and conducting investigations and for 
selecting Other strategies have rnaximized environmental benefit through 
geographic targeting, risk based or facility targeting and comprehensive, integrated and 
multi-media enforcement action?g1 And, as previously discussed, the selective use of 
sanctions, for exarnple criminal prosecution, can have a substantial detenent effect. An 
important aspect of any enforcement strategy is the choice of sanctions and mechanisms for 
ensuring fair, consistent use. 
Considerable variances exist across jurisdictions and among agencies in the use of 
enforcement responses including informai responses, negotiated settlements, and 
administrative, criminal, civil and economic sanctions. The most effective @me has been 
found to be one which has at its disposai a diverse package of responses and sanctions 
enabling officiais to select the response appropriate to the nature of the vioiation, character 
290 Many Canadian environmental protection agencies have developed a team process with 
technical expertise in their agencies and with prosecuton for more effective investigation and 
case preparation. See F. Gordon, "Peranan Saks Ahli Dalam Penuntutan Perkara Linkgmgan" 
in Penindakmr pelangguran Hukum Lingkungan, prosiding Lokakmya. Semarang, Su~ubaya, 
Medan, [Jakarta: B APEDAL dan EMDI Proyek, 199 1 .] [unpublished] 
29' See L. Peterson, " The Great Lakes Enforcement Strategy: Using Enforcement Resources 
to Maximize Risk Reduction and Environmental Restoration in the Great Lakes Basin", Third 
International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 1 8 1 - 196; R. van 
Heuvelen, supra, note 3 1. 
of the offender and any other special circumstan~es.~* Many environmentai agencies are 
now authorized to issue wamings and tickets, a variety of directives and orders and can, in 
cooperation with justice officials, initiate criminal, administrative or civil proceediigs and, 
in limitecl instances, rnay refer cornpliance issues to a dispute resolution process.293 It is also 
a common practice to impose a hierarchical use of penalties. 
The choice of sanction will depend on the end objective(s) which may be singular or multi- 
faceted. Prosecution and sentencing play an important role in both general and specific 
deterrence. Responses and sanctions c m  be used to create an atmosphere of deterrence 
(significant &es or incarceration), to prevent impacts (stop order or injmction), to mitigate 
damage (clean up order), to remove economic benefits gained from noncornpliance or to 
compensate ~ i c t i m s . ~ ~ ~  The availability of sanctions can also be limited by past govemment 
292 For a detailed discussion of sentencing criteria see J Z .  Swaigen at al, Supro note 148. For 
exarnples of the application of similar criteria by Canadian courts see R v. Bat@ supra, note 
29 and R v. Northern MetaZIic Sales, suprs note 26. See also the Canadian Agriculthîre and 
Agri-Food Administrative M o n e t q  Penalties Act. SC. 1995, ch. 40 which introduces 
sanctioning criteria based on a classification of offences. 
293 While the introduction of increasingly stringent penalties, inchding incarceration and 
mil lion dollar fines has attracted public attention, within the pollution control agencies 
concems tend to focus more on expanding the anay of administrative and economic 
sanctions, particularly as preventative measures. See for example minutes of the Proceedings 
of the Canadian Parliamentary Standing Committee on Environmental SustainabIe 
Development, Order of Reference regarding the CEPA (Ottawa, 1994); Alberta 
Envirollmental Protection and Enhancement Act, supra, note 188, s.22 1; E. Barr 
recommends hierarchical use and rapid escalation of both penalties and incentives, supra, 
note 34 at p. 212. See also CEPA Enforcement unà Cornpliunce Policy, supra note 15; Yukon 
Environment Act, Enforcement and Cornpliance Policy, supra, note 58; Canada's Agriculture 
and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties Act, SC.  1995, ch. 40. 
294 J. Swaigen, Supra, note 276; C .  Wasserman, Supra note 129. 
action (or inaction) providing yet another reason for closely reguiated ~ s ~ o n s e . ~ ~ ~  
Any practice of prefacing strict enforcement action with informal, negotiated responses, for 
example warnings or technicd advice, should also be carefully managed to avoid later 
codicts. Many jurisdictions attempt to control discretion in the use of verbal warnings and 
waivers on cornpliance through prescribed criteria for use and format of these 
administrative r e ~ p o n s e s . ~ ~ ~  
b) DELEGA TION OF SANCTIONING PO WERS 
Enforcement action necessitates the designation of special powers beyond those activities 
295 For example, in some instances the courts have acquitted an accused on the grounds that 
standards were excessive or unreasonable or where oficials have k e n  found to have mislead 
the accused by past failure to enforce or by providing inaccurate or misleading information 
about the law ("oficial1y" or "governrnent induced error"). See R v. Byron Creek Collieries 
Limifed (1 979) 8 C.E.L.R. 3 1 ; R v. Cancoil 13rermaI Corparafion and Parkinson. supra n. 
132. See Swaigen supra, note 148 at p. 36-37 where he cites the decision of Stuart, J. in R. v. 
United Keno Hill Mines Ltd. (1 98O), 1 0 CELR 43 (Y.T. Terr. Ct.), p. 47. "If the responsible 
government agency is not pressing for cornpliance, or is actually encouraging non- 
cornpliance ttuough tacit or explicit agreements to permit non-cornpliant operations, the 
corporations cannot be severdy faulted." As a result of past problems caused by broad power 
of discretion in Iicensing or by granting waivers to cornpliance, a Government of Alberta 
appointed Review Panel on Environmental Law Enforcement recornrnended reform of law 
and practice to remove the practice, supra. note 58. See also, E.J. Swanson et al, The Price of 
Pollution: Environmental Litigafion in Canada (Edmonton: Environmen t Law Centre, 1 990) 
at p. 168-176. 
296 American, Canadian and European agencies use a number of verbal and written warnings 
or notices. See C. Wassernan, supra, note 173 at p. 96; CEPA Enforcement and Complimce 
Policy, supra, note 15 at p. 45; L. Paddock, "Civil Field Citations" in Proceedings, Third 
intemational Conference on Envri-onmentul Enforcement, supra. note 4 at p. 401; S.A. 
Sutton-Mendoza. " Field Citations: A T w l  for Enforcing UST Regdations in New Mexico ", 
id, at p. 409; 1.8. Ramic and J.M. Engbert, " United States' Clean Air Act Field Citation 
Program: New Enforcement Authority to Address Minor Violations ", id. at p. 42 1. 
generdy associated 
One ready measure 
with cornpliance activities, for 
of the extent of political and 
exarnple, permitting and inspection. 
bureaucratie cornmitment to tirnely 
enforcement is the degree to which officiais have k e n  given, expressly or irnplicitly, by 
legislation the necessary powers to conduct investigations, to commence legai proceedings 
or to issue orders or directives. 
However, as a balancing measure, govemments must also implement mechanisms to fetter 
and direct enforcement action "' and where necessary to allow for direct intervention. It has 
been the experience of many environmental agencies that inconsistent and in some cases 
illegai or unconstitutional responses are taken if officiais are granted blanket, dettered 
d i s c r e t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  It may also become necessary for an agency to directly intervene, for example 
where other govemments or agencies fail to abide by enforcement agreements or 
protoco~s.299 
297 For example, while as previously mentioned, Environment Canada has issued an 
Enforcemens and Compiiunce P olicy which prescribes the appropriate enforcement response, 
field inspectors report to regional directors, not the centra1 Ofice of Enforcement and 
Compliance. This has resulted in considerable variance among regions in the nature and 
intensity of enforcement activity and response to violations. supra, note 13. 
29R Canadian governrnents have amended environmental laws to prescribe procedures for 
inspection, search and seizure to ensure activities do not violate the Cmiadirm Churter of 
Righrs and Freedom, supra note 42. 
299 For exarnple, in the United States the power of oversight granted to the EPA enables the 
agency to intervene to initiate enforcement action, where a state agency has been found 
wanting in its enforcement efforts. This includes the power of the federal agency to " over- 
file " where a state initiated enforcernent action has resulted in a lesser penalty. [Interview 
with E. Devaney, Director of Criminal Enforcement, USEPA, Washington, April 19961. See 
also C. Wasserrnan, supra, note 173 at p. 1 12. 
Some jurisdictions have supplemented their environmental inspectorate with a specially 
trallied often centrally located investigative team who directly investigate or provide special 
expertise in cornplex cases?00 In others, environmentai enforcernent duties are distributed 
among national, provincial and municipal of fi ci al^^^' and in still others, tribai or First 
Nation govemments.302 In some cases the police retah authority for investigation of 
environmental crimes 'O3 and in others the military police play a key role? In d l 1  others, 
300 For example the US EPA has established the Ofice of Criminal Enforcernent empIoying 
specialized, full-time, criminal investigatorç whose work is supplemented through an MOU 
with the FBI, In recognition of the need to develop specialized skills for environmental 
prosecutions the U.S. Department of Justice established a separate Environmental Crimes 
Section to assist regional prosecutors. The result has been a steady increase in nurnber of 
criminal referrals and the amount of penalties imposed. Earl Devaney "The Evolution of 
Environmental Crimes Enforcement at the United States Environmental Protection Agency", 
Thkd international Conference on Emàonmental Law, supra. note 4 at p. 457. The U.S. 
National Enforcement Investigations Center (NEIC) also provides specialized expertise, 
support and training for the EPA for complex investigations. See C. G. WilIs et al, supra 
note 247 at p. 332-336. 
'O' For example, in the Netherlands, extensive powen are vested in municipalities to enforce 
environmental laws. Drs. P.H. Dordregter, "Environmental Enforcernent by Municipalities in 
the Netherlands", Third Iniernaiionaf Conference on Environmeniai Law, supra, note 4 at p. 
391. 
302 The USEPA has delegated enforcement authority to some tribal governments. 
(Interview with R. Hardacher, International office, USEPA, April 1995 and U.S. 
Govemment Advisory Cornmittee to EPA Administration, Washington, March 1995). In 
Canada, pursuant to constitutionally entrenched First National final agreements, powers to 
enact environmental protection laws have been incorporated, although direct powers of 
enforcement are limited. See for example, C h p a g n e  and Aishihik First Nations F M  
Agreement, May 1993 and The Champagne and Aishihik Firsr Nations Selj-Government 
Agreement, May 29, 1993. 
303 For example, the Republic of Indonesia, See L.F. Duncan et al, supra. note 44. For a 
discussion on the roIe of the police in The Netherlands, see J. Van Dijk, "The Interest of 
Cooperation between Police, Public Prosecutors and Governmental Authorities in the Field of 
Environmental Enforcement", in Proceedings Third International Conference on 
Emkonmenial-Enforcement, supra, note 4 at p. 1 75; R. Hessing, "The Task of the Police", id 
at p. 571-575. For the United States, see E. Neafsey, "The Role of Local, County, and State 
Police Oficers in New Jersey in Environmental Enforcement, id 561-570. On the rote of 
Interpol, see S. Klem, "Environmental Crime and the Role of ICPO-Interpol", id at p. 335- 
341. In Hungary, see Sandor Fulop, "The miblic Prosecutor Office of Hungaq and its 
prosecutors have b e n  granted authority to initiate investigations.'05 
As a general mie the power to prosecute is the sole prerogative of the Attorney ~eneral?'~ 
ln some counîries, however, the judiciary has chosen to directly intervene in the process of 
bringing polluters before the courts?07 in yet others, the power to commence proceedings 
may be assigned directly to environmentai inspectors. 308 
- 
Development" id at p. 373-377. In Argentina, T h e  Ecological Police", see Judge Daniel 
Hugo Llermanos, supra note 36 at p. 249. 
304 For example in Guyana set J.G. Singh, Chief of Staff, Guyana Defence Force 
Headquarters, "The Enforcement Experience in Guyana on Exploitation of Natural 
Resources", supra, note 4 at p. 205. 
305 While in the majority of cases powers vested in the prosecutor are limited to detemining 
whether charges will proceed to trial, in some countries they have retained a more hands-on 
role in environmental investigations. For example, in the Netherlands prosecutors have the 
power to initiate an investigation. (Interview with Ham Fangman, and Gustaaf Biezeveld, 
Departrnent of The Attorney General, Govemment of the Netherlands, Aprii 1991, The 
Hague). In Hungary, it has been proposed that the power to investigate environmental 
offenses be delegated to the Public Prosecutor Office due to complexity of the legal issues 
and the need for special expertise. See, Sandor Fulop, supra, note 303 in Proceedings, 
InternationaI Conference on Environmental Law. supra, note 4. 
306 For example, Canada, USA, Netherlands. For a discussion of the role of the Office of 
Public Prosecutions in environmental enforcement, see G. Van Zeben, "Enforcement of 
Environmental Legislation under Criminal Law by the Public Prosecutions Departrnent of the 
Netherlands", in Proceedings Third International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, 
supra, note 4 at 45 1-456. 
307 In Argentina, Judge D.H. Llermanos, hstrated by the lack of initiative of the governrnent, 
acted ex-oficio in bringing a series of environmental cases before him arguing an ovemding 
duty pursuant to the Constitution and the Penal Code to protect the public health. See Daniel 
Hugo Llermanos, supra, note 36 at p. 247-25 1 and personal interview, April 1994 in Oaxaca, 
Mexico). 
308 Conversation with Jalaluddin Ismail, Director, Malacca & Sembilan Departrnent of 
Environment, Oaxaca, April 1994. 
Many countries empower environmental inspectors, senior managers (e.g . , Director of 
Pollution control3? or elected officiais (including Ministers responsible for environment, 
health, industry) to take administrative action to enforce the Iaw. Powen to sanction 
environmental offenders through administrative action are generally prescribed in 
environmentai laws. Thse  powers are generally assigned to inspecton to be exercised in 
the course of their cornpliance activities with more heavy handed responses ( temporary 
dosure or shutdown orders) reserved to mhisters. ''O In some countnes administrative 
31 1 penalties are issued by special courts established within the bureaucracy . It is important 
that powers be delegated not ody to sanction pouuters afler the fact but also to effect 
preventative action." 
309 The Alberta Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act supra, note 188 at s. 1988 
empowers a designated Director of Pollution Controi to issue orders to suspend approvals, 
shut down activities, speciQ rneasures. 
See for example the Yukon Environment Act provides more than 15 separate 
administrative actions which an inspector or Minister may use to sanction a violator. Supra, 
note 179. Sections 35 and 40 CEPA provide the Minister of the Environment with the power 
to take preemptive action to prevent anticipatecf h m ,  supra, note 114. See also Agricuihre 
and Agri-Food Adminisiration Monetary Penalries Act, supra note 292. 
3" For example, the USEPA has established Administrative Coiid Judges. See C. 
Wassennan, supra, note 129 at p. 97, 
312 By way of exarnple, powers granted to environmental inspectors under the Canadian 
Environmental Protection Act and federal Fisheries Act focus on responses afier the fact. Op. 
cit. For an anaiysis of the limitations of inspector powers and need for anticipatory or 
preventive powers, see L. F. Duncan, supra note 25; Envimnment Canada, I ~ ~ p c i o r s '  
Powers and Provisions Governing m c i a l  Analysrs in the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act (CEPA); Reviewing CEPA, The Issues (Paper #I5), Environrnent Canada, 
(Ottawa: Environment Canada, 1994); and H. Versteeg, hmining  the Cuvent and Proposed 
Potenrial of the Canadian Environmental f rotection Act to Incorporate Pollution Prevention 
PrincipZes md Strategies, (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 1993). 
As discussed earlier, an enforcement and compliance policy can be useful not o d y  for 
sending a clear message to regdated parties about the response which can be anticipated if 
the law is violated, but also for tempering the exercise of discretion by enforcement officiais 
in response to a suspected or reported offence. By prescribing national, or where deemed 
appropriate, regionai criteria for the appropriate enforcement response or sanction, the 
policy can help instiu accountability for fair and consistent enforcement action and Uiform 
the community about the official action they should anticipate in response to their 
comp~aints.) l 3  
An enforcement and compliance policy is also a usefid rnechanism for clarifjbg roles for 
inspectors, investigatoa. prosecutors, judiciary and the public. The policy should cl@ 
the respective powers and roles for the benefit of the regulated industry, public and 
govemment regdators. 
The relative effectiveness of the policy as a rnechanism to deter offenders or to ensure 
consistency depends on adherence to the policy. This can be facilitated through wide 
distribution of the policy (public watchdog), directed training, by mandating an 
environmental agency to ensure adherence to the policy and by formal endorsement of an 
313 See for exarnple CEPA Enforcement and Cornpliance Policy, supra. note 15, Yukon 
Enforcement and Cornpliance Poiiq, supra, note 58. Ontario Ministry of the Environment, 
Urt~onn Enforcement Policy, May 1986. 
enforcement protocol. 
Private enforcement action can be important to spur government action, or as a supplement 
or replacement for officia1 enf~rcement.~'~ Both direct and indirect roles have been found 
constructive in increasing accountability and in spuning enforcement action. For example, 
in some jurisdictions private individuais or organizations can compel the investigation of a 
suspected offience and an official report on the response tal~en.~" The right of access to 
monitoring data and cornpliance reports also facilitates a watchdog tole.)l6 Yet while public 
cornplaints or reports are widely recognized as a significant trigger for enforcement action, 
efforts are not always made to encourage or to access this s ~ u r c e . ~  " 
An equally important stimulus to government enforcement has been the granting of the 
R. Hallo, "Citizens Role in Enforcement: A Spur. a Supplement and a Substitute", supra in 
Intemafional Conference on Environmental Law, supra, note 4 at p. 56 1-573. Public interest 
environmentai suits have been initiated in many countries including Canada, the United 
States, Australia, India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Gerrnany, Columbia, 
Ecuador, Peru, and Russia. See S. Elgie, supra. note 284, at p. 196. In the Philippines, 
villages are empowered to directly enforce environmental laws. See ESCAP Report. Ch. N 
Statutes of Environmental Legislation in the ESCAP Region, at p. 144. 
315 CEPA supra note 1 14 ss. 108, 109; Yukon Emironment Act, supra, note 1 79 ss. 14- 1 8; 
Alberta Environmental Protection and Enhcement Act, supra, note 1 88, S. 1 84. 
316 F. Irwin et a1 "From Public Disclosure to Public Accountability: What Impact Will it have 
on Corn pliance?", Proceedings International Confèreence on Environmental Law, supra. note 
4 at p. 589-603; Paul Keough, et al, supra note 284 at p. 6 1 1-6 16. 
3 17 C. G. Wills, supra, note 247 at p. 329; S. Elgie, supra. note 284. 
right to directly initiate criminal prosecutions or civil proceeduigs for injunction or 
~iarnages.~'~ Successfid civil actions against government for damages caused by non- 
enforcement has provided significant stimulus for improved enforcement. l9 
It has been suggested that private enforcement rights shall be widely publicized so that 
"citizens are able to take concrete action to compel enforcement rather than merely voicing 
outrage and politicize the regdatory process".320 Rivate legd action can be particularly 
effective in forcing official action against government owned or operated facilities or in 
cla-g enforcement d~ t ies?~ '  In sorne instances, liability is hposed on Ministers, 
govemment officiais where they have k e n  found to have directed, authonzed or asserted to 
or acquiesced in participation of an ~ f f ence . )~~  
While many environmental enforcement agencies support giving a role to the public, they 
also express concem about the impact of privately triggered investigations or enforcernent 
on limited resources and any strategic plan for enforcement?* A logical path around this 
318 CEPA. supra, note 1 14, ss 136; Yukon Environment Act, supra, note 179, ss. 8, 19; Alberta 
Environmental Protection and Enhancernent Act, supra, note 188, ss. 204 and 205. 
"' See L.F. Duncan, "Crown Liability and Environmental Rights", Proceedings of the 
Environmental Law Seminar, (Ottawa: National Judicial Institute, 1993) and supra. note 27. 
320 E. Barr, supra, note 34 at p. 222. 
32 1 Friendr of the OldMan River Society, supra. note 28; C .  Wasserman, supra, note 4 at 1 18. 
'" Alberta Environmental Protection and Enhancernent Act, supra note 1 88. s.2 1 7. 
For a discussion of these issues see L. F. Duncan, "The Implications of an Environmental 
Bill of Rights for the Administration of an Enforcement program" an address to the 6th 
Annual Environmental Conference of Canadian Enforcement W c i a l s ,  Victoria, June 1993. 
dilemma is of course public cod ta t ion  in the development of any enforcement strategy or 
policy . 
The dynamic nature of environmental regdation creates a scenario demanding constant 
reevaluation and refom. ScientXc discovenes, technoiogical advances in detecting impacts 
or causes, new industrial processes. changing social, economic and political climates - the 
mutual interrelationships of al1 of these factors combine to mate the need for an evaluation 
process which enables review and revision of management and control strategies. The need 
for ongoing assessrnent and change is equally critical for an enforcement and cornpliance 
program to ensure that its policies, strategies and sanctions remain responsive to the 
character and substance of the laws they are intended to a d d r e ~ s . 3 ~ ~  In addition, 
governments may be accountable to reguiar extemal reporthg responsibilities and scrutiny 
for their enforcement programs.325 
Recognizing the fluidity of environmental regulation, many agencies have incorporated an 
evaluatim process into their compliance £k~nework?~~ As laws and policies evolve and 
324 UNEP, supra, note 32 at p. 1 9. 
32s For example the Parties (Mexico, United States and Canada) are obligated under the 
NAAEC to report annually on their enforcement related obligations. Supra, note 3, article 
12(2)(C). The CEC is working with the North American Working Group on Environmental 
Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation to develop comrnon indicators for effective 
enforcement. 
326 C. Wasserman, supra, note 4 at p. 12 1. 
prioîïties shift enforcement agencies must be capable of revising theu programs and 
approaches?*' Aspects which ment regular review and assessrnent include compliance 
strategies, inspection plans, incentive programs, sanction and penalty options and training 
and resource needs. 
It is also important to have mechanisms in place to enable the evaluation of enforcement 
and compliance activities and strategies against overall environmental quality objecti~es.'~~ 
These objectives and performance standards should be reflected in the reguiations, 
inspection plans, incentive programs and enforcement and compliance budgets329 In this 
way govemments cm better forecast resource and trainuig needs. 
At the m e  tirne it is important not to limit the evaiuation process to the enforcement and 
compliance prograrn, automatically casting al1 blame on the enforcement end of the 
spectnim. Failure to achieve objectives in the prescribed time fiame may not rest solely, 
with the enforcement and compliance program or agency. Fault may lie with the 
327 B. Seigal, supra, note 104 at p. 9- 10. 
328 1991 Report of the Auditor General ofCrmada, supra, note 187 at p. 27 1 ; C. Wasseman, 
international Conference on Environmental Enforcement, (Proceedings Vol. l), supra. note 4 
at p. 121-123; RF. Duw, "Measuring the Success of Cornpliance and Enforcement 
Programs", Proceedings Fourth International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, 
supra. note 4 at p. 489; "Special Topic Workshop F: Measures of Success", id 479. 
329 The Auditor General of Canada in the 199 1 Audit of Environment Canada, ibid, criticized 
them for failure to maintain sufficient data bases to demonstrate the effectiveness or 
efficiency of its enforcement and comptiance activities and for failure to define perFormance 
standards to enable evaluation of the effectiveness of its regulations, and enforcement and 
compliance activities to ensure environmental quality. 
environmental objectives, the laws enacted to meet those objectives or with barriers caused 
by conflicting p i ~ r i t i e s ? ~ ~  It may simply be failure to lend sufficient political or financial 
support to deliver an effective compliance program. 
Consequently, any evaluation of an enforcement strategy should be conducted within a 
broad contexk not merely focusing on the relative success and failures of individual 
enforcement actions, for example the annual count of successful prosecutions~" Any 
thorough review should also encompass roles played by non-enforcement officiais. the 
impact of intergovemmental and potential impacts of conflicting objectives or 
compliance t o ~ l s . ~ ~ ~  For example, it has been recommended that the use of incentives be 
closel y monitored and audited to identify enforcement de ficits.'" Consequentl y, any 
evaluation of a compliance program or strategy must also hclude assessrnent of the impact 
"O B. Seigal reports that evaluations of regdatory pmgrams indicate that factors which have a 
detrimental effect on compliance activities include uncertain~ about the relative priority of 
enforcement, lack of policy direction, inadequate training, lack of adequate data, lack of 
political commitment to use of Ministerial sanctions and lack of ability to estimate non - 
detected violations. Seigai, supra, note 104 at p. 7-8. 
33' This is a comrnon tendency to lirnit the rneasure of commitment or success of 
environmental enforcement on the number of successfd prosecutions. See for example " 
Environmentalists decry lack of charges for pollution offences", Ottawa Citizen, July 1 0, 
1994. It may be noted that the issue of "bean-counting" continued to be a significant matter 
of dispute between the federal and state level agencies in the United States in the process of 
instituting their oversight poiicy and grants program. 
332 For example policies initiatives towards harmonization of standards and processes and 
regionalization of delivery can have a significant impact on an enforcement pmgram. See 
previous discussion in Section B. 1 (b) "Clarified Roles and Responsibilities". 
'" B. Seigal, suprcz, note 104 at p. 1 1 -1 2. 
334 E. Barr, supra note 34 at p. 2 1 1-21 8; see also K. Webb, supra note 80. 
of incentives on compliance records. 
There are humerable sources of indicators for assessing whether the enforcement strategy, 
policy or responses are effective. The regulatory and compliance process itself contains 
many key indicators of problerns and directions for change. As discussed earlier, the 
decision to enact of any new laws, including creating new standards, procedures, sanctions 
or hcentives, should be treated as an automatic trigger for reassessing the institutional 
capacity to achieve c o ~ n ~ l i a n c e . ~ ~ ~  A compliance database if properiy maintained can be a 
useful tool for identi-g problem individuals or secton and the need to redirect staff or 
resources. Cornpliance statistics cm dso serve as valuable indicators of adherence to 
alternative enforcement or control mechanism, whether regulatory or private. 
Enforcement field experience can provide one of the more tangible sources of information 
about the effectiveness of the enforcement tools and strategy. Careful documentation of any 
technical or legal problems or resource deficiencies experienced in the course of on-going 
inspection and enforcement work can provide the backbone of a pragmatic enforcement 
strategy review and training program?36 
335 C. Wasserrnan, supra, note 323. 
336 R.F. Du@, supra, note 328. 
Other usefiii indicators can be found in ernpirical or policy studies conducted in-house or by 
other departments "' or by extemal parties such as legal or policy institutes or 
~niversities.'~~ Sorne agencies have incorporated this review and evaluative h c t i o n  into 
their institutional structure and mandate to enable effective strategic planning through 
tracking of innovative strategies and approaches adopted by other agencies and 
j~nsdictions?~ 
Other triggers which should not go UIlheeded include cornplaints by the public or regulated 
parties or judicial de ci si on^.)^^ Surveys of regdatees also provide valuabte information 
- - 
337 For example, the 1988 Studies in Regulation and Compliance commissioned by the 
Canadian Department of Justice including D. ChappeIl, supra 10 and D. Chappell, The Use of 
Crimina! Penalties for Pollution of the Environment: A Seleetive und Annotateci Bibliography 
ofthe Liferatzae (Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada: 1988); see also the series of study 
reports issued by the Compliance and Regulatory Remedies Project, Department of Justice 
Canada, supra, note 36. 
338 For exarnple, ongoing research and reform proposals by law reform commissions, 
environmental law institutes, non governent organizations. See for exarnple the study series 
by Protection of Life Project, The Law Reform Commission of Canada; studies sponsored by 
the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research including Sanctions and Rewmdr in the Legal 
Sys~em: A Muhi disciplinmy Approach, M.L. Friedland ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press: 1989); and M.L. FriedIand, Securing Cornpliunce: Seven case Shrdies, (Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press: 1990). See also Environmental EnfOreement: Proceedings of the 
National Conference on the Enforcement of Environmental Law, ed. L. F. Duncan 
(Edmonton: Environmental Law Center: 1985); CEC, supra, note 7. 
339 Environment Canada's Office of Enforcement and CompIiance includes staff positions 
dedicated to legal and policy research on alternative approaches to compliance. The USEPA 
undedes  intensive evaluations of in enforcement and compliance programs and strategies 
in addition to the conduct of ongoing research into alternative approaches. See for exarnple 
Enforcement in the 1990s Project: Recommendutions of the Analyrcal Workgroups, USEPA, 
Office of Enforcement (LE- l33,22E-2OOO), (Washington,: EPA, 199 1) 
340 E. Swanson, Public Response Indicators for Meawing Eflective Enforcement, (Montreal: 
CEC, 1997) (Unpublished manuscript). 
about reasons for no~i-com~liance.~~' It has ken  suggested that this infornation can be 
us& in designing cornpliance strategies in response to underlying reasons for non- 
~om~liance."~ To facilitate a public role in the evaluative process, cornpliance histories 
should be made publicly acce~sible.~" 
b) AL TERNA TIVE EVALUA TZON PROCESSES 
Evaluation processes have taken a variety of forms including in-house reviews, reviews by 
neutral parties (for example law reform commissions or Auditors ~eneral)~" or rnulti 
stakeholder review~."~ Empiricai studies by extemai parties can also provide valuable 
-- 
34 1 B. SeigaI, supra, note 1 04 at p. 10. 
343 E. Barr, supra note 34 at p. 214. For example, both Environment Canada Pacifie and 
Yukon Region and the B.C. Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks publish reports on 
corn p 1 iance records. For example, Environment Canada, Complimce S t a m  Summmy 
Repork British Columbia. Fiscal Year 1993- 1994, Regional Program Report 94-04 
(Vancouver: Environment Canada, 1994). 
344 The Law Reform Commission of Canada, Protection of Life Project produced numerous 
studies and working papers on key environmental regulatory and enforcernent issues and 
alternatives including reports on crimes against the environment, sentencing in environmental 
cases, workplace pollution and private prosecution; E. Barr recommends regular evaluation 
by the office of the Conholler General, supra note 34 at p. 223. In 1996, the Parliament of 
Canada established by statute the Commissioner for Environment and Sustainable 
Development with a mandate to audit the policies and programs of federal agencies if 
irnplementing strategies for sustainable development. An Act Respecting the (?#?ce of the 
Auditor General of Canada and Sustuinable Development Monitoring and Reporting, S C .  
1995 c.43. The Commissioner in the first report to Parliament identified environmental 
enforcement programs as one of his fm target for audit. See Report of the CommLrsioner of 
the Emironmenî and Sutainable Development to the House of Comrnom, 1997. 
345 In 1989 Canadats federd Department of Agiculture established an independent secretariat 
and muIti stakeholder review cornmittee for the purpose of evaluating the existing regulatory 
and enforcement regime for managing pesticides and making recommendations for reforxn. 
information about cornpliance ~trate~ies."~ In some jurisdictions accountability and 
evaluation processes have k e n  legislated empowering a variety of parties to evaluate 
adherence to law and policy including appointed cornmittees, legislators or the general 
C) A UDITZNG THE ENFORCER 
It is equally important that the decisions of enforcement officiais themselves be subjected to 
scrutiny and assessrnent to remove any potential for perverse consideratiom. This has k e n  
effected through statutorily hposed review processes, provision for private right of action 
and multi-lateral agreements."* It has k e n  suggested that there should be systematic 
scrutiny of reasons for failure to require compliance to identify who may be exercising too 
iitiIe or too great c o n t r o ~ . ~ ~ ~  
For the resulting legislative and policy refonn, see supra, note 308. 
346 D. Saxe, supra, note 7. 
347 In the United States this " oversight" role is effected through legislative hearings, judicial 
review of agency actions, accountability to the Executive, and private right of action. See W. 
M. Eichbaum, "Alternative Organizational Structures for a Cornpliance and Enforcement 
Program", Proceedings International Conference on Etmironmental Cornpliance, supra, note 
4 at p. 298: Wasserman, ibid at p. 121. In Canada numerous processes are in place to effect 
public review of compliance actions or inactions, see for example the Yukon Environment Act 
empowers an independent Council to review al1 cornplaints regarding regulatory or 
enforcement activities of the government and extends to any citizen the right to compel a 
review of these programs. supra, note 179, ss. 24 and 23. Section 39 of the Act requires 
regular audits of the efficiency and faimess in delivery of environmental programs. See also. 
supra, note 34 1 . 
348 Supra, note 341. See also Section 6 (d) "Private Enforcement". 
349 E.  Barr, supra, note 34 at p. 21 1. 
IV. INDICATORS F SUPPORT FOR AN ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORK 
Chapter III presented a framework within which law, policy and institutional would enable 
effective enforcement of environmental laws. Numerous examples were given with the text 
of individual components of the proposed m e w o r k .  This chapter conveys various 
viewpoints of governments about the usefulness and efficacy in implementing an 
enforcement fhmework including specinc assistance to support implementation. The 
Chapter closes with observations on the potentiai special constraints or barriers which either 
have or potentidy could be faced by emerging or economically developing nations in 
creating more effective policies or programmes for effective environmental enforcement. 
While action to ins t i~e  more effective enforcement may at times appear spotty, there is 
evidence of global support, at least arnong enforcement agencies, for the concept of a 
comprehensive fi.amework for implementation.'so 
Wide recognition has been given for the adoption of a comrnon strategic fiamework against 
which environmental compliance can be anticipated or measured.)" Support for a universal 
350 NAAEC, supra. note 3. article 5 sets a cornmon frame for effective enforcement. 
C. Wasçerman states that a positive response was given to the drafl strategic framework 
for environmental enforcement and compliance presented for discussion at the 1990 meeting 
of representatives fiom 13 countries and international organizations. Subsequent conferences 
fiamework for implementing environmental enforcement, nonetheless, reflects an 
understanding of necessary variances in instituting its componenis due to the unique socio- 
politicai context and financial capacity of individual Still, there is wide 
agreement that the probability of compliance is related more to individual deterrence than 
one of a cultrrral r e s p o ~ s e ~ ~ ~  (with the exception of course of corporate culture).3S4 
in Canada, federal and some provincial and temtorial governments, enforcement and 
compliance polices and strategies have k e n  recognized as necessary corollaries to the 
effective implementation of ~awç?*~ The Auditor General for Cana@ for example, has set 
in 1992 and 1994 drew participation frorn over 80 countries and international organizations. 
See C. Wassertnan, "The Pnnciples of Environmental Enforcement and Beyond: Building 
Institutional Capacity", Third International Conference on Environrnentul Enforcement, 
supra, note 4 at p.22. 
352 As one example, whiie Canadian prosecutors have had mixed success in persuading 
judges of the serious (sornetimes criminal) nature and consequences of environmental 
offenses, the Indonesian judiciary have given enthusiastic endorsement to incarceration of 
environmental violators. See Proceedings of 1992 Seminars on Environmenfal Enforcement. 
ed. DunzadMoestadji (Jakarta: EMDVIndonesian Ministry of Population and Environment. 
1992). Polish officials have emphasized the need to recognize the significant dificulties 
assùciated with the massive privatization of economic activity and the consequent 
inappropriateness of some enforcernent responses including both coercive and market 
measures. See P. Syryczynski, "The 'Ecological Semaphores' for Fourteen Pattis of 
Ownership Changes in Poland, International Conference of Environmenid Law, supra. note 4 
at p. 453-463. In Bulgaria, implementation of an enforcement framework has been hindered 
by a lack of necessary implementing regulations, and financial in capacity of both the 
regulated industry and govenurient regdators. See L. Maslarova, supra, note 45 at p. 97-102. 
P roceedhgs Third International Conference on Envkonrnental Law. 
353 It should be noted that the potential impact of cultural values has not been discounted by 
the author and is listed as one possible factor affêcting the choice of enforcement response 
and the relative probability of successfùl implementation. See next section, "Developing and 
Emerging Nations: Barriers and Constraints". 
354 D. Saxe, supra, note 7. 
See for example, A Strategic Approach to Developing Cornpliunce Policies: A Guide, 
out a W e w o r k  for implementation economical, efficient environmental compliance, 
including clarification of enforcernent roles; appropnate working relationships with 
provinces and other federal departments; establishing and following a set of policies, 
priorities and plans including a balance of promotional and enforcement activities; 
allocation and efficient use of resources in accordance with predetermined priorities; and 
program evaluation based on predetermined objectives.3s6 Since the rnid- 1 9808s, 
enforcement respomes by most Canadian jurisdictions have ken  dictated by official 
enforcement and compliance policies and in some instances detailed procedurai 
In at Ieast one jurisdiction these documents are required by I~w.~' '  
SÏmilar policy documents have been adopted by the USEPA and State environmental 
359 agencies. in addition to detailed policies, procedural manuais, strategies and intensive 
supra note 56; E. Barr, et al, szrpre note 34. S e e  also the evaluative h e w o r k  set out by the 
Auditor General of Canada for assessing the performance of the federal Department of the 
Environment in enforcing environmental Iaws. Report of the Auditor General of Canada to 
the Home of Commom, Chapter 13. supra, note 1 87 at p. 268. 
357 For example the federal, Alberta, British Columbia, Ontario and Yukon Enforcement mrd 
Compliance Policies, supra, note 58 and 129. The Canadian Department of Justice as already 
issued a series of documents outlining the merits of an enforcement and compliance policy 
and strategy and outlining the necessary steps. Supra, note 142. AI1 federal regdatory impact 
statements now require that a compliance strategy be gazetted along with any new regdation. 
See RLRS Writer's Guide, supra note 139. It may also be noted that the Canadian position in 
negotiation of the NAAEC purportedly drew its foundation from the Cmadian 
Environmental Protection Act Enforcement and Cornplicmce Policy. See H .  Mann, "The 
North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation: Implications for the 
Enforcement of Environmental Law", supra, note 63. 
358 Yukon Environment Act, supra. note 179, section 1 50. 
359 C. Wasserman, ccOverview of Compliance and Enforcement in the United States: 
Philosophy, Strategies and Management Tools", Proceedings International Enforcement 
training progmms, the USEPA has endorsed a Four Year Strateeic Plan for improved 
edorcement and compliance action?* The USEPA detailed framework for effective 
environmental enforcement has k e n  subjected to intensive international scmtiny as a 
working h e w o r k  for other nations.361 
Support for a basic h e w o r k  for measining progress on improved environmental 
compliance has had a more mixed reception in Europe at Ieast by the individual members 
countries of the European Economic Union   EU).^" Nonetheless the European Council has 
cailed for full implementation and enforcement of Community legislation and instnicted the 
Commission to conduct and rnake public reguiar evaluations of progress in this 
Community environmental legislation will only be effective if it is fully 
implemented and enforced by Mernber states3@ 
.- 
Workshop, supra, note 4 at p. 7-46; Commission for Environmental Cooperation. 1995 
Amual Report, (Annex IIL Annual Reporî on Enforcement) (Montreal: C EC, 1 996). 
USEPA Office of Enforcement, Enforcanent in the 1990's Projecf, Recommendations 
fiom the AnaiyticaI Workgroups, (Washington: EPA: 199 1). For a more detailed discussion 
of Amencan policies and sûategies see Proceedings of the second, third and fourth 
International Conferences on Environmental Enforcement, supra note 4. 
36 1 The f'ramework was the focus of international discussion and debate during the series of 
international conferences on environmental enforcement held in Utrecht, Budapest, Oaxaca 
and Chiang Mai, supra, note 4. 
362 An overview of dificulties faceci in persuading Member states to institute consistent 
enforcement responses for environmental laws is provided in R. MacRory, "Membenhip in 
the Empean Community: What it means for Environmental Requirements and 
En forcementf*, Proceedings International Confrence on Emironmental Law. supra note 4 at 
p. 1 7 1 - 1 8 1 and L. Krarner, supra, note 66. 
363 L. b e r ,  ibid at pp. 184 and 185. Member states are obligated to not only to incorporate 
community environmental standards into their domestic laws but also to enforce them. 
364 Statement of the European Council (Bulletin of the European Communities 6-1990) at p. 
18-2 1, as cited in R. MacRory, supra, note 362. 
The Netherlands cm be singled out among those counaies voicing strong support 
for adoption of the basic f r a m e w ~ r k ? ~ ~  
A 1985 OECD case study of American, Dutch and British approaches to implementing 
environmental policy identified a common failure to give adequate attention to enforcement 
and cornpliance?" These discussions precipitated a nurnber of international exchanges on 
approaches to environmental enforcement and cornpliance culminating in three 
international conferences, focused on the need for enforcement, building the necessary 
fkmework and alternative approaches.'67 The dialogue initiated among Western European 
and North Arnerican jurisdictions was later expanded to include enforcement practitioners 
from eastem Europe, AfEca, Russia, Caribbean nations, central and southem Amenca and 
Asia SUnilar exchanges on approaches to environmental enforcement were occuning 
between the Republic of Indonesia, the Netherlands and 
365 In 1990, for example, the Netherlands established the National Coordination Cornmittee 
for Environmental Iaw Enforcement (LCCM) to monitor and promote the implernentation of 
a more effective enforcement structure. See J. A. Peters, " The Relationship between Central 
Govemment and ProvinciaVMunicipal Authorities with Regard to Enforcement", supra, note 
4 at p. 273. The Netherlands Minisûy of Housing, Physical Planning, and the Environment 
(VROM) has contributed generously to the series on international conferences of 
environmental law, supra, note 4. 
3' C. Wassennan, supro. note 4 at p.22; F. Plate, supra note 40 at p. 239-24 1. 
367 Supra, note 4. 
A series of enforcernent training seminan and conferences were held between 1989 and 
1993 sponsored by the Environmental Development in Indonesia Project (EMDI) and the 
Netherlands Minishty of Justice in cooperation with the Indonesian Ministry of Population 
and Environment (KLH), Department of Justice and Environmental Impact Control Agency 
(BAPEDa). 
It was observed during the course of the these international dialogues, that discussion 
quickly progressed fiom a debate of the relative merits of environmental enforcement to a 
consensus on the need to build the capacity for compliance and enforcement as one of the 
369 essentiai elements of environmental management. While wide support has been 
expressed for the basic W e w o r k  for effective enforcement, many nations have voiced 
reservations about their capability to implement the necessary refomis due to lunited 
training and resources. Some have voiced the need to adapt the components of the 
hmework to fit their own unique priorities and sit~ations."~ These coIlStraints and 
necessary variances to the basic framework are discussed in the next section. 
B. DEVELOP~VG AND EMERGING NATIONS: BARRIERS AND CONSTRAINTS 
Regardless of the wide support for the concept of a hmework for environmental 
enforcement, certain additionai barriers and consûaints may be faced by lesser developed or 
emerging nations in its implementation. Variances to the recomrnended framework may be 
necessary to reflect diverse cultural, political and, in particda., economic differences. 
Regardless of the view that the task of achieving compliance centers on a cornmon 
challenge of afEec ting individual behavior, including that of public, corporations and 
369 C. Wasseman, supra, note 4 at p. 22. 
370 This view was expressed by a number of delegates, particularly those fiom eastem 
European, Asian and Afncan nations, at the series of International Environmental 
Enforcement Conferences in Budapest, Oaxaca and Chiang Mai. Among the issues identified 
as unique to newiy emerging or less developed nations is the ment privatization of economic 
development activity and cntical lack of resources and expertise, supra note 4. 
government officials, as opposed to distinct cultural values, noae the less, it is recognized 
that some nations may face unique constraints and barriers in implementing a credible 
working environmental enforcement regirne. 
These variances may be most pronounced for developing or emerging  nation^.^" In many 
instances the differences rnay only be a matter of degree or delay. For example, basic 
capacity building to establish a working bureaucracy (education, training) and institutional 
reform (judicid and administrative systems), requires a greater investment at the fiont end 
than may be necessary in nations with these systerns in place. There will be little value in 
efforts to implement complex enforcement or cornpliance programs without this necessary 
foundation. 
Developing workable laws in itself is a triclq business. But haWig the right laws and 
appropnate sanctions is only part of what is needed to successfidly transfer tested methods 
of environmental protection to other corntries. Related legal hfhstructure must develop on 
a parallel track and long-standiig cultural differences mut be recognized and assessed. 
Econornic realities must be taken into account and resources (both human and monetary) 
must be made available. Very possibly, the single most essential element of the successful 
transfer of environmental solutions is the domestic will of the receiving country. Without 
this, assistance is likely to be a one-sided endea~or?'~ 
37' Recognition for these very differences became a central focus of the Rio Conferme on 
Environment and Development and the resulting Agenda 2 1, supra, notes 1 and 2. 
'" R. Greenspan Bell and S.E. Brornm supra, note 107. 
In recognition of these ciiffierences, a number of international agencies, have recommended 
that lesser developed countries establish interim, achievabie goals thereby phasing in 
improved standards over a longer t h e  pexiod.373 This approach can help alleviate the 
scenario of enacting laws which go unenforced due to lack of resources or expertise, with 
the consequent loss of credibility or face by environmental agencies?4 Some nations have 
adopted a strategy of phasing in controls, concentrating on significant polluters on a sectorai 
or regional ba~is."~ A third alternative may be to limit standard setting to new facilities to 
avoid overly prohibitive costs to industry in retrofitting. This rnay also alleviate a 
discoumghg backlog of non cornpliance for govemment en forcer^.^'^ 
'" For example the World Health Organization as cited in F. Halter, "Towards more 
Effective regdation in Developing Countries" (Paper presented to OECD Conference on 
Environmental Management in Developing Countries) (Paris: October 3-5, 1990) at p. 19. 
Evidence of the growing recognition by some international environmental and aid 
organizations of the need to provide front end assistance to build an institutional foundation 
supportive of environmental protection refonns include the recent environmental cornpliance 
related and more general institutional capacity building programs of for example UNEP, the 
World Bank, USAID, and CIDA. The latter example has provided over $30 million through 
the Environmental Development in Indonesia Project <O the Republic of Indonesia directed at 
environmental management capacity building in govemment, univenity institutions and the 
private sector. This mode1 is now king duplicated by other aid programs. See for example 
üNEP and World Bank, supra, note 18. 
The Republic on Indonesia, for example, with the assistance of the Canadian International 
Development Agency sponsored Environmental Management Development in Indonesia 
(EMDI) Project in 1989 launched PROKASIH as a pilot program under which the Indonesian 
Ministry of Population and Environment (KLH) and later the Indonesian Environmental 
Impact Management Agency (BAPEDAL) would lay the foundation for standard setting, 
ambient monitoring and enforcement for water quality. See N. Marakim. J. Nagendran, C. 
Potter, C. S. Jardine, G. Adnan, "Water Pollution Contml in Indonesia: The Clean River 
Program (PROKASIH)" (Jakarta: EMDVBAPEDAL, 1 99 1 ). 
376 F. Halter, supra. note 373 at p.14. For example, the Republic of Indonesia is enacting 
their environmental impact assessrnent process inboduced a significant enforcement and 
From the perspective of many developing and emerging nations, establishing these basic 
building blocks for effective environmental regulation and enforcement are viewed as a " 
super-added" t a ~ k . ~ ~ '  If developing nations are to be expected to progress within a 
reasonable tirne b e  towards implementing their respective international environmental 
obligations, in tandem with building a strong economic foundation, recognition must be 
given to the special constraints and barriers they face and target assistance to irnplement this 
basic h n e w ~ r k . ~ ~ ~  The following discussion reviews some of the unique collstraints these 
nations face in imthting effective enforcement. 
In many instances before nations can contemplate implementuig an effective environmental 
compliance strategy, concerted efforts will be required to establish an effective juridical 
system. An effective compliance regime is premised on the enactrnent of enforceable laws. 
evidentiary and procedural capable legal officers and a skilled, independent 
corn pliance headache by requiring the complet ion of assessrnent for facilities pre-dating the 
law. In 1994, due to a significant (hundred of thousands) of backlog of incidents of non- 
compliance, the law was amended to resûict the requirements to proposed operations. See L. 
F. Duncan, supra, note 34, 
377 With deference to Justice La Forest who first coined the phrase in his decision on FrienaS 
of the Old Mm, supra, note 27. 
378 Prof. Dr. Emil Salim, then Minister of State for Population and Environment, Republic of 
Indonesi* " Towards a Sustainable Future", paper presented at preparatory meeting for 
UNCED, (Geneva, July, 199 1). 
379 For example enforcement of environmental laws in Hungary is purportedly constrained by 
the lack of clear definition of environmentai offences. A. Momannay, "Enforcing the Law at 
Govenunent Owned or Operated Facilities", supra, note 4 at p. 467. 
j~d ic ia ry?~~ Where a juridical system is not established, it cannot be presumed that illegal 
or even hannful activities will be made subject to the "Rule of Law". The enactment of 
environmental laws wili have minimal practical effect unless these systems are in place to 
make them b i n d i r ~ ~ . ~ ~  ' 
A parallel reform process may be necessary to consolidate and update laws including 
rescinding outdated or conflichg statutes and regulations?82 It may be necessary to enact 
or revise administrative, civil and criminal procedural codes and evidentiary d e s .  In 
addition it may be necessary to prepare compilations of relevant laws to facilitate ready 
access and reference by lawyers and j~diciary.)~~ It may aiso be necessary to improve basic 
legislative cirafting skills and capabilities to screen laws for enf~rceability.~'~ 
380 See W. S. Bieblo, "Environrnental Enforcement in Central and Eastern Europe in 
Transition", International Conference on Environmenta2 L m ,  Supra, note 4 at p. 229-234; G. 
Bandi, supra, note 45 at p. 237. 
38 1 F. Halter, supra, note 373 at p. 19. 
3" See L. Maslarova, supra, note 45; L. F. Duncan and M. A. Santosa, supra. note 36; T .  
Panayotou, "Economic Incentives in Environrnental Management and their Relevance to 
Developing Countries", (Paper prepared for the OECD meeting on Environmental 
Management in the Developing Countries), (Paris: OECD, 1990) at p. 12; J. Mayda, supra, 
note 140 at p. 1014-1015. 
383 This need was identified by prosecutors and judges participating in the 1991 
environmental enforcement training seminars sponsored by EMDI in Indonesia. See L. F. 
Duncan and P. Moestadji, Penindakan Pelanggaran Hukum Linghgan, (Batu) (Jakarta: 
EMDI/KLH, 1990) and L. F. Duncan and P. Moestadji, "Penegakan Hukum Lingkzingan" 
(Semarang, Surabaya, Medan) (Jakarta: EMDVB APED AL, 1 992). 
'" This need was identified in the program analysis on institutional capacity for 
environmental enforcernent and cornpliance for the Republic of Indonesia, L. F. Duncan and 
M. A. Santosa, supra, note 36. 
It has also been suggested that the orientation and skills of lawyers and judges in developing 
corntries may constrain environmental enforcement, in particular the acceptance of more 
innovative appmaches to ~anct ionin~?~ This may however be more a question of degree 
as there is evidence of a widespread failure in the legal cornmunity to recognize and admit 
to the complex nature of environmentai For many nations legal expertise is lacking 
for legislative drafüng and its enforcement?*' in other cases a generai scarcity of skilled 
govemment lawyers Limits oppomuiities to hone specialized ~kills.~~' A related constraint is 
the inability of government agencies to compete with private h s  in attracting quaiified 
practitioners. in other instances, developing nations d e r  the effects of the "brain drain" 
where those fortunate enough to acquire advanced education, seek their fortunes elsewhere 
where opportunities exist to use their special expertise. 
Another significant barrier to timely reform of laws and procedures is the dearth of material 
on environmentai law published in the languages of receiving nations:89 and al1 to rarely do 
J. Mayda, supra. note 140 at p. 1008- 10 14. The CIDA sponsored EMDI Project supported 
development of an environmental law cumculum for the Republic of Indonesia as early as 
1989. 
386 In Canada, for example. many mernbers of the legal comrnunity, induding lawyers, 
prosecutors and the judiciary remain sceptical of the idea that special training may be 
necessary to practice environmental Iaw. Regardless, environmental courses in law schools 
and seminars for practitioners have gown exponentially. 
387 F. Halter, supra, note 373. "Towards More Effective Regulations in Developing 
Countries" paper presented to OECD Conference on Environmental Management in 
developing Countries (Paris: Oct. 3-5, 1990). 
''* Interviews with lawyers in the Indonesian Department of the Attomey General supports 
this view with lawyers simultaneously responsible for civil and criminal cases. Interviews 
with officiais in the Department of the Attorney General, 1990- 1994. 
'" J. Mayia, q r a .  note 104 at p. 10 1 O noteworthy exceptions includes the EMDI Project 
legal materials or training programs address the unique needs and systems of the receiving 
Consequently, environmental laws rnay be enacted which cannot be pmctically 
implernented causing both discouragement and loss of face for newly established 
environmental enforcement agencies. 
Similarly, while many emerging nations have enacted basic enabling statutes for 
environmental protection and pollution control, less progress has been made in the 
necessary restructuring of govemment to improve the capacity to irnplement contr~ls.'~' A 
1985 çhidy reported that few industnaluing and less industrialized nations had any 
institutional capacity for rnanaging Those experienced in efforts to assist 
emerging nations in the irnplementation of environmental controls have suggested that 
institution building rernains "among the most difficult and elusive of objectives just as it is 
publishing legal texts, study reports, and conference proceedings in Bahasa, Indonesian and 
the CEC North American Environmental Law Database available in English, Spanish and 
French. The iUCN Environmental Law Centre has also collaborated with the iUCN 
Commission on Environmental Law in support of the compiIation of environmental laws of 
the ASEAN nations. 
390 Programmes initiated by UNEP, the International Enforcement Office of EPA, 
International Office of Enforcement, Fish and Wildiife Department, Environment Canada 
and World Bank among others are beginning to address this gap: See note 18 at p. 362. 
39' F. Halter, supra note 373 at p. 2-8. 
"* 2id. It rnay be noted that some progress has k e n  made in providing enforcement training 
since that date. See supra, note 387. 
among the most important causes of program f a i ~ u r e " . ~ ~ ~  
It has also k e n  suggested that as environmental agencies in lesser developed nations may 
lack the necessary clout to move their protection agendas, there may be a need to adjust 
expectations? This is ai l  the more important for enforcement programs. Again, this is a 
constraint common to most nations who have yet to refomi their decision making structures 
to better reflect the principles of sustainable d e ~ e l o ~ r n e n t ? ~ ~  
There is also a propensity for lesser developed nations to employ officials with advanced 
education 05t minimal practicd experience. This is often fostered by pay scales correlated 
with scholarly achie~ernents .~~~ It is therefore important that govemments and donors be 
encouraged to provide greater importance to study opportunities which will provide more 
dkectly related skill development and capacity building programs, in particular for gaining 
enforcement expertise. Another stmtegy may be to ensure involvement by local officials 
and professionals in any foreign fhded studies or consultancies to foster the development 
of in - country enforcement expertise and institutions building.)97 
394 Ibid at p. 10; T. Panayoyou, supra, note 382 at p. 12. 
395 E. Swanson, Put- Surtainable Developrnent to Work: Implerrten~ation Through Lmvrmd 
Policy (Edmonton: Environmental Law Center, 1994). 
396 For example, the pay s a l e  for civil servants in the Republic of Indonesia is calculated on a 
formula which among other factors gives significance to the level of scholastic achievement. 
397 For an example, the EMDI Project included the participation of indonesian governent 
officiais, legal practitioners and acadernics in al1 legal studies and training programs 
sponsored by the Project. See also, L. F. Duncan and M. A. Santosa, supra note 36. 
Similar to other nations, developing nations often 3 S e r  &om a lack of coordination 
between respective development and protection initiatives by various departments and 
agencies can conshaint development of effective enforcement programs, the problem ofien 
exacerbated by donor aid. The necessary preoccupation by developing nations with 
economic development is yet another h ~ r d l e . ' ~ ~  
Another related constraint to implementing effective enforcement regimes common to 
many lesser developed countries is lack of a basic " dernocratic" foundation to facilitate 
public acco~ntabilit~.'" Entrenched systerns of corruption and influence and dearth of 
citizen nghts to access environmental information or to participate in enforcement 
processes, are prime examples. 
The culture of corruption, or " rent seeking behavior", semes as a major barrier to the 
implementation of pollution control programs. While one of the arguments for replacing a 
"command and controi" regime with market measures has been the potential impact of 
398 J. Mayda, supro, note 140 at p. 1016 - 1017. 
399 M. A. Santosa provides a cogent argument for the impact of citizen participation and basic 
dernocratic rights on environmental decision making through a comparative analysis of 
respective rights in north Amerka and the Republic of Indonesia in Citben Pmiicipclion in 
Emironmentat Adminishwtive Decision-making: A Case Shrdy of Indonesia, LLM thesis. 
Osgoode Hall Law SchooI, Toronto, April 1990. 
bribes on enforcement effortsgW it is arguable that this problem would be even more 
significant for any system based on collection or waiver of taxes or fees can impact every 
facet of the cornpliance regime fiom the processing of pennits to exercise of discretion to 
inspect or enforce. The power of influence and direct financial gain associated with control 
over these activities can dorninate decisions about the development of the whole regdatory 
regime. 40 1 
Considered fiorn another viewpoint, where there is a high propensity for rent-seeking a 
behavior, it may be all the more important that measures be instituted to establish channels 
to ensure transparency and accountability. However, in many developing nations the 
potential role for the public as a watch-dog for lack of enforcement is often limited by the 
generally low level of education and awareness in the general populace.402 
Even where an NGO community has established itself as an environmental watch-dog, 
limited right of access to information and participatory rights may seriously limit their 
effecti~eness.~'~ In other instances environmental nghts have been enacted without the 
400 T. Panayotou, supra, note 3 82 at p. 1 3. 
"' While the culture of corruption can seriously constrain domestic efforts to ernploy 
market measures, it is onIy logical that attempts to institute global emissions trading 
programs would suffer from the same limitations, only on a grander scale. 
'O2 M. A. Santosa, supra, note 399 at p. 282; T. Panayotou, supra. note 3 82 at p. 13. 
"3 By way of example. even in some European counhies the right of access to monitoring 
data is limited in practical value by the m u e n t  failure to implement efficient systems for 
collating and accessing the information. Rik De Baere, "Free Access to Information and the 
Licensing procedures for Industrial Plants: The Flemish and Belgian Situation" supra, note 4 
at p. 605-609. 
neceçsary implementing regulations and procedures, and efforts at dispute resolution may 
be hampered by laws which forbid community gatherings.404 Finaily, while it has been 
suggested that a totalitarian government be advantageous, where it chooses to move an 
environmental agenda, it can dso increase reticence of officiais to acknowledge problems in 
implementing their programs.40s 
While debt repayment and economic development have captured the attention of dl 
govemments, for lesser developed or emerging industriai nations the debt load and 
consequent pressure for escaiated development can be counted among the most significant 
barriers to environmentai enforcement. Emerging industriai States, including those who 
have moved rapidly into an economy based on resource extraction are hard pressed to 
implernent necessary parallel environmental contr~ls ."~~ 
The ail too fiequently perceived conflict between environmental directives and ability to 
404 For example the Republic of Indonesia in 1982 enacted the right to a healthy environment 
as welI as right of standing for citizen suits but have yet to promulgate the necessary 
regulations to actualize these nghts. M. A. Santosa, supra. note 399 at p. 281-286. See also J. 
Jendroska, supra. note 107 at p. 3 54 and L. Maslorova, supra, note 45 at p. 98. 
'O5 F. Halter, supra. note 373 at p. 9. 
406 L. Maslarova, Bulgarian Ministry of the Environment advises that for her country 
"Environmental concerns, despite the declarations, are still not integrated into economic and 
policy decisions and they are rapidly king pushed into the background by purely economic 
priorities", supra, note 45. 
have uniimiteci economic choices is ail the more exaggerated in emerging and 
industriabhg nations-4o7 It is also suggested that the propensity to adopt economic models 
based on conventional econornics (i.e. growth model) rather than economic strategies which 
reflect sustainable development principles has a paralle1 negative effect on the capacity to 
achieve environmentai co~n~liance.~~* 
Developing nations ofien lack associated inhstructure including communications and 
transportation, have inadequate intelligence and information management systems and a 
scarcity of scientific or technicd expertise for basic impact assessrnent and control 
~ ~ s t e r n s . ~ ~ ~  In some countries limited budgets for field level eiiforcernent activities 
including environmental monitoring and inspection have lefi vast areas virtuaüy 
~ n r e ~ u l a t e d . ~ ' ~  
The siting of economic control may also constrain the effective operation of an 
environmentai cornpliance regime. This may be particdarly cntical where the major 
pollutiog industries are owned by governrnent, individual govemment officiais, or the 
407 J. Mayda, supra, note 140 at p. 1007. 
409 J. G. Sin& "The Enforcernent Experience in Guyana on Exploitation of Naturat 
Resources", suprq note 4 at p. 205-209. 
4'0 ~nterviews with oficials in Republic of Indonesia, Kalimantan during 1990 to 1992 and 
State level agencies of Mexico, 1995 to 1997. This is also a problem for Canada's northern 
lands. 
~d i tary .~"  The problem is exacerbated where the military hold the power to enforce 
environmental Iaws. 
Problerns have dso k e n  identified in the process of privatinng activities under former 
cornmunistic regimes including the minimal role afTorded to environmental agencies in the 
process, limited impact audits and failure to adequately address liability for past 
pollution."'2 Enforcement has been made difficult by requests by foreign investors to waive 
emission charges, introducing inequities between domestic and foreign owned enterprises 
and a general breakdown in accountability for payment of The process of 
privatization and major resûucturing of the economies, in particular ownership and control 
of industrial facilities, introduces the need for whole new approaches to environmental 
cornpliance. 
Some have suggested that culture can play a role in either limiting or facilitating regdatory 
activity414 Where it rnay have the rnost significant impact is in the generd attitude or value 
towards accepting or controllkg fate with consequence for participatory demands. C learl y a 
" ' F. Halter, supra, note 373 at p. 19. 
''' P. Syrycmski, supra, note 106 at p. 103-1 18. 
413 P. Syrycmski, supra, note 352 at p. 455-456. 
414 M. A. Santosa, supra, note 399. This view is also shared by Mtro. Antonio Azuela, 
Attorney General Cprocurador), for PROFEPA, Mexico (Interview, 1 995, Mexico). 
society which argues against any fom of human intewention to protect the environment 
may give littie support to a guardianship role of the state over the environment through any 
form of surveillance or enforcement. 
On the other hanci, a highly lineal society may place great reliance on senior officiais or 
decision-rnakers to protect their interests. Public expression of support by respected officiais 
for involvement of citizens can encourage their participation.4'5 Similady, mores about the 
relationship between humans and nature will determine attitudes about the relative necessity 
to exploit or respect nature (air, water, wildlife). F k d y  the relative significance given to 
processes involving contlict versus harmony or equanimity will influence the choice of 
mechanisrns for resolving problems or For example, it may innuence the 
relative effectiveness of mediation and litigation as instrument. for achieving 
c~rn~l iance .~  '' 
- 
ibid at p. 283. By way of example, the practice by Prof. Dr. Ernil Salim, former 
Indonesian Minister of Population and Environment, of expressing public support for the 
rights of citizens and environmental organizations in participating in environmental decision- 
making has had a significant influence on willingness of citizens to express their views in that 
country. 
."6 ibid at p. 8 1-82. 
"' Prof. Dr. Koesnadi has frequently argued for the use of mediation rather than litigation to 
resolve environmental disputes in Indonesia because of the general cultural rejection of 
conflict. Achmad Santosa, ibid, however suggests that where the traditional rights and values 
individuals and communities are violated through expropriation of their lands and loss of 
traditional livelihoods through industrial pollution there is evidence of increased willingness 
to express opposition through demonstrations and litigation; the difference in litigation 
between USA and Canada is often cited as an argument against according standing for citizen 
suits. 
6. THE NATURE AND SCALE OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
It has k e n  suggested that the ciifference in the nature and scale of environmentai problems 
in developed and less developed nations rnay affect c o ~ n ~ l i a n c e . ~ ~ ~  W l e  in developed 
nations, it is development which is the key cause of environmental degradation, in less 
developed countries in many insiances pollution is fostered because of poverty and lack of 
development (at least appropriate deve l~~rnen t )~ '~ .  For ernerging industrializing nations the 
problems are exacerbated by the infusion of industrial poUutants into cornmunities 
incapable of mitigating the impacts due to lack of resources, technology or institutional 
structures. 
In addition, in lesser developed countries pollution sources are often small, widely 
dispersed cottage or small scale industries, unregulated housing settlements and widespread 
uncontrolled pesticide use and d i ~ ~ o s a l ? ~ ~  While sorne have argued for use of economic 
measures rather than regulation to control these disparate sources '", it is suggested the 
poor are the least likely to be able to pay and the administrative cost would be prohibitive. 
Alternative strategies have focused on regulation of major industrial sources targeting 
418 J. Mayda, supra. note 140 at p. 10 10- 1 6. 
419 J. Mayda, ibid; T. O'Riordan, "The Politics of Sustainability", R. Kerry Turn, ed. in 
Sustainable Environmental Management: PrincIpIes di Practice (London: Bellhaven: 1988) 
at p. 38-42. 
420 F. Halter, supra, note 373 at p. 10; T. Panayotou, supro. note 3 82 at p. 13. 
domestic and other non point sources through education and awareness programs.4" 
C. TARGE~ING ASSISTANCE FOR EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT 
While the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development did not 
dedicate significant attention to the issue of environmental enforcement and compliance, 
one of the key action documents fkom the conference, Agenda 21, endorses a strategy for 
maximiPng cornphance with laws and regdations relating to sustainable development 
which includes enforceable, effective laws, appropriate sanctions, mechanisms to promote 
compliance, institutional capacity and mechanisms for public involvement in the making 
and enforcing of laws on environment and d e v e ~ o ~ r n e n t . ~ ~  
The necessary legislative, policy and institutional reforms, including those prescribed by 
multi-lateral agreements, will be beyond the reach of rnost developing nations without the 
infusion of significant and targeted aid. The alternative mechanisms to provide this 
assistance were exposed intensively during the 1992 United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development and the follow-up meeting of the Parties to the Rio 
Declmation in 1997. A number of significant new institutions and prograrns have 
evolved to address the issue of financing the implementation of sustainable 
- - - 
4" For example, the approach adopted by the Republic of Indonesia. 
'" Agenda 2 1, chapter 8, s q m a  note 2. 
de~elo~rnent.~" Less attention has been paid to targeting hancial and technical 
assistance for effective enfor~ement .~~~ 
It will be important that any technical assistance recognize the political realities in the 
receiving counûies, in other words, assistance programs should be planned for the long 
duration. Part of the process of implementing environmental cornpliance regirnes is the 
processing of legislative, policies and institutional reforms through senior decision makers. 
In any government this takes more tirne than is ever anticipated; for developing nations 
there may be substantially greater delays unless paralle1 assistance is dso king provided to 
improve institutional structures and general administrative ~ornpetence.~~~ 
The longevity of an enforcement program will be substantially increased if technicd 
assistance or aid involves direct involvement and benefit by local officials and 
organizations, and it has been suggested, "missions should provide 'state of the art' 
424 For exarnple the creation of the Global Environment Facility (G.E.F.) and numerous 
other programs within the United Nations institutions, international banks (e-g., World 
Bank, Asian Development Bank), and in some cases new international capacity building 
programs in national governments, (USAID, CIDA). An example of a specific institution 
created to deliver this mandate is the CEC, supra, note 3. 
425 Under the NAAEC, the Parties specifkally commit to promoting education in 
environmental law and further commit to ensure their respective laws not only provide for 
high levels of environmental protection, but also to continue to improve them. The CEC is 
mandated to M e r  cooperation in the development and improvement of these laws through 
exchange of expertise. Supra note 3, articles 3, lO(3). F. Halter, supra. note 373 at p. 22; L. 
F. Duncan and M. A. Santosa, Third international Conference on Emtironrnenlal 
Enforcement, Theme 6: Establishing International Networks, supra, note 4 at p. 32 1-37 1. 
426 J. Mayda, ibid at p. 998. 
information, tailored to the needs and capabilities of the recipient naîion, in a manner that 
builds the recipient nation's ability to solve its own environmental problems.'427 This 
includes sponsoring or fostering in-country nidies, data collection, training, information 
and response networks. For this to occur it has been suggested that it may also be necessary 
to educate the donon and to improve coordination of assistance programs to ensure critical 
needs are targeted, for example, to avoid concentrating assistance only to one component of 
the enforcement framework or the financing of programs which may conflict with the 
overail enforcement ~ t r a t e g y . ~ ~ ~  Sorne bilateral and muhilateral aid programs have 
redirected technical assistance to support lesser developed countries in the design and 
implementation of more effective environmental enforcement and compliance regirnes. For 
example, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), $30 million 
Environmentai Management in Indonesia Project (EMDI) has since 1989 provided 
technicd assistance directed at building the institutional capacity for environmental 
enforcement and ~ o r n ~ l i a n c e . ~ ~ ~  The EMDI project also facilitated a process for 
coordinating the involvement of other foreign assistance programs in providing assistance 
for regulatory and cornpliance programs.430 
427 J. Mayda, ibid at p. 1024. 
423 F. Halter, supra note 373 at p. 26. Efforts have been made in North Arnerica to 
coordinate enforcement capacity building programs sponsored by the CEC, Border XXI 
program and domestic assistance. 
429 The EMDI project has provided advice on institutional development, legislative, 
regulatory and policy development, as well as staff development and training. The Regdatory 
and Cornpliance component provided expertise in environmental law and procedure, 
enforcement and compliance alternatives and program development and integration as welI as 
education and training. 
"O A donor coordinator was facilitated through and funded by Canada and the World Bank. 
Since 1991 the USEPA has b e n  delivering a capacity building prograrn for other nations 
focused on the development and implementation of a h e w o r k  for enforcement and 
co~n~l iance .~~ '  Canada and several European nations, most notably the Netherlands, have 
also contributed substantially to programs for enhanced capacity to enforce environmentai 
Iaws. 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in 1990 organized a meeting of 
international experts on environmental enforcement cuiminating in a fiamework document 
for building institutional capabilities to achieve environmentai ~orn~l iance .~~ '  The focus of 
the UNEP prograrn is the provision of assistance to developing or newly emerging nations 
who have identified the need to initiate a enforcement and compliance program. This has 
been particularly helpfid for those countries who had enacted laws without giving adequate 
attention to necessary conho1 mechanisms or hf&struct~re:"~~ The UNEP training prograrn 
was developed to provide assistance to nations in the process of identification of the basic 
components of an effective regulatory and compliance regime and to identi@ alternatives 
appropriate to their unique political and institutional and economic situation. The program 
is also a direct response to Agenda 21.~" 
43 1 C. Wasserman, supra, note 4 at p. 2 1-26. 
432 R. Glaser, Ministry of Housing, Spacial Planning and the Environment, the Netherlands. 
Opening speech to the Third International Conference on Environmental Enforcement, supra, 
note 4 at p. 2. 
The World Bank has also endorsed the need to direct attention and resources towards 
improved capacity in Iesser developed nations for environmental enforcement and 
compliance and is working with donors and recipient countries in the development of 
country environmental action plans which incorporate a compliance f k ~ n e w o r k . ~ ~ ~  The 
agenda adopted for preparation of the country plans reflects an appreciation for the 
fkmeworks proposed in Chapter III : 
Experience with the plans has shown that there are five main requirements for 
successful policy implementation: a clear legislative fhmework, an appropriate 
administrative structure, technical skills, adequate money, and decentraiized 
re~~onsibility."~ 
Consistent with this strategy, the Bank has extended fuianciai assistance for the 
irnplementation of environmental regdatory and compliance regimes for a number of 
countries .437 
Finally, a nurnber of international and regional networks have been established for the 
purpose of facilitating the exchange of expertise in alternative approaches to enforcement 
434 LMEP, supra, note 2 at p. 8. 
"' The International Bank for Reconstruction and DeveloprnenVThe World Bank, World 
Developrnent Report 1992. Developrnent and the Environmen& (Oxford: University Press, 
1992) at p. 90. 
437 L. F. Duncan and M. A. Santosa, supra, note 36. 
and c ~ r n ~ l i a n c e . ~ ~ ~  These networks have also entianced the capacity for timely response 
to environmental offenses involving transborder activities and impacts. 
438 For example, the International Network of Environmental Enforcement and Cornpliance 
(MECE), the European Network of Enforcement Agencies (IMPEL) and the North 
American Working Group on Environmental Enforcement and Cornpliance Cooperation. 
The nations of the world wiil continue to confkont the task of hding  common solutions 
to issues of global concern. Global warming, ozone depletion, desertification, lost 
biodiversity, are al1 problerns which command major political coumitment to address. Ln 
the process of seeking solutions, pressure will mount to fmd increasingly more innovative 
means to ensure that environment remains an inherent factor in trade expansion and 
development agendas. It will be important in designing new tools not to lose sight of the 
need to put in place and maintain the basic building blocks which will guarantee that 
environmental protection and sustainable development are not forgotten (and that the race 
to the top does not become the race to the bottom.) One of the critical building blocks is 
enforcement. 
Regardless of the issue confronted (e-g., protection of endangered species, ensuring safe 
drinking water) or the mechanism chosen to implement the protection measure (e.g., 
regulations, emissions trading), the same basic underlying issues will be c o h n t e d .  Does 
the political will exist to institute the agreed agenda, and, secondly, how do we measure 
the depth of cornmitment? While many nations continue to espouse support for adherence 
to the "Rule of Law" in the exploitation of the world's resources, in far too many 
instances the means to institute those democratic principles have been found senously 
lac king.439 
439 Observe for example the massive environmental and health impacts fiom raging forest fires 
161 
In Chapter II a series of arguments were made for the indispensable role of enforcement 
in achieving sustainable developrnent, including its inexhicable link to the " Rule of 
Law". If one accepts that precept, it then foilows that a test of tme cornmitment to this 
underlying dernocratic principle is the enactrnent of the necessary powers and 
mechanisms and dedication of the necessary resources to ensure compliance with 
environmental standards, regardless of the instrument chosen to implement them. As was 
previously outlined, this requires the implementation of a basic framework for effective 
enforcement, including the enactment of binding standards. institution of mec hanisms for 
promoting and monitoring compliance and the creation of tools and a strategy to respond 
to non-compliance. Implementation of this framework will be necessary regardless of the 
innovative mechanisms adopted for triggering and enhancing compliance. As has been 
outiined, the ultimate effectiveness of alternative mesures, inclusive of the widely touted 
emissions trading regimes, environmental management systems, or green taxes, is 
premised on a solid regulatory foundation. It will be equally important in devising new 
environmental management tools to maintain the processes enswing transparency and 
participation, in many cases legislated in tandem with regulatory and enforcement 
caused by the failure of the Republic of Indonesia( by their own admission) to enforce forest 
practice laws and the resulting strain behveen the trading nations of ASEAN. See for example" 
The smoke in Asia's eyes", The Economisf as reprinted in the Toronto Globe and Mail, Monday 
October 6, 1997, at p. A21 and "Malaysian forest fires straining relations with ASEAN", Toronto 
GIobe and Mail, Tuesday October 7, 1997 at A 1 1 B in which information is provided to the effect 
that 176 logging companies were under investigation for violation forestry protection laws. A 
November 2, 1997 report found an even greater problem in Brazil with reported 28 % increase in 
burning in the Amazon region. " Arnazon ablaze; Forest fires up despite world pressure", 
Montreal Gazette, November 2, 1997 p. A6. 
processes. 
It is well recognized that investment is attracted to a jurisdiction with a proven record of 
regulatory consistency . The intent of many recent multi-lateral trade agreements is not 
only the expansion of economic opportunities, but concurrent with that the assurance of a 
level playing-field. As has been presented, one means of establishing that arena is an 
effective domestic environmental regulatory and enforcement regime for setting and 
meeting  standard^."^ 
In evaluating the contribution of enforcement to the process of achieving sustainable 
development, it will be important to first Mly comprehend what enforcement actually 
entails. Enforcement must be recognized as more than an end result. Enforceability can 
provide a measuring stick for the viability of any system for implementing environmentai 
protection or sustainable development. It provides the test for consistency and faKness in 
any system of standards or procedures. The sarne issues apply regardless of the intended 
target whether it is ensuring conservation and biodiversity are respected in allotting 
timber concessions, the Iicensing of transport and disposal of hazardous wastes, or an 
approval process for construction of an irrigation dam. Are there consistent and binding 
d e s ?  Are procedures for transparency and participation prescnbed? Where there are 
- - 
440 As previously discussed, the NAAEC, impIemented as a side agreement to the NAFTA, not 
only subjects the Parties thereto to the possibility of imposition of monetary penalties or trade 
sanctions for persistent pattern of failed enforcement of their respective environmental laws, but 
also introduces a forum for the review of any abrogation's of environmental commitments for 
the purpose of gaining an economic advantage. Supra note 3, article 5, 10(6) and Part Five. 
opportunities for the non-cornpliant (i.e. fiee-riders) to gain an &air advantage over 
those who do comply, are processes in place for detection and response ? 
There is nothing mysterious about an effective environmental enforcement regime. 
Perhaps it is this Iack of mystique which fails to evoke substantive interest or support. For 
the rnost part, enforcement involves the basic technical tasks of standard- seniog, 
monitoring, information management, and institutional responses. Market rneasures and 
complex trading schemes and the urgent substantive issues like global warming or rapidly 
disappearing species understandably capture the public attention. Yet without the basic 
foundation of a working enforcement and compliance regime, little red progress c m  be 
made in addressing these bigger problems. 
In the framework presented for instituthg an effective enforcernent regime, it is 
important to recognize that each component is munially reliant. Enforcement action will 
not be possible without legaily-binding standards and mechanisms in place to detect 
violations. The credibility of an enforcernent and compliance regime will be put at nsk 
unless parallel attention is given to the necessary institutional mechanisrns to mitigate 
against conflicting messages and responses. Voluntary compliance and enforcement 
actions demand ptecise and binding standards and clearl y delineated roles for regulated 
industry, government and the Sected community. Still, con- to the views of some 
detractors, this "recipe for success" does make allowances for considerable flexibility and 
innovation. Enforcement is not oniy synonymous with "command and control''. It 
encompasses a broad spectrum of regulatory, market and voluntary initiatives. 
Fuially, in propounding any formula for successful enforcement, allowances must be 
made for the particular coIlStraints confionting developing nations. Nonetheless, a 
cornmon cornmitment to the principle of effective enforcement will be necessary if we 
hope to effect real change. 
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